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A central organizing framework of the voluminous recent literature studying changes in the returns
to skills and the evolution of earnings inequality is what we refer to as the canonical model, which
elegantly and powerfully operationalizes the supply and demand for skills by assuming two distinct
skill groups that perform two different and imperfectly substitutable tasks or produce two imperfectly
substitutable goods. Technology is assumed to take a factor-augmenting form, which, by complementing
either high or low skill workers, can generate skill biased demand shifts. In this paper, we argue that
despite its notable successes, the canonical model is largely silent on a number of central empirical
developments of the last three decades, including: (1) significant declines in real wages of low skill
workers, particularly low skill males; (2) non-monotone changes in wages at different parts of the
earnings distribution during different decades; (3) broad-based increases in employment in high skill
and low skill occupations relative to middle skilled occupations (i.e., job 'polarization'); (4) rapid diffusion
of new technologies that directly substitute capital for labor in tasks previously performed by moderately-
skilled workers; and (5) expanding offshoring opportunities, enabled by technology, which allow foreign
labor to substitute for domestic workers in specific tasks. Motivated by these patterns, we argue that
it is valuable to consider a richer framework for analyzing how recent changes in the earnings and
employment distribution in the United States and other advanced economies are shaped by the interactions
among worker skills, job tasks, evolving technologies, and shifting trading opportunities. We propose
a tractable task-based model in which the assignment of skills to tasks is endogenous and technical
change may involve the substitution of machines for certain tasks previously performed by labor. We
further consider how the evolution of technology in this task-based setting may be endogenized. We
show how such a framework can be used to interpret several central recent trends, and we also suggest















dautor@mit.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The changes in the distribution of earnings and the returns to college over the last several decades in
the U.S. labor market have motivated a large literature investigating the relationship between technical
change and wages. The starting point of this literature is the observation that the return to skills, for
example as measured by the relative wages of college graduate workers to high school graduates, has
shown a tendency to increase over multiple decades despite the large secular increase in the relative
supply of college educated workers. This suggests that concurrent with the increase in the supply of
skills, there has been an increase in the (relative) demand for skills. Following Tinbergen’s pioneering
(1974, 1975) work, the relative demand for skills is then linked to technology, and in particular to the
skill bias of technical change. This perspective emphasizes that the return to skills (and to college)
is determined by a race between the increase in the supply of skills in the labor market and technical
change, which is assumed to be skill biased, in the sense that improvements in technology naturally
increase the demand for more “skilled” workers, among them, college graduates (relative to non-college
workers).
These ideas are elegantly and powerfully operationalized by what we refer to as the canonical model,
which includes two-skill groups performing two distinct and imperfectly substitutable occupations (or
producing two imperfectly substitutable goods).1 Technology is assumed to take a factor-augmenting
form, and thus complements either high or low skill workers. Changes in this factor-augmenting
technology then capture skill biased technical change.2 The canonical model is not only tractable and
conceptually attractive, but it has also proved to be empirically quite successful. Katz and Murphy
(1992), Autor Katz and Krueger (1998), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008), and Carneiro and Lee
(2009), among others, show that it successfully accounts for several salient changes in the distribution
of earnings in the United States. Katz, Loveman, and Blanchﬂower (1995), Davis (1992) and Murphy,
Riddell and Romer (1998), Card and Lemieux (2001a), Fitzenberger and Kohn (2006), Atkinson
(2008) among others, show that the model also does a good job of capturing major cross-country
diﬀerences among advanced nations. Goldin and Katz (2008) show that the model, with some minor
modiﬁcations, provides a good account for the changes in the returns to schooling and the demand
for skills throughout the entire twentieth century in the United States.
In this paper, we argue that despite the canonical model’s conceptual virtues and substantial
empirical applicability, a satisfactory analysis of modern labor markets and recent empirical trends
1In many cases, this model is extended to more than two skill groups (see., e.g., Card and Lemieux, 2001, and
Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle, 2004. Atkinson (2008) refers to the Tinbergen education-race model as the Textbook Model.
2In addition to Tinbergen (1974, 1975), see Welch (1973), Freeman (1976), Katz and Murphy (1992) and Autor, Katz
and Krueger (1998), and Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) on the canonical model. Acemoglu (2002a) develops several
implications of the canonical model and relates these to other approaches to the relationship between technology and
skill premia.
1necessitates a richer framework. We emphasize two shortcomings of the canonical model. First, the
canonical model is made tractable in part because it does not include a meaningful role for “tasks,”
or equivalently, it imposes a one-to-one mapping between skills and tasks. A task is a unit of work
activity that produces output (goods and services). In contrast, a skill is a worker’s endowment of
capabilities for performing various tasks. Workers apply their skill endowments to tasks in exchange
for wages, and skills applied to tasks produce output. The distinction between skills and tasks becomes
particularly relevant when workers of a given skill level can perform a variety of tasks and change the
set of tasks that they perform in response to changes in labor market conditions and technology. We
argue that a systematic understanding of recent labor market trends, and more generally of the impact
of technology on employment and earnings, requires a framework that factors in such changes in the
allocation of skills to tasks. In particular, we suggest, following Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003),
that recent technological developments have enabled information and communication technologies to
either directly perform or permit the oﬀshoring of a subset of the core job tasks previously performed
by middle skill workers, thus causing a substantial change in the returns to certain types of skills and
a measurable shift in the assignment of skills to tasks.
Second, the canonical model treats technology as exogenous and typically assumes that technical
change is, by its nature, skill biased. The evidence, however, suggests that the extent of skill bias
of technical change has varied over time and across countries. Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), for
example, suggest that there was an acceleration in skill bias in the 1980s and 1990s.3 Goldin and
Katz (1998) present evidence that manufacturing technologies were skill complementary in the early
twentieth century, but may have been skill substituting prior to that time. The available evidence
suggests that in the nineteenth century, technical change often replaced–rather than complemented–
skilled artisans. The artisan shop was replaced by the factory and later by interchangeable parts and
the assembly line, and products previously manufactured by skilled artisans started to be produced in
factories by workers with relatively few skills (e.g., Hounshell, 195, James and Skinner, 1985, Mokyr,
1991, Goldin and Katz, 2008). Acemoglu (1998, 2002a) suggested that the endogenous response of
technology to labor market conditions may account for several such patterns and signiﬁcantly enriches
the canonical model.
To build the case for a richer model of skill demands and wage determination, we ﬁrst provide
an overview of key labor market developments in the United States over the last ﬁve decades, and
in less detail, across European Union economies. This overview enables us to highlight both why
the canonical model provides an excellent starting point for any analysis of the returns to skills,
but also why it falls short of providing an entirely satisfactory framework for understanding several
3Later analyses have not conﬁrmed this conclusion, however. See Goldin and Katz (2008).
2noteworthy patterns. In particular, in addition to the well-known evolution of the college premium
and the overall earnings inequality in the United States, we show that (1) low skill (particularly low
skill male) workers have experienced signiﬁcant real earnings declines over the last four decades; (2)
there have been notably non-monotone changes in earnings levels across the earnings distribution over
the last two decades (sometimes referred to as wage ‘polarization’), even as the overall ‘return to skill’
as measured by the college/high-school earnings gap has monotonically increased; (3) these changes
in wage levels and the distribution of wages have been accompanied by systematic, non-monotone
shifts in the composition of employment across occupations, with rapid simultaneous growth of both
high-education, high-wage occupations and low-education, low-wage occupations in the United States
and the European Union; (4) this ‘polarization’ of employment does not merely reﬂect a change in
the composition of skills available in the labor market but also a change in the allocation of skill
groups across occupations–and, in fact, the explanatory power of occupation in accounting for wage
diﬀerences across workers has signiﬁcantly increased over time; (5) recent technological developments
and recent trends in oﬀshoring and outsourcing appear to have directly replaced workers in certain
occupations and tasks. We next provide a brief overview of the canonical model, demonstrate its
empirical success in accounting for several major features of the evolving wage distribution, and
highlight the key labor market developments about which the canonical model is either silent or at
odds with the data.
Having argued that the canonical model is insuﬃciently nuanced to account for the rich rela-
tionships among skills, tasks and technologies that are the focus of this chapter, we then propose a
task-based framework for analyzing the allocation of skills to tasks and for studying the eﬀect of new
technologies on the labor market and their impact on the distribution of earnings. We further show
how technology can be endogenized in this framework.4
The framework we propose consists of a continuum of tasks, which together produce a unique ﬁnal
good. We assume that there are three types of skills–low, medium and high–and each worker is
endowed with one of these types of skills.5 Workers have diﬀerent comparative advantages, a feature
that make our model similar to Ricardian trade models. Given the prices of (the services of) diﬀerent
tasks and the wages for diﬀerent types of skills in the market, ﬁrms (equivalently, workers) choose
the optimal allocation of skills to tasks. Technical change in this framework can change both the
4Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009b) and Autor and Dorn (2010) provide related
task-based models. The model we propose builds most directly on Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and is also closely
related to Costinot and Vogel (forthcoming), who provide a more general approach to the assignment of skills tasks
and derive the implications of their approach for the eﬀect of technical change on wage inequality. Similar models have
also been developed and used in the trade literature, particularly in the context of outsourcing and oﬀshoring. See, for
example, Feenstra and Hanson (2005), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), Rodriguez-Clare and Ramondo (2010),
and Acemoglu, Gancia and Zilibotti (2010).
5We also oﬀer an extension to the model in which workers have multiple skills and choose the allocation of their skills
across tasks given a ﬁxed time budget.
3productivity of diﬀerent types of workers in all tasks (in a manner parallel to factor-augmenting
technical change in the canonical model) and also in speciﬁc tasks (thus changing their comparative
advantage). Importantly, the model allows for new technologies that may directly replace workers in
certain tasks. More generally, it treats skills (embodied in labor), technologies (embodied in capital),
and trade or oﬀshoring as oﬀering competing inputs for accomplishing various tasks. Thus, which
input (labor, capital, or foreign inputs supplied via trade) is applied in equilibrium to accomplish
which tasks depends in a rich but intuitive manner on cost and comparative advantage.
We show that even though this framework allows for an endogenous allocation of skills to tasks and
a richer interaction between technology and wages than the canonical model, it is tractable. Relative
wages of high to medium and medium to low skill workers are determined by relative supplies and
task allocations. The canonical model is in fact a special case of this more general task-based model,
and hence the model generates similar responses to changes in relative supplies and factor-augmenting
technical change. Nevertheless, there are also richer implications because of the endogenously changing
allocation of skills to tasks. Notably, while factor-augmenting technical progress always increases
all wages in the canonical model, it can reduce the wages of certain groups in this more general
model. Moreover, other forms of technical change, in particular the introduction of new technologies
replacing workers in certain tasks, have richer but still intuitive eﬀects on the earnings distribution
and employment patterns
We then show how this framework can be enriched by endogenizing the supply of skills and technol-
ogy. We ﬁnally show how the mechanisms proposed by this framework suggest new ways of analyzing
the data and provide some preliminary empirical evidence motivated by this approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section, Section 2, provides an overview of
labor market trends, with an emphasis on changes in the earnings distribution, in the real wages of
diﬀerent demographic groups, in the distribution of employment by occupation, and in the allocation
of skill groups to job tasks. Section 3 provides a brief recap of the canonical model, which has become
the natural starting point of most analyses of recent labor market trends, and explains why several
of the patterns highlighted in Section 2 are challenging for the canonical model and suggest the need
to move beyond this framework. Section 4 presents a tractable task-based model of the labor market,
which we then use to reinterpret the patterns discussed in Section 2. Section 5 provides a ﬁrst look at
the evolution of real wages by demographic groups in the U.S. labor market through the lens of the
framework developed in Section 4. Section 6 concludes with a brief summary and with several areas
for future research suggested by our paper. Two appendices contain additional details on the sources
and the construction of the data used in the text and some further theoretical arguments.
42 An Overview of Labor Market Trends
This section provides an overview of trends in education, wage levels, wage distribution, and occupa-
tional composition in the US labor market over the last ﬁve decades, and also oﬀers some comparisons
with labor market developments in European Union economies. Our objective is not to provide a
comprehensive account of labor market developments but to highlight those that we view as most
relevant for understanding the changing structure of the supply and demand for skills.6 We focus on
changes in earnings levels and earnings inequality not only because of the intrinsic importance of the
topic but also because the evolution of the wage distribution provides information on how the market
values of diﬀerent types of skills have changed over time.
2 . 1 Ab r i e fo v e r v i e wo fd a t as o u r c e s
To summarize the basic changes in the US wage structure over the last ﬁve decades, we draw on four
large and representative household data sources: the March Current Population Survey (March CPS),
the combined Current Population Survey May and Outgoing Rotation Group samples (May/ORG
CPS), the Census of Populations (Census), and the American Community Survey (ACS).7 We describe
these sources brieﬂy here and provide additional details on the construction of samples in the Data
Appendix. The March Annual Demographic Files of the Current Population Survey oﬀer the longest
high-frequency data series enumerating labor force participation and earnings in the US economy.
These data provide reasonably comparable measures of the prior year’s annual earnings, weeks worked,
and hours worked per week for more than four decades. We use the March ﬁles from 1964 to 2009
(covering earnings from 1963 to 2008) to form a sample of real weekly earnings for workers ages 16 to
64 who participate in the labor force on a full-time, full-year (FTFY) basis, deﬁned as working 35-plus
hours per week and 40-plus weeks per year.
We complement the March FTFY series with data on hourly wages of all current labor force
participants using May CPS samples for 1973 through 1978 and CPS Outgoing Rotation Group samples
for 1979 through 2009 (CPS May/ORG). From these sources, we construct hourly wage data for
all wage and salary workers employed during the CPS sample survey reference week. Unlike the
retrospective annual earnings data in the March CPS, the May/ORG data provide point-in-time
6A more detailed account of several other trends related to labor market inequality and more extensive references to
the literature are provided in Katz and Autor (1999). Goldin and Katz (2008) provide an authoritative account of the
evolution of labor market inequality and the supply and de m a n df o re d u c a t i o ni nt h eU n i t e dS t a t e sf r o mt h ed a w no f
the twentieth century to the mid 2000s. Card and DiNardo (2002) oﬀer a skeptical perspective on the literature linking
trends in wage inequality to the evolution of skill demands. See also the recent overview papers by Autor, Katz and
Kearney (2008) and Lemieux (2008).
7The ACS is the successor to the Census’ long form questionnaire, which collected detailed demographic data from
a subset of Census respondents. The long form was retired after the 2000 Census. The ACS is conducted annually and
c u r r e n t l yc o n t a i n sa5p e r c e n tp o p u l a t i o ns a m p l e .T h eA C Ss u r v e yq u e s t i o n sc l o s e l yf o l l o wt h eC e n s u sl o n gf o r m .
5measures of usual hourly or weekly earnings. We use CPS sampling weights for all calculations.8
As detailed in Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005) and Lemieux (2006b), both the March and
May/ORG CPS surveys have limitations that reduce their consistency over the ﬁfty year period
studied. The March CPS data are not ideal for analyzing the hourly wage distribution since they lack
a point-in-time wage measure and thus hourly wages must be computed by dividing annual earnings
by the product of weeks worked last year and usual weekly hours last year. Estimates of hours worked
last year from the March CPS appear to be noisy, and moreover, data on usual weekly hours last
year are not available prior to the 1976 March CPS. The May/ORG samples provide more accurate
measures of the hourly wage distribution (particularly for hourly workers) but cover a shorter time
period than the March CPS. Both the March and May/ORG CPS samples have undergone various
changes in processing procedures over several decades that aﬀect the top-coding of high earnings, the
ﬂagging of earning imputations, and the algorithms used for allocating earnings to individuals who do
not answer earnings questions in the survey. These changes create challenges in producing consistent
data series over time, and we have tried to account for them to the extent possible.9
To analyze levels and changes in occupational structure within and across detailed demographic
groups, we exploit the 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census of Populations and the 2008 Ameri-
can Community Survey (ACS). Because these data sources provide substantially larger samples than
either the March or May/ORG surveys, they are better suited for a ﬁne-grained analysis of changing
occupational employment patterns within detailed demographic groups.10 The earnings and employ-
ment questions in the Census and ACS ﬁles are similar to those in the March CPS and similarly
oﬀer retrospective measures of annual earnings and labor force participation that we use to calculate
implied weekly or hourly earnings
8Beginning with DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), many studies (e.g., Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998; Lemieux,
2006b; and Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008) have further weighted samples by workers’ hours and weeks worked when
computing sample statistics. Statistics calculated using these weights therefore correspond to the average paid hour of
work rather than the wage paid to the average worker. We break with this tradition here because we view the conceptual
object of interest for this chapter to be the distribution of prices (or wages) that workers’ skills command in the labor
market rather than the interaction between these prices and workers’ realized choice of hours. To the extent that we
have experimented with the weighting scheme, we have found that the choice of weights–hours versus bodies–has only
second-order eﬀects on our substantive results. Thus, our use of the bodies rather hours-weighting scheme is of notional
but not substantive importance.
9The major redesign of the earnings questions in the CPS ORG in 1994 led to a substantial rise in non-response to
these questions as well as other potential consistency issues that are only imperfectly addressed by our processing of
the data. For example, the earnings non-response rate in the CPS ORG increased from 15.3 percent in 1993 to 23.3
percent in the last quarter of 1995 (the ﬁrst quarter in which allocation ﬂags are available in the redesigned survey), and
reached 31 percent by 2001 (Hirsch and Schumacher 2004). The contemporaneous rise in the earnings imputation rate in
the March survey was comparatively small. This redesign may be an important factor in accounting for the signiﬁcant
discrepancies in trends in inequality trends in the May/ORG and March samples beginning in 1994 (see Lemieux, 2006b;
and Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008).
10The Census samples comprise 1 percent of the U.S. population in 1960 and 1970, and 5 percent of the population in
1980, 1990, and 2000.
62.2 The college/high-school wage premium
Motivated by the canonical relative supply-demand demand framework discussed in the Introduction
and developed further in Section 3, a natural starting point for our discussion is to consider the evolu-
tion of the wage premium paid to ‘skills’ in the labor market. A useful, though coarse, approximation
is to consider a labor market consisting of two types of workers, “skilled” and “unskilled,” and iden-
tify the ﬁrst group with college graduates and the second with high school graduates. Under these
assumptions, the college premium–that is, the relative wage of college versus high-school educated
workers–can be viewed as a summary measure of the market’s valuation of skills.
Figure 1 plots the composition-adjusted log college/high-school weekly wage premium in the US
labor market for years 1963 through 2008 for full-time, full-year workers. This composition adjustment
holds constant the relative employment shares of demographic group, as deﬁned by gender, educa-
tion, and potential experience, across all years of the sample. In particular, we ﬁrst compute mean
(predicted) log real weekly wages in each year for 40 sex-education-experience groups. Mean wages
for broader groups shown in the ﬁgures are then calculated as ﬁxed-weighted averages of the relevant
sub-group means (using the average share of total hours worked for each group over 1963 to 2008 as
weights). This adjustment ensures that the estimated college premium is not mechanically aﬀected
by shifts in the experience, gender composition, or average level of completed schooling within the
broader categories of college and high-school graduates.11
Three features of Figure 1 merit attention. First, following three decades of increase, the college
premium stood at 68 points in 2008, a high water mark for the full sample period. A college premium
of 68 log points implies that earnings of the average college graduate in 2008 exceeded those of the
average high school graduate by 97 percent (i.e., exp(068)−1 ' 0974). Taking a longer perspective,
Goldin and Katz (2008) show that the college premium in 2005 was at its highest level since 1915, the
earliest year for which representative data are available–and as Figure 1 makes clear, the premium
rose further thereafter. Second, the past three decades notwithstanding, the college premium has not
always trended upward. Figure 1 shows a notable decline in the college premium between 1971 and
1978. Goldin and Margo (1992) and Goldin and Katz (2008) also document a substantial compression
of the college premium during the decade of the 1940s. A third fact highlighted by the ﬁgure is that
the college premium hit an inﬂection point at the end of the 1970s. This premium trended downward
throughout the 1970s, before reversing course at the end of the decade. This reversal of the trend in
11T h e s e4 0g r o u p sc o n s i s to fﬁve education categories (less than high schoo l ,h i g hs c h o o lg r a d u a t e ,s o m ec o l l e g e ,f o u r -
year college degree, post-college schooling), four potential experience levels (0 to 9 years, 10 to 19 years, 20 to 29 years,
and 30 to 39 years), and two genders. Full-time, full-year workers are those who work at least 40 weeks per year and at
least 35 hours per week. The construction of the relative wage series follows Katz and Murphy (1992), Katz and Autor
(1999), and Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008). We follow closely the conventions set by these prior studies to facilitate
comparisons. The Data Appendix provides further details.
7the college premium is critical to our understanding of the operation of supply and demand in the
determination of between-group wage inequality.
The college premium, as a summary measure of the market price of skills, is aﬀected by, among
other things, the relative supply of skills. Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the relative supply of college
versus non-college educated workers. We use a standard measure of college/non-college relative supply
calculated in “eﬃciency units” to adjust for changes in labor force composition.12 From the end of
World War II to the late 1970s, the relative supply of college workers rose robustly and steadily, with
each cohort of workers entering the labor market boasting a proportionately higher rate of college
education than the cohorts immediately preceding. Moreover, the increasing relative supply of college
workers accelerated in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Reversing this acceleration, the rate of growth
of college workers declined after 1982. The ﬁrst panel of Figure 3 shows that this slowdown is due to
a sharp deceleration in the relative supply of young college graduate males–reﬂecting in decline in
their rate of college completion–commencing in 1975, followed by a milder decline among women in
the 1980s. The second panel of Figure 3 conﬁrms this observation by documenting that the relative
supply of experienced college graduate males and females (i.e., those with 20 to 29 years of potential
experience) does not show a similar decline until two decades later.
What accounts for the deceleration of college relative supply in the 1980s? As discussed by Card
and Lemieux (2001b), four factors seem particularly relevant. First, the Vietnam War artiﬁcially
boosted college attendance during the late 1960s and early 1970s because males could in many cases
defer military service by enrolling in post-secondary schooling. This deferral motive likely contributed
to the acceleration of the relative supply of skills during the 1960s seen in Figure 2. When the Vietnam
War ended in the early 1970s, college enrollment rates dropped sharply, particularly among males,
leading to a decline in college completion rates half a decade later.
Second, the college premium declined sharply during the 1970s as shown in Figure 1. This downturn
in relative college earnings likely discouraged high school graduates from enrolling in college. Indeed,
Richard Freeman famously argued in his 1976 book, The Overeducated American, that the supply of
college-educated workers in the United States had so far outstripped demand in the 1970s that the
net social return to sending more high school graduates to college was negative.13
Third, the large baby boom cohorts that entered the labor market in the 1960s and 1970s were both
more educated and more numerous than exiting cohorts, leading to a rapid increase in the average
12This series is also composition adjusted to correctly weight the changing gender and experience composition of college
and non-college labor supply. Our construction of this ﬁgure follows Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) Figure 4b, and
adds three subsequent years of data. See the Data Appendix for details.
13One should not blame the entire rise in U.S. earnings inequality on Richard Freeman, however. His book correctly
predicted that the college glut was temporary, and that demand would subsequently surpass the growth of supply, leading
to a rebound in the college premium.
8educational stock of the labor force. Cohorts born after 1964 were signiﬁcantly smaller, and thus
their impact on the overall educational stock of the labor force was also smaller. Had these cohorts
continued the earlier trend in college-going behavior, their entry would still not have raised the college
share of the workforce as rapidly as did earlier cohorts (see, e.g., Ellwood, 2002).
Finally, and most importantly, while the female college completion rate rebounded from its post-
Vietnam era after 1980, the male college completion rate has never returned to its pre-1975 trajectory,
as shown earlier in Figure 3. While the data in that ﬁgure only cover the period from 1963 forward,
the slow growth of college attainment is even more striking when placed against a longer historical
backdrop. Between 1940 and 1980, the fraction of young adults ages 25 to 34 who had completed a four-
year college degree at the start of each decade increased three-fold among both sexes, from 5 percent
and 7 percent among females and males, respectively, in 1940 to 20 percent and 27 percent, respectively,
in 1980. After 1980, however, this trajectory shifted diﬀerentially by sex. College completion among
young adult females slowed in the 1980s but then rebounded in the subsequent two decades. Male
college attainment, by contrast, peaked with the cohort that was age 25—34 in 1980. Even in 2008, it
remained below its 1980 level. Cumulatively, these trends inverted the male to female gap in college
completion among young adults. This gap stood at positive 7 percentage points in 1980 and negative
7 percentage points in 2008.
2.3 Real wage levels by skill group
A limitation of the college/high-school wage premium as a measure of the market value of skill is that
it necessarily omits information on real wage levels. Stated diﬀerently, a rising college wage premium
is consistent with a rising real college wage, a falling real high-school wage, or both. Movements in
real as well as relative wages will prove crucial to our interpretation of the data. As shown formally
in Section 3, canonical models used to analyze the college premium robustly predict that demand
shifts favoring skilled workers will both raise the skill premium and boost the real earnings of all skill
groups (e.g., college and high school workers). This prediction appears strikingly at odds with the
data, as ﬁrst reported by Katz and Murphy (1992), and shown in the two panels of Figure 4. This
ﬁgure plots the evolution of real log earnings by gender and education level for the same samples of
full-time, full-year workers used above. Each series is normalized at zero in the starting year of 1963,
with subsequent values corresponding to the log change in earnings for each group relative to its 1963
level. All values are deﬂated using the Personal Consumption Expenditure Deﬂator, produced by the
US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
In the ﬁrst decade of the sample period, years 1963 through 1973, real wages rose steeply and
relatively uniformly for both genders and all education groups. Log wage growth in this ten year
9period averaged approximately 20 percent. Following the ﬁrst oil shock in 1973, wage levels fell
sharply initially, and then stagnated for the remainder of the decade. Notably, this stagnation was also
relatively uniform among genders and education groups. In 1980, wage stagnation gave way to three
decades of rising inequality between education groups, accompanied by low overall rates of earnings
growth–particularly among males. Real wages rose for highly educated workers, particularly workers
with a post-college education, and fell steeply for less educated workers, particularly less educated
males. Table 1 provides many additional details on the evolution of real wage levels by sex, education,
and experience groups during this period.
Alongside these overall trends, Figure 4 reveals three key facts about the evolution of earnings by
education groups that are not evident from the earlier plots of the college/high-school wage premium.
First, a sizable share of the increase in college relative to non-college wages in 1980 forward is explained
by rising wages of post-college workers, i.e., those with post-baccalaureate degrees. Real earnings for
this group increased steeply and nearly continuously from at least the early 1980s to present. By
contrast, earnings growth among those with exactly a four-year degree was much more modest. For
example, real wages of males with exactly a four-year degree rose 13 log points between 1979 and
2008, substantially less than they rose in only the ﬁrst decade of the sample.
A second fact highlighted by Figure 4 is that a major proximate cause of the growing college/high-
school earnings gap is not steeply rising college wages but rapidly declining wages for the less
educated–especially less educated males. Real earnings of males with less than a four year college
degree fell steeply between 1979 and 1992, by 12 log points for high school and some-college males,
and by 20 log points for high school dropouts. Low-skill male wages modestly rebounded between
1993 and 2003 but never reached their 1980 levels. For females, the picture is qualitatively similar
but the slopes are more favorable. While wages for low-skill males were falling in the 1980s, wages for
low-skill females were largely stagnant; when low-skill males wages increased modestly in the 1990s,
low-skill female wages rose approximately twice as fast.
A potential concern with the interpretation of these results is that the measured real wage declines
of less-educated workers mask an increase in their total compensation after accounting for the rising
value of employer provided non-wage beneﬁts such as healthcare, vacation and sick time. Careful
analysis of representative, wage and fringe beneﬁts data by Pierce (2001 and forthcoming) casts doubt
on this notion, however. Monetizing the value of these beneﬁts does not substantially alter the
conclusion that real compensation for low-skilled workers fell in the 1980s. Further, Pierce shows that
total compensation–that is, the sum of wages and in-kind beneﬁts–for high-skilled workers rose by
more than their wages, both in absolute terms and relative to compensation for low-skilled workers.14
14The estimated falls in real wages would also be overstated if the price deﬂator overestimated the rate of inﬂation and
thus underestimated real wage growth. Our real wage series are deﬂated using the Personal Consumption Expenditure
10A complementary analysis of the distribution of non-wage beneﬁts–including safe working conditions
and daytime versus night and weekend hours–by Hamermesh (1999) also reaches similar conclusions.
Hamermesh demonstrates that trends in the inequality of wages understate the growth in full earnings
inequality (i.e., absent compensating diﬀerentials) and, moreover, that accounting for changes in the
distribution of non-wage amenities augments rather than oﬀsets changes in the inequality of wages.
It is therefore unlikely that consideration of non-wage beneﬁts changes the conclusion that low-skill
workers experienced signiﬁcant declines in their real earnings levels during the 1980s and early 1990s.15
The third key fact evident from Figure 4 is that while the earnings gaps between some-college, high
school graduate, and high school dropout workers expanded sharply in the 1980s, these gaps stabilized
thereafter. In particular, the wages of high school dropouts, high school graduates, and those with
some college moved largely in parallel from the early 1990s forward.
The net eﬀect of these three trends–rising college and post-college wages, stagnant and falling real
wages for those without a four-year college degree, and the stabilization of the wage gaps among some-
college, high school graduates, and high school dropout workers–is that the wage returns to schooling
have become increasingly convex in years of education, particularly for males, as also emphasized by
Lemieux (2006b). Figure 5 shows this ‘convexiﬁcation’ by plotting the estimated gradient relating
years of educational attainment to log hourly wages in three representative years of our sample: 1973,
1989, and 2009. To construct this ﬁgure, we regress log hourly earnings in each year on a quadratic
in years of completed schooling and a quartic in potential experience. Models that pool males and
females also include a female main eﬀect and an interaction between the female dummy and a quartic
in (potential) experience.16 In each ﬁgure, the predicted log earnings of a worker with seven years of
Deﬂator produced by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The PCE generally shows a lower rate of inﬂation than
the more commonly used Consumer Price Index (CPI), which was in turn amended following the Boskin report in 1996
to provide a more conservative estimate of inﬂation (Boskin et al., 1996).
15Moretti (2008) presents evidence that the aggregate increase in wage inequality is greater than the rise in cost-of-
living-adjusted wage inequality since the aggregate increase does not account for the fact that high-wage college workers
are increasingly clustered in metropolitan areas with high and rising housing prices. These facts are surely correct, but
their economic interpretation requires some care. As emphasized above, our interest in wage inequality is not as a measure
of welfare inequality (for which wages are generally a poor measure), but as a measure of the relative productivities of
diﬀerent groups of workers and the market price of skills. What is relevant for this purpose is the producer wage–which
does not require cost of living adjustments provided that each region produces at least some traded (i.e., traded within
the United States) goods and wages and regional labor markets reﬂect the value of marginal products of diﬀerent groups.
O n em i g h tw i s ht ou s et h econsumer wage to approximate welfare inequality–that is the producer wage adjusted for cost
of living. It is unclear whether housing costs should be fully netted out of the consumer wage, however. If high housing
prices reﬂect the amenities oﬀered by an area, these higher prices are not a pure cost. If higher prices instead reﬂect
congestion costs that workers must bear to gain access to high-wages jobs, then they are a cost not an amenity. These
alternative explanations are not mutually exclusive and are diﬃcult to empirically distinguish since many high education
cities (e.g., New York, San Francisco, Boston) feature both high housing costs and locational amenities diﬀerentially
valued by high-wage workers (see Black, Kolesnikova and Taylor, 2009).
16Years of schooling correspond to one of eight values, ranging from 7 to 18 years. Due to the substantial revamping of
the CPS educational attainment question in 1992, these eight values are the maximum consistent set available throughout
the sample period.
11completed schooling and 25 years of potential experience in 1973 is normalized to zero. The slope of
the 1973 locus then traces out the implied log earnings gain for each additional year of schooling in
1973, up to 18 years. The loci for 1989 and 2009 are constructed similarly, and they are also normalized
relative to the intercept in 1973. This implies that upward or downward shifts in the intercepts of
these loci correspond to real changes in log hourly earnings, whereas rotations of the loci indicate
changes in the education-wage gradient.17
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 5 shows that the education-wage gradient for males was roughly log linear
in years of schooling in 1973, with a slope approximately equal to 0.07 (that is, 7 log points of hourly
earnings per year of schooling). Between 1973 and 1989, the slope steepened while the intercept fell
by a sizable 10 log points. The crossing point of the two series at 16 years of schooling implies that
earnings for workers with less than a four-year college degree fell between 1973 and 1989, consistent
with the real wage plots in Figure 4. The third locus, corresponding to 2009, suggests two further
changes in wage structure in the intervening two decades: earnings rose modestly for low education
workers, seen in the higher 2009 intercept (though still below the 1973 level); and the locus relating
education to earnings became strikingly convex. Whereas the 1989 and 2009 loci are roughly parallel
for educational levels below 12, the 2009 locus is substantially steeper above this level. Indeed at
18 years of schooling, it lies 16 log points above the 1989 locus. Thus, the return to schooling ﬁrst
steepened and then ‘convexiﬁed’ between 1973 and 2009.
Panel B of Figure 5 repeats this estimation for females. The convexiﬁcation of the return to
education is equally apparent for females, but the downward shift in the intercept is minimal. These
diﬀerences by gender are, of course, consistent with the diﬀerential evolution of wages by education
group and gender shown in Figure 4.
As a check to ensure that these patterns are not driven by the choice of functional form, Figure
6 repeats the estimation, in this case replacing the education quartic with a full set of education
dummies. While the ﬁtted values from this model are naturally less smooth than in the quadratic
speciﬁcation, the qualitative story is quite similar: between 1973 and 1989, the education-wage locus
intercept falls while the slope steepens. The 1989 curve crosses the 1973 curve at 18 years of schooling.
Two decades later, the education-wage curve lies atop the 1989 curve at low years of schooling, while
it is both steeper and more convex for completed schooling beyond the 12th year.
2.4 Overall wage inequality
Our discussion so far summarizes the evolution of real and relative wages by education, gender and
experience groups. It does not convey the full set of changes in the wage distribution, however, since
17We use the CPS May/ORG series for this analysis rather than the March data so as to focus on hourly wages, as is
the convention for Mincerian wage regressions.
12there remains substantial wage dispersion within as well as between skill groups. To ﬁll in this picture,
we summarize changes throughout the entire earnings distribution. In particular, we show the trends in
real wages by earnings percentile, focusing on the 5th through 95th percentiles of the wage distribution.
We impose this range restriction because the CPS and Census samples are unlikely to provide accurate
measures of earnings at the highest and lowest percentiles. High percentiles are unreliable both
because high earnings values are truncated in public use samples and, more importantly, because non-
response and under-reporting are particularly severe among high income households.18 Conversely,
wage earnings in the lower percentiles imply levels of consumption that lie substantially below observed
levels (Meyer and Sullivan, 2008). This disparity reﬂects a combination of measurement error, under-
reporting, and transfer income among low wage individuals.
Figure 7 plots the evolution of real log weekly wages of full-time, full-year workers at the 10th,
50th and 90th percentiles of the earnings distribution from 1963 through 2008. In each panel, the
value of the 90th, 50th and 10th percentiles are normalized to zero in the start year of 1963, with
subsequent data points measuring log changes from this initial level. Many features of Figure 7 closely
correspond to the education by gender real wages series depicted in Figure 4. For both genders, the
10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the distribution rise rapidly and relatively evenly between 1963
and 1973. After 1973, the 10th and 50th percentiles continue to stagnate relatively uniformly for the
remainder of the decade. The 90th percentile of the distribution pulls away modestly from the median
throughout the decade of the 1970s, echoing the rise in earnings among post-college workers in that
decade.19
Reﬂecting the uneven distribution of wage gains by education group, growth in real earnings among
males occurs among high earners but is not broadly shared. This is most evident by comparing the male
90th percentile with the median. The 90th percentile rose steeply and almost monotonically between
1979 and 2007. By contrast, the male median was essentially ﬂat from 1980 to 1994. Simultaneously,
the male 10th percentile fell steeply (paralleling the trajectory of high school dropout wages). When
the male median began to rise during the mid 1990s (a period of rapid productivity and earnings
growth in the US economy), the male 10th percentile rose concurrently and slightly more rapidly.
This partly reversed the substantial expansion of lower-tail inequality that unfolded during the 1980s.
18Pioneering analyses of harmonized U.S. income tax data by Piketty and Saez (2003) demonstrate that the increases
in upper-tail inequality found in public use data sources and documented below are vastly more pronounced above the
90th percentile than below it, though the qualitative patterns are similar. Burkhauser, Feng and Larrimore (2008) oﬀer
techniques for improving imputations of top incomes in public use CPS data sources.
19Whether the measured rise in inequality in the 1970s is reliable has been a subject of some debate because this
increase is detected in the Census and CPS March series but not in the contemporaneous May CPS series (cf. Katz and
Murphy, 1992; Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993; Katz and Autor, 1999; Lemieux, 2006b; and Autor, Katz and Kearney
2008). Recent evidence appears to support the veracity of the 1970s inequality increase. Using harmonized income tax
data, Piketty and Saez (2003) ﬁnd that inequality, measured by the top decile wage share, started to rise steeply in the
early 1970s.
13The wage picture for females is qualitatively similar, but the steeper slopes again show that the
females have fared better than males during this period. As with males, the growth of wage inequality
is asymmetric above and below the median. The female 90/50 rises nearly continuously from the late
1970s forward. By contrast, the female 50/10 expands rapidly during the 1980s, plateaus through the
mid-1990s, and then compresses modestly thereafter.
Because Figure 7 depicts wage trends for full-time, full-year workers, it tends to obscure wage
developments lower in earnings distribution, where a larger share of workers is part-time or part-year.
To capture these developments, we apply the May/ORG CPS log hourly wage samples for years 1973
through 2009 (i.e., all available years) to plot in Figure 8 corresponding trends in real indexed hourly
wages of all employed workers at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles. Due to the relatively small size
of the May sample, we pool three years of data at each point to increase precision (e.g., plotted year
1974 uses data from 1973, 1974 and 1975).
The additional fact revealed by Figure 8 is that downward movements at the 10th percentile are
far more pronounced in the hourly wage distribution than in the full-time weekly data. For example,
the weekly data show no decline in the female 10th percentile between 1979 and 1986, whereas the
hourly wage data show a fall of 10 log points in this period.20 Similarly, the modest closing of the
50/10 earnings gap after 1995 seen in the full-time, full-year sample is revealed as a sharp reversal
of the 1980s expansion of 50/10 wage inequality in the full hourly distribution. Thus, the monotone
expansion in the 1980s of wage inequality in the top and bottom halves of the distribution became
notably non-monotone during the subsequent two decades.21
The contrast between these two periods of wage structure changes–one monotone, the other non-
20The more pronounced fall at the female tenth percentile in the distribution that includes hourly wages reﬂects the
fact that a substantial fraction (13 percent) of all female hours worked in 1979 were paid at or below the federal minimum
wage (Autor, Manning and Smith, 2009), the real value of which declined by 30 log points over the subsequent 9 years.
It is clear that the decline in the minimum wage contributed to the expansion of the female lower tail in the 1980s,
though the share of the expansion attributable to the minimum is the subject of some debate (see DiNardo, Fortin and
Lemieux, 1996; Lee, 1999; Teulings, 2003; Autor, Manning and Smith, 2009). It is noteworthy that in the decade in
which the minimum wage was falling, female real wage levels (measured by the mean or median) and female upper-tail
inequality (measured by the 90/50) rose more rapidly than for males. This suggests that many forces were operative on
the female wage structure in this decade alongside the minimum wage.
21An additional discrepancy between the weekly and hourly samples is that the rise in the 90th wage percentile for
males is less continuous and persistent in the hourly samples; indeed the male 90th percentile appears to plateau after
2003 in the May/ORG data but not in the March data. A potential explanation for the discrepancy is that the earnings
data collected by the March CPS uses a broader earnings construct, and in particular is more likely to capture bonus and
performance. Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent (2009) ﬁnd that the incidence of bonus pay rose substantially during the
1990s and potentially contributed to rising dispersion of annual earnings. An alternative explanation for the March versus
May/ORG discrepancy is deterioration in data quality. Lemieux (2006b) oﬀers some limited evidence that the quality
of the March CPS earnings data declined in the 1990s, which could explain why the March and May/ORG CPS diverge
in this decade. Conversely, Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) hypothesize that the sharp rise in earnings non-response in
the May/ORG CPS following the 1994 survey redesign may have reduced the consistency of the wage series (especially
given the sharp rise in earnings non-response following the redesign). This hypothesis would also explain why the onset
of the discrepancy is in 1994.
14monotone–is shown in stark relief in Figure 9, which plots the change at each percentile of the hourly
wage distribution relative to the corresponding median during two distinct eras, 1974—1988 and 1988—
2008. The monotonicity of wage structure changes during the ﬁrst period, 1974—1988, is immediately
evident for both genders.22 Equally apparent is the U-shaped (or ‘polarized’) growth of wages by
percentile in the 1988—2008 period, which is particularly evident for males. The steep gradient of
wage changes above the median is nearly parallel, however, for these two time intervals. Thus, the
key diﬀerence between the two periods lies in the evolution of the lower-tail, which is falling steeply
in the 1980s and rising disproportionately at lower percentiles thereafter.23
Though the decade of the 2000s is not separately plotted in Figure 9, it bears note that the U-
shaped growth of hourly wages is most pronounced during the period of 1988 through 1999. For the
1999 through 2007 interval, the May/ORG data show a pattern of wage growth that is roughly ﬂat
across the ﬁrst seven deciles of the distribution, and then upwardly sloped in the three highest deciles,
though the slope is shallower than in either of the prior two decades.
These divergent trends in upper-tail, median and lower-tail earnings are of substantial signiﬁcance
for our discussion, and we consider their causes carefully below. Most notable is the ‘polarization’
of wage growth–by which we mean the simultaneous growth of high and low wages relative to the
middle–which is not readily interpretable in the canonical two factor model. This polarization is
made more noteworthy by the fact that the return to skill, measured by the college/high-school wage
premium, rose monotonically throughout this period, as did inequality above the median of the wage
distribution. These discrepancies between the monotone rise of skill prices and the non-monotone
evolution of inequality again underscore the potential utility of a richer model of wage determination.
Substantial changes in wage inequality over the last several decades are not unique to the U.S.,
though neither is the U.S. a representative case. Summarizing the literature circa ten years ago,
Katz and Autor (1999) report that most industrialized economies experienced a compression of skill
diﬀerentials and wage inequality during the 1970s, and a modest to large rise in diﬀerentials in the
1980s, with the greatest increase seen in the U.S. and U.K. Drawing on more recent and consistent
data for 19 OECD countries, Atkinson reports that there was at least a ﬁve percent increase in either
upper-tail or lower-tail inequality between 1980 and 2005 in 16 countries, and a rise of at least 5 percent
in both tails in seven countries. More generally, Atkinson notes that substantial rises in upper-tail
inequality are widespread across OECD countries, whereas movements in the lower-tail vary more in
22The larger expansion at low percentiles for females than males is likely attributable to the falling bite of the minimum
wage during the 1980s (Lee, 1999 and Teulings, 2003). Autor, Manning and Smith (2009) report that 12 to 13 percent
of females were paid the minimum wage in 1979.
23A second important diﬀerence between the two periods, visible in earlier ﬁgures, is that there is signiﬁcantly greater
wage growth at virtually all wage percentiles in the 1990s than in the 1980s, reﬂecting the sharp rise in productivity in
the latter decade. This contrast is not evident in Figure 9 since the wage change at the median is normalized to zero in
both periods.
15sign, magnitude, and timing.24
2.5 Job Polarization
Accompanying the wage polarization depicted in Figures 7 through 9 is a marked pattern of job po-
larization in the United States and across the European Union–by which we mean the simultaneous
growth of the share of employment in high-skill, high-wage occupations and low-skill, low-wage occu-
pations. We begin by depicting this broad pattern (ﬁrst noted in Acemoglu, 1999) using aggregate
U.S. data. We then link the polarization of employment to the ‘routinization’ hypothesis proposed by
Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003, ‘ALM’ hereafter), and we explore detailed changes in occupational
structure across the U.S. and OECD in light of that framework.
Changes in occupational structure
Figure 10 provides a starting point for the discussion of job polarization by plotting the change
over each of the last three decades in the share of U.S. employment accounted for by 318 detailed
occupations encompassing all of U.S. employment. These occupations are ranked on the x-axis by
their skill level from lowest to highest, where an occupation’s skill rank is approximated by the average
wage of workers in the occupation in 1980.25 The y-axis of the ﬁgure corresponds to the change in
employment at each occupational percentile as a share of total U.S. employment during the decade.
Since the sum of shares must equal one in each decade, the change in these shares across decades
must total zero. Thus, the height at each skill percentile measures the growth in each occupation’s
employment relative to the whole.26
The ﬁgure reveals a pronounced ‘twisting’ of the distribution of employment across occupations
over three decades, which becomes more pronounced in each period. During the 1980s (1979-1989),
employment growth by occupation was nearly monotone in occupational skill; occupations below the
median skill level declined as a share of employment and occupations above the median increased.
In the subsequent decade, this monotone relationship gave way to a distinct pattern of polarization.
Relative employment growth was most rapid at high percentiles, but it was also modestly positive
at low percentiles (10th percentile and down) and modestly negative at intermediate percentiles.
24Dustmann, Ludsteck and Schönberg (2009) and Antonczyk, DeLeire and Fitzenberger (2010) provide detailed analysis
of wage polarization in Germany. Though Germany experienced a substantial increase in wage inequality during the
1980s and 1990s, the pattern of lower-tail movements was distinct from the U.S. Overturning earlier work, Boudarbat,
Lemieux, and Riddell (2010) present new evidence that the returns to education for Canadian men increased substantially
between 1980 and 2005.
25Ranking occupations by mean years of completed schooling instead yields very similar results. Moreover, occupational
rankings by either measure are quite stable over time. Thus, the conclusions are not highly sensitive to the skill measure
or the choice of base year for skill ranking (here, 1980).
26These series are smoothed using a locally weighted regression to reduce jumpiness when measuring employment shifts
at such a narrow level of aggregation. Due to smoothing, the sum of share changes may not integrate precisely to zero.
16In contrast, during the most recent decade for which Census/ACS data are available, 1999-2007,
employment growth was heavily concentrated among the lowest three deciles of occupations. In deciles
four through nine, the change in employment shares was negative, while in the highest decile, almost no
change is evident. Thus, the disproportionate growth of low-education, low-wage occupations became
evident in the 1990s and accelerated thereafter.27
This pattern of employment polarization is not unique to the United States, as is shown in Figure
11. This ﬁgure, based on Table 1 of Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009a), depicts the change in the
share of overall employment accounted for by three sets of occupations grouped according to average
wage level–low, medium, and high–in each of 16 European Union countries during the period 1993
through 2006.28 Employment polarization is pronounced across the E.U. during this period. In all 16
countries depicted, middle-wage occupations decline as a share of employment. The largest declines
occur in France and Austria (by 12 and 14 percentage points, respectively) and the smallest occurs
in Portugal (1 percentage point). The unweighted average decline in middle-skill employment across
countries is 8 percentage points.
The declining share of middle-wage occupations is oﬀs e tb yg r o w t hi nh i g ha n dl o w - w a g eo c c u -
pations. In 13 of 16 countries, high-wage occupations increased their share of employment, with an
average gain of 6 percentage points, while low-wage occupations grew as a share of employment in
11 of 16 countries. Notably, in all 16 countries, low-wage occupations increased in size relative to
middle-wage occupations, with a mean gain in employment in low relative to middle wage occupations
of 10 percentage points.
For comparison, Figure 11 also plots the unweighted average change in the share of national
employment in high, middle, and low-wage occupations in all 16 European Union economies alongside
a similar set of occupational shift measures for the United States. Job polarization appears to be at
least as pronounced in the European Union as in the United States
Figure 12 studies the speciﬁc changes in occupational structure that drive job polarization in the
United States. The ﬁgure plots percentage point changes in employment levels by decade for the years
1979—2009 for 10 major occupational groups encompassing all of U.S. non-agricultural employment.
We use the May/ORG data so as to include the two recession years of 2007 through 2009 (separately
plotted).29
27Despite this apparent monotonicity, employment growth in one low-skill job category–service occupations–was
rapid in the 1980s (Autor and Dorn, 2010). This growth is hardly visible in Figure 10, however, because these occupations
were still quite small.
28T h ec h o i c eo ft i m ep e r i o df o rt h i sﬁgure reﬂects the availability of consistent Harmonized European Labor Force data.
The ranking of occupations by wage/skill level is assumed identical across countries, as necessitated by data limitations.
Goos, Manning and Salomons report that the ranking of occupations by wage level is highly comparable across EU
countries.
29The patterns are very similar, however, if we instead use the Census/ACS data, which cover the period 1959 through
17The 10 occupations summarized in Figure 12 divide neatly into three groups. On the left-hand side
of the ﬁgure are managerial, professional and technical occupations. These are highly-educated and
highly-paid occupations. Between one-quarter and two-thirds of workers in these occupations had at
least a four-year college degree in 1979, with the lowest college share in technical occupations and the
highest in professional occupations (Table 4). Employment growth in these occupations was robust
throughout the three decades plotted. Even in the deep recession of 2007 through 2009, during which
the number of employed U.S. workers fell by approximately 8 million, these occupations experienced
almost no absolute decline in employment.
The subsequent four columns display employment growth in ‘middle-skill occupations,’ which
we deﬁne as comprising sales; oﬃce and administrative support; production, craft and repair; and
operator, fabricator and laborer. The ﬁrst two of this group of four are middle-skilled, white-collar
occupations that are disproportionately held by women with a high school degree or some college.
The latter two categories are a mixture of middle and low-skilled blue-collar occupations that are
disproportionately held by males with a high school degree or lower education. While the headcount
in these occupations rose in each decadal interval between 1979-2007, their growth rate lagged the
economy-wide average and, moreover, generally slowed across decades. These occupations were hit
particularly hard during the 2007—2009 recession, with absolute declines in employment ranging from
7 to 17 percent.
T h el a s tt h r e ec o l u m n so fF i g u r e1 2d e p i c te m p l o y m e n tt r e n d si ns e r v i c eo c c u p a t i o n s ,w h i c h
are deﬁned by the Census Bureau as jobs that involve helping, caring for or assisting others. The
majority of workers in service occupations have no post-secondary education, and average hourly
wages in service occupations are in most cases below the other seven occupations categories. Despite
their low educational requirements and low pay, employment growth in service occupations has been
relatively rapid over the past three decades. Indeed, Autor and Dorn (2010) show that rising service
occupation employment accounts almost entirely for the upward twist of the lower tail of Figure 10
during the 1990s and 2000s. All three broad categories of service occupations–protective service, food
preparation and cleaning services, and personal care–expanded by double digits in the both the 1990s
and the pre-recession years of the past decade (1999—2007). Protective service and food preparation
and cleaning occupations expanded even more rapidly during the 1980s. Notably, even during the
recessionary years of 2007 through 2009, employment growth in service occupations was modestly
positive–more so, in fact, than the three high-skilled occupations that have also fared comparatively
well (professional, managerial and technical occupations). As shown in Table 3, the employment share
of service occupations was essentially ﬂat between 1959 and 1979. Thus, their rapid growth since 1980,
2007 (see Table 3 for comparison).
18marks a sharp trend reversal.
Cumulatively, these two trends–rapid employment growth in both high and low-education jobs–
have substantially reduced the share of employment accounted for by “middle skill” jobs. In 1979,
the four middle skill occupations–sales, oﬃce and administrative workers, production workers, and
operatives–accounted for 57.3 percent of employment. In 2007, this number was 48.6 percent, and in
2009, it was 45.7 percent. One can quantify the consistency of this trend by correlating the growth
rates of these occupation groups across multiple decades. The correlation between occupational growth
rates in 1979-1989 and 1989-1999 is 0.53, and for the decades of 1989-1999 and 1999-2009, it is 0.74.
Remarkably, the correlation between occupational growth rates during 1999-2007 and 2007-2009–that
is, prior to and during the current recession–is 0.76.30
Sources of job polarization: The ‘routinization’ hypothesis
Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) link job polarization to rapid improvements in the productivity–
and declines in the real price–of information and communications technologies and, more broadly,
symbolic processing devices. ALM take these advances as exogenous, though our framework below
shows how they can also be understood as partly endogenous responses to changes in the supplies of
skills. ALM also emphasize that to understand the impact of these technical changes on the labor
market, is necessary to study the ‘tasks content’ of diﬀerent occupations. As already mentioned in the
Introduction, and as we elaborate further below, a task is a unit of work activity that produces output
(goods and services), and we think of workers as allocating their skills to diﬀerent tasks depending on
labor market prices.
While the rapid technological progress in information and communications technology that mo-
tivates the ALM paper is evident to anyone who owns a television, uses a mobile phone, drives a
car, or takes a photograph, its magnitude is nevertheless stunning. Nordhaus (2007) estimates that
the real cost of performing a standardized set of computational tasks–where cost is expressed in
constant dollars or measured relative to the labor cost of performing the same calculations–fell by
at least 1.7 trillion-fold between 1850 and 2006, with the bulk of this decline occurring in the last
three decades. Of course, the progress of computing was almost negligible from 1850 until the era
of electromechanical computing (i.e., using relays as digital switches) at the outset of the twentieth
century. Progress accelerated during World War II, when vacuum tubes replaced relays. Then, when
microprocessors became widely available in the 1970s, the rate of change increased discontinuously.
Nordhaus estimates that between 1980 and 2006, the real cost of performing a standardized set of
computations fell by 60 to 75 percent annually. Processing tasks that were unthinkably expensive
30These correlations are weighted by occupations’ mean employment shares during the three decade interval.
1930 years ago–such as searching the full text of a university’s library for a single quotation–became
trivially cheap.
The rapid, secular price decline in the real cost of symbolic processing creates enormous economic
incentives for employers to substitute information technology for expensive labor in performing work-
place tasks. Simultaneously, it creates signiﬁcant advantages for workers whose skills become increas-
ingly productive as the price of computing falls. Although computers are now ubiquitous, they do not
do everything. Computers–or, more precisely, symbolic processors that execute stored instructions–
have a very speciﬁc set of capabilities and limitations. Ultimately, their ability to accomplish a task is
dependent upon the ability of a programmer to write a set of procedures or rules that appropriately
direct the machine at each possible contingency. For a task to be autonomously performed by a com-
p u t e r ,i tm u s tb es u ﬃciently well deﬁn e d( i . e . ,s c r i p t e d )t h a tam a c h i n el a c k i n gﬂexibility or judgment
can execute the task successfully by following the steps set down by the programmer. Accordingly,
computers and computer-controlled equipment are highly productive and reliable at performing the
tasks that programmers can script–and relatively inept at everything else. Following, ALM, we refer
to these procedural, rule-based activities to which computers are currently well-suited as ‘routine’ (or
‘codiﬁable’) tasks. By routine, we do not mean mundane (e.g., washing dishes) but rather suﬃciently
well understood that the task can be fully speciﬁed as a series of instructions to be executed by a
machine (e.g., adding a column of numbers).
Routine tasks are characteristic of many middle-skilled cognitive and manual jobs, such as book-
keeping, clerical work, repetitive production, and monitoring jobs. Because the core job tasks of
these occupations follow precise, well-understood procedures, they can be (and increasingly are) cod-
iﬁed in computer software and performed by machines (or, alternatively, are sent electronically–
‘outsourced’–to foreign worksites). The substantial declines in clerical and administrative occupa-
tions depicted in Figure 12 are likely a consequence of the falling price of machine substitutes for these
tasks. It is important to observe, however, that computerization has not reduced the economic value
or prevalence of the tasks that were performed by workers in these occupations–quite the opposite.31
But tasks that primarily involve organizing, storing, retrieving, and manipulating information–most
common in middle-skilled administrative, clerical and production tasks–are increasingly codiﬁed in
computer software and performed by machines.32 Simultaneously, these technological advances have
dramatically lowered the cost of oﬀshoring information-based tasks to foreign worksites (Blinder, 2007;
Jensen and Kletzer, 2008 and forthcoming; Blinder and Krueger, 2009; Oldesnki, 2009).33
31Of course, computerization has reduced the value of these tasks at the margin (reﬂecting their now negligible price).
32Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) oﬀer ﬁrm-level econometric analysis of the process of automation of routine job
tasks and attendant changes in work organization and job skill demands. Autor, Levy and Murnane (2002) and Levy
and Murnane (2004) provide case study evidence and in-depth discussion.
33While many codiﬁable tasks are suitable for either automation or oﬀshoring (e.g., bill processing services), not all
20This process of automation and oﬀshoring of routine tasks, in turn, raises relative demand for
workers who can perform complementary non-routine tasks. In particular, ALM argue that non-
routine tasks can be roughly subdivided into two major categories: abstract tasks and manual tasks
(two categories that lie at opposite ends of the occupational-skill distribution). Abstract tasks are
activities that require problem-solving, intuition, persuasion, and creativity. These tasks are charac-
teristic of professional, managerial, technical and creative occupations, such as law, medicine, science,
engineering, design, and management, among many others. Workers who are most adept in these tasks
typically have high levels of education and analytical capability. ALM further argue that these analyt-
ical tasks are complementary to computer technology, because analytic, problem-solving, and creative
tasks typically draw heavily on information as an input. When the price of accessing, organizing, and
manipulating information falls, abstract tasks are complemented.
Non-routine manual tasks are activities that require situational adaptability, visual and language
recognition, and in-person interactions. Driving a truck through city traﬃc, preparing a meal, in-
stalling a carpet, or mowing a lawn are all activities that are intensive in non-routine manual tasks.
As these examples suggest, non-routine manual tasks demand workers who are physically adept and,
in some cases, able to communicate ﬂuently in spoken language. In general, they require little in
the way of formal education, however, at least relative to a labor market where most workers have
completed high school.
This latter observation applies with particular force to service occupations, as stressed by Autor
and Dorn (2009, 2010). Jobs such as food preparation and serving, cleaning and janitorial work,
grounds cleaning and maintenance, in-person health assistance by home health aides, and numerous
jobs in security and protective services, are highly intensive in non-routine manual tasks. The core
tasks of these jobs demand interpersonal and environmental adaptability. These are precisely the job
tasks that are challenging to automate because they require a level of adaptability and responsiveness
to unscripted interactions–both with the environment and with individuals–which at present exceed
the limits of machine-competency, though this will surely change in the long run. It also bears note
that these same job tasks are infeasible to oﬀs h o r ei nm a n yc a s e sb e c a u s et h e ym u s tb ep r o d u c e d
and performed in person (again, for now). Yet, these jobs generally do not require formal education
beyond a high school degree or, in most cases, extensive training.34
oﬀshorable tasks are routine in our terminology. For example, call center operations, data entry, and journeyman pro-
gramming tasks are readily oﬀshorable since they are information-based tasks that require little face-to-face interactions
among suppliers and demanders. These tasks are not generally fully codiﬁable at present, however.
34Pissarides and Ngai (2007), Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2007), Weiss (2008) and Reshef (2009) also provide theoretical
perspectives on the rise of service employment in industrialized economies, focusing on unbalanced productivity growth
as in the classic analysis by Baumol (1967). The model in Autor and Dorn (2010) is similarly rooted in unbalanced
growth, though Autor and Dron focus on unbalanced productivity growth across tasks rather than sectors. See also
Manning (2004) and Mazzolari and Ragusa (2008) for models of rising service demand based on substitution of market
21In summary, the displacement of jobs that are intensive in routine tasks may have contributed to
the polarization of employment by reducing job opportunities in middle-skilled clerical, administrative,
production and operative occupations. Jobs that are intensive in either abstract or non-routine manual
tasks, however, are much less susceptible to this process due to the demand for problem-solving,
judgment and creativity in the former case, and ﬂexibility and physical adaptability in the latter. Since
these jobs are found at opposite ends of the occupational skill spectrum–in professional, managerial
and technical occupations on the one hand, and in service and laborer occupations on the other–
the consequence may be a partial “hollowing out” or polarization of employment opportunities. We
formalize these ideas in the model below.35
Linking occupational changes to job tasks
Drawing on this task-based conceptual framework, we now explore changes in occupational structure in
greater detail. To make empirical progress on the analysis of job tasks, we must be able to characterize
the ‘task content’ of jobs. In their original study of the relationship between technological change and
job tasks, ALM used the U.S. Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) to
impute to workers the task measures associated with their occupations. This imputation approach
has the virtue of distilling the several hundred occupational titles found in conventional data sources
into a relatively small number of task dimensions. A drawback, however, is that both the DOT, and its
successor, the Occupational Information Network (O*NET), contain numerous potential task scales,
and it is rarely obvious which measure (if any) best represents a given task construct. Indeed, the
DOT contains 44 separate scales, and the O*NET contains 400, which exceeds the number of unique
Census occupations codes found in the CPS, Census, and ACS data sets.36
To skirt these limitations and maximize transparency in this chapter, we proxy for job tasks here
by directly working with Census and CPS occupational categories rather than imputing task data
to these categories. To keep categories manageable and self-explanatory, we use broad occupational
groupings, either at the level of the ten categories as in Figure 12–ranging from Managers to Personal
Care workers–or even more broadly, at the level of the four clusters that are suggested by the ﬁgure:
versus household provision of domestic services.
35The literature studying the relationship between technological change, job tasks, skill demands, employment po-
larization, and wage structure shifts is young but expanding rapidly. In addition to papers cited above, see especially
Spitz-Oener (2006), Antonczyk, Fitzenberger and Leuschner (2009), Dustmann, Ludsteck and Schönberg (2009), Firpo,
Fortin and Lemieux (2009), Ikenaga (2009), Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen (2009), Black and Spitz-Oener (2010),
and Ikenaga and Kambayashi (2010).
36By contrast, task measures collected at the level of the individual worker oﬀer much additional insight. Such measures
are available in the German IAB/BIBB survey used by DiNardo and Pischke (1997), Spitz-Oener (2006), Dustmann,
Ludsteck and Schonberg (2009), and Gathmann and Schönberg (2010) among others. Autor and Handel (2009) also use
individual task measures collected by the PDII survey instrument and demonstrate that these measures oﬀer substantial
additional explanatory power for wages relative to occupation level data from O*NET.
22(1) managerial, professional and technical occupations; (2) sales, clerical and administrative support
occupations; (3) production, craft, repair, and operative occupations; and (4) service occupations.
Though these categories are coarse, we believe they map logically into the broad task clusters identiﬁed
by the conceptual framework. Broadly speaking, managerial, professional, and technical occupations
are specialized in abstract, non-routine cognitive tasks; clerical, administrative and sales occupations
are specialized in routine cognitive tasks; production and operative occupations are specialized in
routine manual tasks; and service occupations are specialized in non-routine manual tasks.
Before turning to the occupational analysis, we use data from both the DOT and O*NET to
verify that our heuristic characterization of the major task diﬀerences across these broad occupational
groups is supported. The task measures from the DOT, presented in Table 5, were constructed by
ALM (2003) and have subsequently been widely used in the literature.37 The companion set of O*NET
task measures in the table are new to this chapter. Since the O*NET is the successor data source to
the DOT, the O*NET based measures are potentially preferable. However, the O*NET’s large set of
loosely deﬁned and weakly diﬀerentiated scales present challenges for researchers.38
Consistent with expectations, Table 5a shows that the intensity of use of non-routine cognitive
(‘abstract’) tasks is highest in professional, technical and managerial occupations, and lowest in service
and laborer occupations. To interpret the magnitudes of these diﬀerences, note that all task measures
in Table 5 are standardized to have a mean of zero and a cross-occupation standard deviation of one
in 1980 across the 318 consistently coded occupations used in our classiﬁcation.39 Thus, the means
of -0.67 and 1.22, respectively, for service occupations and professional, managerial and technical
occupations indicate approximately a two standard deviation (-067 − 122 ' 2) average gap in
abstract task intensity between these occupational groups. The subsequent two rows of the table
present a set of O*NET-based measures of abstract task input. Our O*NET task measures also
make a further distinction between non-routine cognitive analytic tasks (e.g., mathematics and formal
37The ALM DOT task measures were subsequently used by Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006, 2008), Goos and Manning
(2007), Peri and Sparber (2008), Goos, Manning and Salomons (2010), and Autor and Dorn (2009, 2010). Many additional
details of the construction of the DOT task measures are found in ALM (2003) and Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008).
Borghans, ter Weel, and Weinberg (2008) also use task measures from the DOT, some of which overlap ALM and others
of which do not.
38We employ a sparse set of O*NET scales that, in our view, most closely accord with the task constructs identiﬁed by
the conceptual model (see the Data Appendix). Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009), and Goos, Manning and Salomons
(2009b) use O*NET task measures to construct measures of routine and abstract tasks, as well as oﬀshorability. The
set of tasks used by both papers is highly inclusive, and in our view creates substantial overlap among categories. For
example, several task measures used in the oﬀshorability index created by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) are also
logical candidates for inclusion in the routine category (e.g., controlling machines or processes); and several of the items
used as indices of non-oﬀshorability are also logical candidates for the abstract/non-routine cognitive category (e.g.,
thinking creatively). Our oﬀshorability measure starts from the measure constructed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux
(2009), but drops nine of its 16 O*NET scales that may substantially overlap the routine and, more signiﬁcantly, non-
routine cognitive categories. The Data Appendix provides further details on our measures.
39The statistics in the table are employment-weighted means and standard deviations across the detailed occupations
within each larger category. The count of detailed occupations in each category is provided in the table.
23reasoning) and non-routine cognitive interpersonal and managerial tasks. The qualitative pattern of
task intensity across the occupation groups is comparable for the two measures and also similar to the
DOT non-routine cognitive (abstract) task measure.
The next three rows of the table present measures of routine task intensity. Distinct from abstract
tasks, routine task intensity is non-monotone in occupational ‘skill’ level, with the highest levels of
routine-intensity found in clerical/sales occupations and production/operative occupations. Using the
O*NET, we make a further distinction between routine cognitive and routine manual tasks. Logically,
routine cognitive tasks are most intensively used in clerical and sales occupations and routine manual
tasks are most prevalent in production and operative positions. Finally, non-routine manual tasks–
those requiring ﬂexibility and physical adaptability–are most intensively used in production, operative
and service positions.
Blinder (2007) and Blinder and Krueger (2008) have argued that essentially any job that does
not need to be done in person (i.e., face-to-face) can ultimately be outsourced, regardless of whether
its primary tasks are abstract, routine, or manual. Table 5 also provides a measure of occupational
oﬀshorability. This measure codes the degree to which occupations require face-to-face interactions,
demand on-site presence (e.g., constructing a house), or involve providing in-person care to oth-
ers.40 As with routine tasks, oﬀshorability is highest in clerical/sales occupations. Unlike the routine
measure, however, oﬀshorability is considerably higher in professional, managerial and technical oc-
cupations than in either production/operative or in service occupations, reﬂecting the fact that many
white-collar job tasks primarily involve generating, processing, or providing information, and so can
potentially be performed from any location.
Table 5b summarizes task intensity by education group and sex. Logically, both abstract and
manual tasks are monotone in educational level, the former increasing in education and the latter
decreasing. Routine cognitive tasks are strongly non-monotone in education, however. They are used
most intensively by high school and some-college workers, and are substantially higher on average
among women than men (reﬂecting female specialization in administrative and clerical occupations).
Routine manual tasks, in turn, are substantially higher among males, reﬂecting male specialization in
blue collar production and operative occupations.
Notably, the oﬀshorability index indicates that the jobs performed by women are on average
substantially more suitable to oﬀshoring than those performed by males. Moreover, the educational
pattern of oﬀshorability also diﬀers by sex. high school females are most concentrated in potentially
oﬀshorable tasks, while for males, college graduates are most often found in oﬀshorable tasks. This
pattern reﬂects the fact that among non-college workers, females are more likely than males to hold
40Tasks with these attributes score low on our oﬀshorability scale.
24clerical, administrative and sales occupations (which are relatively oﬀshorable), while males are far
more likely than females to hold blue collar jobs (which are relatively non-oﬀshorable).
These patterns of specialization appear broadly consistent with our characterization of the task
content of broad occupational categories: professional, managerial and technical occupations are spe-
cialized in non-routine cognitive tasks; clerical and sales occupations are specialized in routine cognitive
tasks; production and operative occupations are specialized in routine manual tasks; and service oc-
cupations are specialized in non-routine manual tasks. Although all occupations combine elements
from each task category, and moreover, task intensity varies among detailed occupations within these
broad groups (and among workers in these occupations), we suspect that these categories capture the
central tendencies of the data and also provide a useful mnemonic for parsing the evolution of job task
structure.
The evolution of job tasks
In Figures 13 and 14, we study the evolution of employment among these four broad task/occupation
categories, starting with overall shifts in employment across occupational categories between 1959 and
2007 (Figure 13). Most evident in this ﬁgure is the secular growth of professional, managerial, and
technical occupations and the secular decline of production and operative positions. Among males,
blue-collar and production and operative employment fell by nearly 20 percentage points between 1959
and 1979 (from 54.0 to 36.1 percent). The two categories that absorbed this slack are professional,
managerial and technical occupations and, after 1979, service occupations. Figure 14 further shows
that service occupation employment rose rapidly among males with less than a four-year college degree
after 1979, and most rapidly in the current decade. In net, the share of males employed in service
occupations rose by 4.4 percentage points between 1979 and 2007 while the share in professional,
technical and managerial occupations rose by 5.3 percentage points (Table 3).
This simultaneous growth of high and low-skill occupations is particularly striking in light of the
substantial increases in male educational attainment in this time interval. Indeed, the fraction of
employed males who had high school or lower education fell from 57 to 42 percent between 1979
and 2007, while the fraction with at least a four-year college degree rose from 20 to 28 percent.41
Simultaneously, the fraction of males at each education level employed in the highest occupational
category (professional, managerial and technical occupations) declined while the fraction of males
at each educational level in the lowest occupational category (service occupations) rose. Thus, the
‘polarization’ of male employment occurs despite of rather than because of changes in male educational
attainment.
41Males with some-college make up the residual category. These statistics are calculated using our Census and ACS
data.
25Arguably, some part of the movement of high education workers into traditionally low-skill jobs is
arguably mechanical; as the share of workers with college education rises, it is inevitable that a subset
will take traditionally non-college jobs. Nevertheless, we strongly suspect that the decline of middle-
skill jobs–particularly blue collar occupations–has fostered a movement of male employment in both
high-wage, high-skill and low-wage, low-skill occupations. Our model below provides a formal rationale
for the migration of skill groups across occupational categories in response to declining comparative
advantage (e.g., due to task-replacing technologies), and makes further predictions about the extent
to which these occupational movements will be primary downward or upward.
The pattern of occupational polarization seen for males is equally evident for females. However,
the net eﬀect of declining middle-skill employment on the female occupational distribution is distinct.
Movement of females out of middle-skill jobs is driven by a secular decline in female employment in
production and operative positions (evident in every decade of our sample) and a sharp trend reversal
in female employment in sales, clerical and administrative occupations–which were historically the
dominant female occupational category. After hovering at 41 to 43 percent of female employment
during 1959 through 1979, the share of females employed in clerical, administrative support and sales
occupations fell in each of the next three decades, with a net decline of 8 percentage points.42
As with males, the slack at the middle was taken up by the tails. Female employment in pro-
fessional, technical and managerial occupations rose in every decade of the sample, increasing by
6.4 percentage points between 1959 and 1979 and by another 13.0 percentage points between 1979
and 2007. However, female employment in low-education service occupations rose rapidly starting
in the 1990s. Between 1959 and 1989, the share of females employed in service occupations declined
from 23.2 to 17.2 percent. It then rebounded. Between 1989 and 2007, female employment in ser-
vice occupations rose by 4.2 percentage points (25 percent) while female employment in clerical and
administrative support occupations waned.
Thus, the polarization of employment seen in aggregate in Figure 12 is detected for both sexes,
and proximately accounted for by three factors: (1) rising employment in non-routine cognitive task-
intensive professional, managerial, and technical occupations; (2) rising employment in non-routine
manual task-intensive service occupations; and (3) declining employment in middle-skill, routine task-
intensive employment in clerical, administrative support and production occupations. Although em-
ployment in middle-skill jobs has fallen by considerably more among females than males between 1979
and 2007 (15.6 versus 9.6 percentage points), the oﬀsetting employment gains have diﬀered sharply.
For females, 85 percent of the decline in middle-skill jobs was oﬀset by a rise in professional, man-
agerial and technical occupations. For males, this share is 55 percent, with the remaining 45 percent
42This decline is fully accounted for by falling employment in clerical and administrative rather than sales occupations.
26accruing to service occupations.
These patterns of occupational change by gender and education mirror the patterns of wage changes
depicted in Figure 4. Male wage growth was sluggish or negative after 1979 for males without at least
a four-year college degree. This pattern is mirrored in the downward occupational movement of non-
college males seen in Figure 14. Conversely, real wage growth for females was modestly to strongly
positive for all education groups except high school dropouts after 1979. Paralleling these wage trends,
female occupational composition has shifted favorably; as middle-skill occupations have contracted,
females with a high school degree or greater have found employment both in low-skill services and in
high-skill professional, managerial and technical occupations.
Cross-national evidence on employment polarization
Figures 15 and 16 explore the extent to which the contemporaneous polarization of European em-
ployment, documented in Figure 13, has stemmed from a similar set of occupational changes. Here,
we use data from Eurostat to construct non-agricultural occupational employment for ten European
economies for years 1992 through 2008. The eight occupational categories provided by Eurostat are
coarser than the ten broad categories used above for the U.S. in Figure 14, and hence we further ag-
gregate the U.S. data for comparison. We focus on workers under age 40 since changes in occupational
composition are typically ﬁrst evident among workers closer to the start of their careers (Autor and
Dorn, 2009).43
Figure 15 reveals a striking commonality in employment trends in the U.S. and E.U.: high-
education occupations (managers, professionals, and technicians) are growing; middle-education oc-
cupations (clerks, crafts and trades, and operators) and assemblers are declining; and low-education
service occupations (which unfortunately are aggregated with sales occupations in Eurostat) are also
growing. The employment-weighted correlation of U.S. and E.U. changes in employment shares by
occupation is 0.63.
Since the E.U. averages presented in Figure 15 potentially mask considerable cross-country het-
erogeneity, we present in Figure 16 individual changes in employment shares for all ten countries.
We aggregate to the level of four occupational categories as in Figures 13 and 14, though there are
some diﬀerences in aggregation required to accommodate the categories reported by Eurostat.44 In
43The Eurostat data are based on the harmonized European Labor Force survey, and are available for download at
www.eurostat.org. The ten countries included in the series in the paper are Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The Eurostat data include many additional EU
countries, but not on a consistent basis for this full time interval. The series presented in Figure 15 are weighted averages
of occupational shares across these ten countries, where weights are proportional to the average share of EU employment
in each country over the sample period. The Eurostat data for young workers include workers ages 15-39 while the U.S.
sample includes workers ages 16-39.
44While our four categories above group sales occupations with clerical occupations, the Eurostat data aggregate sales
with service occupations, and this aggregation carries over to our ﬁgure. Elementary occupations, as deﬁned by Eurostat,
27virtually every countries, and for both sexes, we see a decline in clerical, craft, trade, and operative
occupations–our two middle-skill categories–and a rise in both professional, technical and manage-
rial occupations and in service and elementary occupations. Indeed, for female workers, there are no
exceptions to this pattern, while for males, only three countries (Portugal, Spain and Italy) show slight
gains in skilled blue-collar employment or modest declines in service employment. Thus, the broad
pattern of occupational change seen in the U.S. appears to be pervasive among European economies,
at least for the period in which comparable data are available (1992 through 2008).
Moving beyond these summary statistics, Goos, Manning and Salomons (2010) provide an in-
depth analysis of occupational polarization in the E.U. and conclude that declines in routine-intensive
employment (driven by technology) are the by far the largest cause. Using data on industry skill
shares for the U.S., Japan, and nine E.U. economies between 1980 and 2004, Michaels, Natraj and
Van Reenan (2009) ﬁnd that countries and industries (within countries) that diﬀerentially increased
investment in information and communication technology raise their relative demand for high-skill
workers and reduced their relative demand for middle-skill workers (whom the authors identify with
routine-intensive occupations).
Is job polarization explained by industrial composition?
A more mundane explanation for employment polarization is not that ‘task demand’ has changed per
se, but rather that industry structure has shifted towards sectors that intrinsically use fewer ‘routine’
occupations and more ‘abstract’ and ‘manual’ occupations. We test for this possibility with a standard









Here, ∆ is the change in the overall share of employment in occupation  over time interval , ∆

is the change in occupation ’s share of employment attributable to changes in industrial composition
and, conversely, ∆
 is the change in occupation 0 employment share attributable to within-
industry shifts.45 We implement this decomposition at the level of the 10 occupational categories used
in Figure 12 and an analogous division of industries into 11 consistent non-farm sectors.46
include a mixture of service and manual labor positions. The ordering of countries in Figure 16 follows the ordering used
in Figure 11.
45∆ = 1−0 is the change in industry 
0 employment share during time interval   =( 1 + 0)2 is
the average employment share of industry  over the sample interval, ∆ = 1 − 0 is the change in occupation

0 share of industry  employment during time interval ,a n d =( 1 + 0)2 is occupation 
0 average share
of industry  employment during that time.
46These sectors are: extractive industries; construction; manufacturing, transportation and utilities; wholesale trade;
retail trade; ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate; business services; personal services and entertainment; professional
services; and public administration.
28Table 6 summarizes the results. In the ﬁrst set of columns, we perform the decomposition separately
for each of the ﬁve decades from 1959 through 2007. In the ﬁnal two columns, we compare the periods
1959—1979 and 1979—2007. This latter comparison proves particularly telling.
In both of the extended time intervals, 1959—1979 and 1979—2007, the share of employment in
professional, technical and managerial occupations rose rapidly for both sexes–and particularly so
for females. However, in the pre-1980 period, this rise was primarily accounted for by growth in the
share of overall employment in industries that used these occupations intensively. In the latter period,
three-quarters of the growth of high-skill occupations reﬂected increased intensity of employment
within rather than between industries. Similarly, the decline in clerical and sales employment was
almost entirely accounted for by declining within-industry employment of workers performing these
tasks. Indeed, changes in industry structure predict overall growth in clerical, administrative and sales
occupations both before and after 1979. But in the latter period, these cross-industry shifts were more
than oﬀset by declining within-industry employment of these occupations–leading to net declines for
these occupations.
The decline of blue-collar production and operative positions follows a pattern similar to clerical
and administrative occupations, though here the pre/post 1979 contrast of between versus within-
industry components is not quite as sharp. In the periods both before and after 1979, the share of
employment in production, craft and operative occupations declined rapidly, averaging 3 to 5 percent-
age points per decade for males and 2 to 3 percentage points for females. Prior to 1980, approximately
two-thirds of this decline was accounted for by shifts in industrial structure, with the rest explained by
within-industry movements against blue-collar occupations. After 1979, the contraction of production,
craft and operative occupations accelerate=d, but the source of this contraction moved from cross to
within-sector shifts. Speciﬁcally, 70 percent of the decline among males and 35 percent of the decline
among females was due to within-industry shifts, as compared to 40 percent and —15 percent for males
and female respectively in the pre-1980 period.47
Finally, the rising share of employment in service occupations is dominated by within-industry
shifts towards this occupational category. Thus, this overt manifestation of polarization is also not
due to employment shifts towards service-occupation intensive sectors.
In net, this exercise indicates that shifts in industrial composition do not explain the observed
polarization of employment across occupations. Within-industry shifts against middle-skilled and
favoring high and low-skilled occupational categories are the primary driver, and the importance of
47For females, this fact is partially obscured in the long change between 1979—2007 because female service employment
contracted sharply in the ﬁrst decade of this interval and expanded thereafter. Looking separately by decade, however,
it is clear that the contraction and subsequent expansion of female employment between 1979 and 2007 are both due to
within-industry shifts.
29these within-industry shifts is rising secularly.
It bears note that this exercise is performed at the level of fairly coarse industries, and it is possible
that the between-industry component of occupational change would appear more pronounced if we
were to disaggregate industries further. However, because our decomposition is currently performed at
the level of 220 industry-occupation-gender cells, subdividing industries to a much ﬁner degree would
yield limited precision.48
The growing importance of occupations in wage determination
The polarization of occupational structures documented above, combined with the polarization of wage
growth seen in Figures 7 through 9, jointly suggest that workers’ occupational aﬃliations may have
become a more important determinant of wages in recent decades. Intuitively, when the evolution of
earnings is monotone in educational level, education itself may be a suﬃcient statistic for earnings. In
contrast, when employment and earnings are rising more rapidly in low and high-educated occupations
than in middle-educated occupations, it is plausible that the explanatory power of occupations for
earnings may rise.
To explore this possibility, we use Census and ACS data from 1959 through 2007 to estimate a
set of cross-sectional OLS regressions of log full-time, full-year weekly wages on a quartic in potential
experience and four sets of control variables (included separately): 1) years of completed schooling; 2)
dummy variables for highest completed educational category (less than high school, high school grad-
uate, some college, four-year college, post-college degree); 3) dummy variables for the 10 occupational
categories used above (Table 2); and 4) dummies for the 11 industry categories used in Table 6. For
each set of regressors, we calculate the partial 2 value (net of the experience quartic) in each year,
and we plot these values in Figure 17.49
The explanatory power of educational attainment for earnings rises sharply after 1979–
approximately doubling by 2007–consistent with the rising return to skill in this period. When
the linear education term is replaced with a set of ﬁve education category dummies, the dummies and
linear term have comparable explanatory power for the ﬁrst two decades of the sample (1959 — 1979).
After 1979, however, the explanatory power of the dummies rises substantially more (by approximately
one-third) than does the linear term, reﬂecting the convexiﬁcation of the return to education (Figures
48Moreover, due to the major restructuring of the Census occupational classiﬁcation scheme in 1980, we have found
that it is infeasible to develop a satisfactory occupational classiﬁcation scheme that is both detailed and consistent for the
full 1959 through 2007 interval. Thus, while it is feasible to apply a more detailed industry scheme for the full sample,
we cannot perform a parallel exercise with occupations.
49All estimates are performed using the Census/ACS data to provide the maximal time window. We use full-time,
full-year log weekly earnings as our dependent variable since this variable is better measured than hourly earnings in the
Census/ACS data. Models estimated using the March CPS (full-time, full-year), May/ORG CPS (all hourly earnings)
and Census/ACS hourly earnings measure all produce substantively similar results.
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Replacing the education measures with 10 occupation dummies produces a striking time pattern.
The explanatory power of occupation reaches a nadir in 1979 and then, like the education measures,
rises over the subsequent three decades. Distinct from the education measures, however, the explana-
tory power of the occupation variables rises less rapidly than education in the 1980s and more rapidly
than education thereafter–overtaking education by 2007. Thus, as hypothesized, occupation appears
to gain in importance over time. This is most pronounced starting in the 1990s, when the monotone
growth of employment and earnings gives way to polarization.
One might ask whether this pattern of rising explanatory power is generally true across broad
measures of job characteristics. As an alternative to occupation, we substitute the 11 industry dummies
above in the wage regression. The explanatory power of industry is considerably lower than either
education or occupation, and moreover has changed little over time. Thus, echoing the ﬁndings of
the shift-share analysis above, occupation plays an increasingly important role in the evolution of
employment and (here) earnings; it is not simply a proxy for either education or industry.
Although we have been using broad occupation categories as task proxies, it is informative to
benchmark how well direct measures of job task content perform in capturing the changing wage
relationships evidenced by Figure 17. We perform this benchmark by comparing the partial 2 values
of the task measures summarized in Table 5 with both the education and occupation measures used
above. To maintain equivalent coarseness of measurement, we assign task means at the level of
the same 10 occupation categories using the three DOT and ﬁve O*NET task scales from Table 5
(excluding the oﬀshorability index). Figure 18 plots the partial 2 values.
The task measures show an even more pronounced pattern of rising explanatory power than do the
occupation dummies. For males, the explanatory power of the O*NET task measures in 1979 is well
below either the education or occupation dummies. But the rise in the explanatory power of the task
measures is steeper than either the education or occupation measures after 1989, and it surpasses both
by 2007.51 For females, the O*NET measures also exceed the education and occupation measures in
explanatory power by the end of the sample, though the nadir in 1979 is not quite as low. In all cases,
the DOT task measures exhibit a similar time pattern to the O*NET measures but oﬀer somewhat
lower explanatory power.
We have excluded the oﬀshorability measure from the prior regressions because its behavior appears
distinct. In Table 7, we separately investigate the explanatory power of this measure. When entered
50A quadratic in years of schooling performs almost identically to the ﬁve education dummies.
51Although the task measures are assigned at the level of occupation dummies, it is possible for their partial r-squared
value to exceed the dummies, since the partial r-squared is calculated on the residual variance after the wage variable
has been orthogonalized with respect to both the experience quartic and the task measures.
31in the wage regression with the experience quartic but no other task measures, the partial 2 of the
oﬀshorability measure rises steeply for males after 1979 (from 0.026 in 1979 to 0.079 in 2007) but has
no meaningful explanatory power or time trend for females after the ﬁrst decade of the sample. What
drives this diﬀerence by gender, we believe, is that the oﬀshorability index is strongly monotone in
education for males but non-monotone in education for females (Table 5b). As the return to education
rose steeply between 1979 and 2007, the partial 2 of oﬀshorability therefore rises for males but not
for females.
To assess the marginal explanatory power of the oﬀshorability measure, Table 7 reports both
the partial 2 values of the DOT and O*NET task measures entered separately and the partial
2 values of the cluster of oﬀshorability and task measures. The oﬀshorability measure does not
add meaningfully to the explanatory power of the task measures. This result is in line with other
recent work that compares the explanatory power of oﬀshoring versus other job task measures (e.g.,
most importantly, routine task content) in explaining cross region, cross-industry and cross-national
trends in employment and wage polarization (Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux, 2009; Michaels and Van
Reenen, 2009; Autor and Dorn, 2010; Goos, Manning and Salomons, 2010). A general ﬁnding of this
s e to fp a p e r si st h a to ﬀshorability plays a comparatively small or negligible explanatory role when
considered alongside other potential causes. We caution, however, that measures of both job tasks
and oﬀshorability are highly imperfect and diﬀer substantively across studies. The conclusions drawn
at this stage of the literature should therefore be viewed as provisional.52
3 The Canonical Model
Most economic analyses of changes in wage structure and skill diﬀerentials build on the ideas proposed
in Tinbergen (1974, 1975) and developed in Welch (1973), Katz and Murphy (1992), and Card and
Lemieux (2001), among many others. In this approach, the college/high-school log wage ratio serves
as a summary index of the premium that high skill workers command relative to low skill workers,
and this premium is determined by the relative supply and relative demand for skills. The relative
demand for skills increases over time because changes in technology are assumed to be “skill biased,”
in the sense that new technologies have greater skill demands for or are more complementary to high
skill workers. Since relative supply has also steadily increased over the last century and a half, both
because of the greater public investments in schooling and because of greater willingness of families
and individuals to acquire schooling, this leads to Tinbergen’s famous race between technology and
52Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant role for oﬀshorability in explaining wage polarization, though
this eﬀect is smaller than the estimated technology eﬀect. Papers by Blinder (2007), Jensen and Kletzer (2008 and
forthcoming), and Blinder and Krueger (2010) develop innovative measures of oﬀshorability. The eﬃcacy of these
measures relative to other task scales in predicting patterns of wage and employment polarization awaits testing.
32the supply of skills.
The eﬀects of relative demand and supply on the earnings distribution is typically modeled in an
environment with just two types of workers (high and low skill) and competitive labor markets.53 In
addition, the substitution between the two types of workers is often captured using a constant elasticity
of substitution aggregate production function. We refer to the framework with these features as the
canonical model. In this section, we review the canonical model, explain how it provides a simple
framework for interpreting several of the patterns illustrated in the previous section, and then highlight
why we believe that we need to step back from or expand upon the canonical model to consider a richer
framework for analyzing how the evolution of earnings and employment are shaped by the interactions
among worker skills, job tasks, evolving technologies, and shifting trading opportunities.
3.1 The simple theory of the canonical model
The canonical model has two skills, high and low. It draws no distinction between skills and occu-
pations (tasks), so that high skill workers eﬀectively work in separate occupations (perform diﬀerent
tasks) from low skill workers. In many empirical applications of the canonical model, it is natural
to identify high skill workers with college graduates (or in diﬀerent eras, with other high education
groups), and low skill workers with high school graduates (or again in diﬀerent eras, with those with
less than high school). We will use education and skills interchangeably, but as we discuss below, the
canonical model becomes more ﬂexible if one allows heterogeneity in skills within education groups.
Critical to the two-factor model is that high and low skill workers are imperfect substitutes in
production. The elasticity of substitution between these two skill types is central to understanding
how changes in relative supplies aﬀect skill premia.
Suppose that the total supply of low skill labor is  and the total supply of high skill labor is
. Naturally not all low (or high) skill workers are alike in terms of their marketable skills. As a
simple way of introducing this into the canonical model, suppose that each worker is endowed with
either high or low skill, but there is a distribution across workers in terms of eﬃciency units of these
skill types. In particular, let L denote the set of low skill workers and H denote the set of high skill
workers. Each low skill worker  ∈ L has  eﬃciency units of low skill labor and each high skill worker
 ∈ H has  units of high skill labor. All workers supply their eﬃciency units inelastically. Thus the
53It is straightforward to extend the canonical model to include several skill groups, with each group allocated to a
single occupation (or to producing a single good). Most of the features of the canonical model emphasized here continue
to apply in this case, particularly when the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent groups is the same. When there
are diﬀerent elasticities of substitution between diﬀerent factors, the implications of the canonical model become richer
but also more diﬃcult to characterize and generalize.



















where  ∈ [0∞) is the elasticity of substitution between high skill and low skill labor, and  and
 are factor-augmenting technology terms.54
The elasticity of substitution between high and low skill workers plays a pivotal role in interpreting
the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of technological changes in this canonical model. We refer to high and
low skill workers as gross substitutes when the elasticity of substitution 1, and gross complements
when 1. Three focal cases are: (i)  → 0, when high skill and low skill workers will be Leontief,
and output can be produced only by using high skill and low skill workers in ﬁxed portions; (ii)  →∞
when high skill and low skill workers are perfect substitutes (and thus there is only one skill, which
 and  workers possess in diﬀerent quantities), and (iii)  → 1, when the production function tends
to the Cobb-Douglas case.
In this framework, technologies are factor-augmenting, meaning that technological change serves
to either increase the productivity of high or low skill workers (or both). This implies that there
are no explicitly skill replacing technologies. Depending on the value of the elasticity of substitution,
however, an increase in  or  can act either to complement or (eﬀectively) substitute for high
or low skill workers (see below). The lack of directly skill replacing technologies in the canonical
model is an important reason why it does not necessarily provide an entirely satisfactory framework
for understanding changes in the earnings and employment distributions over the last four decades.
The production function (2) admits three diﬀerent interpretations.
1. There is only one good, and high skill and low skill workers are imperfect substitutes in the
production of this good.












deﬁned over two goods. Good  is produced using only high skill
workers, and  is produced using only low skill workers, with production functions  = ,
and  = .








−1  where   and 
are factor-augmenting technology terms and  is the distribution parameter. To simplify notation, we suppress  (i.e.,
set it equal to 1/2).
343. A mixture of the above two whereby diﬀerent sectors produce goods that are imperfect substi-
tutes, and high and low-education workers are employed in both sectors.
Since labor markets are competitive, the low skill unit wage is simply given by the value of marginal





















Given this unit wage, the earnings of worker  ∈ L is simply
 = 
There are two important implications of equation (3):
1.   0, that is, as the fraction of high skill workers in the labor force increases, the low
skill wage should increase. This is an implication of imperfect substitution between high and
low skill workers. An increase in the fraction (or relative supply) of high skill workers increases
the demand for the services of low skill workers, pushing up their unit wage. (Formally, high
and low skill workers are q-complements.)
2.   0 and   0, that is, either kind of factor-augmenting technical change
increases wages of low skill workers (except in the limit cases where  =0and  = ∞,w h e r e
these inequalities might be weak). This result is intuitive but will also turn out to be important:
technological improvements of any sort will lead to higher wages for both skill groups in the
canonical model (also following from q-complementary). Thus unless there is “technical regress,”
the canonical model cannot account for declining (real) wages of a factor whose supply is not
shifting outward.




















We again have similar comparative statics. First,   0, so that when high skill workers
become more abundant, their wages should fall. Second,   0 and   0,s ot h a t
technological progress of any kind increases high skill (as well as low skill) wages. Also similarly, the
earnings of worker  ∈ H is simply
 = 
It can also be veriﬁed that an increase in either  or  (and also an increase in )w i l lr a i s e
average wages in this model (see Acemoglu, 2002a).


































The log skill premium, ln, is important in part because it is a key market outcome, reﬂecting
the price of skills in the labor market, and it has been a central object of study in the empirical
literature on the changes in the earnings distribution. Equation (6) shows that there is a simple log
linear relationship between the skill premium and the relative supply of skills as measured by .







This relationship corresponds to the second of the two forces in Tinbergen’s race (the ﬁrst being
technology, the second being the supply of skills): for a given skill bias of technology, captured here
by , an increase in the relative supply of skills reduces the skill premium with an elasticity
of 1. Intuitively, an increase in  creates two diﬀerent types of substitution. First, if high and
low skill workers are producing diﬀerent goods, the increase in high skill workers will raise output of
the high skill intensive good, leading to a substitution towards the high skill good in consumption.
This substitution hurts the relative earnings of high skill workers since it reduces the relative marginal
utility of consumption, and hence the real price, of the high skill good. Second, when high and low skill
workers are producing the same good but performing diﬀerent functions, an increase in the number
of high skill workers will necessitate a substitution of high skill workers for the functions previously
performed by low skill workers.55 The downward sloping relationship between relative supply and the
skill premium implies that if technology, in particular , had remained roughly constant over
recent decades, the remarkable increase in the supply of skills shown in Figure 1 would have led to
as i g n i ﬁcant decline in the skill premium. The lack of such a decline is a key reason why economists
believe that the ﬁrst force in Tinbergen’s race–changes in technology increasing the demand for
skills–must have also been important throughout the 20th century (cf. Goldin and Katz, 2008).







55In this interpretation, we can think of some of the “tasks” previously performed by high skill workers now being
performed by low skill workers. Nevertheless, this is simply an interpretation, since in this model, there are no tasks
and no endogenous assignment of tasks to workers. One could alternatively say that the  and  tasks are imperfect
substitutes, and hence an increase in the relative supply of  labor means that the  task is used more intensively but
less productively at the margin.
36Equation (8) implies that if 1, then relative improvements in the high skill augmenting
technology (i.e., in ) increase the skill premium. This can be seen as a shift out of the relative
demand curve for skills. The converse is obtained when 1:t h a ti s ,w h e n1, an improvement in
the productivity of high skill workers, , relative to the productivity of low skill workers, ,s h i f t s
the relative demand curve inward and reduces the skill premium. This case appears paradoxical at
ﬁrst, but is in fact quite intuitive. Consider, for example, how factor-augmenting technology change
aﬀects the wages of the augmented factor when the production function is Leontief (ﬁxed proportions).
In this case, as  increases, high skill workers become more productive, and hence the demand for low
skill workers increases by more than the demand for high skill workers. Eﬀectively, the increase in 
creates “excess supply” of high skill workers given the number of low skill workers, which depresses
the high skill wage relative wage. This observation raises an important caveat. It is tempting to
interpret improvements in technologies used by high skill workers, , as “skill biased”. However,
when the elasticity of substitution is less than 1, it will be advances in technologies used with low skill
workers, , that increase the relative productivity andw a g e so fh i g hs k i l lw o r k e r s ,a n da ni n c r e a s e
in  relative to  will be “skill replacing”. Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom is that the skill
premium increases when high skill workers become relatively more–not relatively less–productive,
which is consistent with 1.56
While the case of 1 is interesting (and potentially relevant when we think of diﬀerent factors
of production), in the context of the substitution between college and non-college workers, a relatively
high elasticity of substitution is both plausible and consistent with several studies. Most estimates
put  in this context to be somewhere between 1.4 and 2 (Johnson, 1970; Freeman, 1986; Heckman,
Lochner and Taber, 1998). In this light, in what follows we assume that 1.
3.2 Bringing Tinbergen’s education race to the data
The key equation of the canonical model, (6), links the skill premium to the relative supply of skills,
, and to the relative technology term, . This last term is not directly observed. Neverthe-
less, we can make considerable empirical progress by taking a speciﬁc form of Tinbergen’s hypothesis,
and assuming that there is a log linear increase in the demand for skills over time coming from






= 0 + 1 (9)
56Weiss (2008) considers a model in which ongoing skilled-labor augmenting (though of course not skill biased) technical
change ﬁrst raises then lowers the relative wage of skilled labor. Autor and Dorn (2010) also consider a setting where
this can occur if the goods produced by high and low skill workers are gross complements.
37where  is calendar time and variables written with  subscript refer to these variables at time .
















Equation (10) implies that “technological developments” take place at a constant rate, while
the supply of skilled workers may grow at varying rates at diﬀerent points in times. Therefore,
changes in the skill premium will occur when the growth rate of the supply of skills diﬀers from the
pace of technological progress. In particular, when  grows faster than the rate of skill biased
technical change, ( − 1)1, the skill premium will fall. And when the supply growth falls short of
this rate, the skill premium will increase. In the next subsection, we will see that this simple equation
provides considerable explanatory power for the evolution of the skill premium. At the same time, the
limitations of the model become evident when it is confronted with a richer array of facts.
3.3 Changes in the U.S. earnings distribution through the lens of the canonical
model
We begin by replicating the seminal work of Katz and Murphy (1992), who demonstrated the power
of the approach outlined above by ﬁtting equation (10) to aggregate time-series data on college/high-
school relative wages and college/high-school relative supplies for the years 1963 through 1987. Fol-
lowing their methods as closely as possible, the ﬁrst column of Table 8 presents an OLS regression
of the composition-adjusted college/high-school log weekly wage premium (Figure 1) on a linear time
trend and our measure of college/high-school log relative supply (Figure 2) for years 1963—1987. We
obtain the estimate:







As shown in Figure 19, this simple speciﬁcation performs relatively well in capturing the broad features
of the evolving college premium between 1963 and 1987, most notably, the sharp reversal of the
trajectory of the college premium coinciding with the deceleration in the growth of college relative
supply in the late 1970s. The power of the model is underscored in Figure 20, which plots the college
premium and college relative supply measures by year, each purged of a linear time trend. The robust
inverse relationship between these two series demonstrates the key role played by the decelerating
supply of college workers in driving the college premium upward in recent decades.
More formally, these estimates suggest that the evolution of the college premium during the period
1963 through 1987 can be characterized by an elasticity of substitution between college graduate
38workers and non-college workers of about ˆ  =1 061 ≈ 16, and an annual increase of about 27
percent in the relative demand for college labor.57
Column 2 of Table 8 includes 21 additional years of data beyond 1987 to extend the Katz-Murphy
estimate to 2008. When ﬁt to this longer time period, the model yields a substantially higher estimate
of the elasticity of substitution, ˆ  ≈ 29 a n das l o w e rt r e n dr a t eo fd e m a n dg r o w t h( 16 percent
annually).58 The proximate cause of this change in the model’s estimated parameters can be seen in
Figure 19, which, following Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008), plots the out-of-sample ﬁt of the Katz-
Murphy model for the years 1987-2008. The ﬁt of the model remains quite good through the year 1992,
ﬁve years out of sample. But the model systematically deviates from the data thereafter, predicting
a sharper rise in the college premium than occurs. While the observed college premium rose by 12
points between 1992 and 2008, the model predicts a rise of 25 log points. Without further reﬁnements
to the model, this discrepancy suggests that either the trend in relative demand decelerated after 1992
or the elasticity of substitution rose.
Subsequent columns of Table 8 explore this possibility by freeing up the linear time trend with
somewhat richer speciﬁcations: a linear spline, allowing the time trend to deviate from its initial
trajectory after 1992; a quadratic time trend; and a cubic time trend. When ﬁt to the data, all three
of these variants suggest a signiﬁcant deceleration in trend relative demand takes place sometime
during the 1990s. Conditional on the more ﬂexible time trend, the elasticity of substitution in these
estimates returns to the range of 16 to 18. Thus, taken at face value, this model suggests that relative
demand for college workers decelerated in the 1990s, which does not accord with common intuitions
regarding the nature or pace of technological changes occurring in this era. We return to this point
below.
One can gain additional identiﬁcation and explanatory power with this model by considering
a slightly richer set of facts. As shown in Table 1, changes in the college/high school wage gap
have diﬀered substantially by age/experience groups over recent decades. This pattern may be seen
through a comparison of the college premium for younger workers (those with 0-9 years of potential
experience) and older workers (those with 20-29 years of potential experience). Figure 21 shows that
the rapid rise in the college/high-school gap during the 1980s was concentrated among less experienced
workers. Conversely, from the mid-1990s forward, the rise in the college/high-school was greater among
experienced workers.
These facts may better accord with a simple extension to the canonical model. To the extent
that workers with similar education but diﬀerent ages or experience levels are imperfect substitutes in
57Our estimates are very similar, though not identical, to those of Katz and Murphy, who ﬁnd an elasticity of substi-
tution of 14 and a time trend of 33 percent.
58This point is explored by Card and DiNardo (2002), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008), and Goldin and Katz (2008).
39production, one would expect age-group or cohort-speciﬁc relative skill supplies–as well as aggregate
relative skill supplies–to aﬀect the evolution of the college-high school premium by age or experience
as emphasized by Card and Lemieux (2001b). Consistent with this view, Figure 3 (presented in
Section 2) shows a rapid deceleration in relative college supply among younger workers in the mid
to late 1970s, several years after the end of the Vietnam war reduced male college enrollment. Two
decades later (circa 1995), this kink in the relative supply schedule generates a sharp deceleration in
the availability of experienced college workers. Notably, the diﬀerential rises in the college premium for
young and (later) for experienced workers roughly coincide with the diﬀerential slowdown in college
supply among these experience groups (though these slowdowns are 20 years apart). This pattern
oﬀers a prima facie case that the college premium for an experience group depends on its own-group
relative supply as well as the overall supply of college relative to high school graduates.
We take fuller account of these diﬀering trends by experience group in Table 9 by estimating
regression models for the college wage by experience group. These extend the basic speciﬁcation in
equation (10) to include own experience group relative skill supplies. The ﬁrst column of Table 10
presents a regression pooled across 4 potential experience groups (those with 0-9, 10-19, 20-29, and
30-39 years of experience), allowing for group-speciﬁc intercepts but constraining the other coeﬃcients
to be the same for all experience groups. Speciﬁcally, we estimate:

















+ 3 ×  + 4 × 2 +  + 
where  indexes experience groups,  is a set of experience group main eﬀects, and we include a
q u a d r a t i ct i m et r e n d . T h i ss p e c i ﬁcation arises from an aggregate constant elasticity of substitution
production function in which college and high school equivalents from the aggregate inputs, similar
to equation (2) above, where these aggregate inputs are themselves constant elasticity of substitution
sub-aggregates of college and high school labor by experience group (Card and Lemieux, 2001b).
Under these assumptions, 12 provides an estimate of  the aggregate elasticity of substitution,
and 11 provides an estimate of , the partial elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent experience
groups within the same education group.
The estimates in the ﬁrst column of Table 9 indicate a substantial eﬀect of both own-group and
aggregate supplies on the evolution of the college wage premium by experience group. While the
implied estimate of the aggregate elasticity of substitution in this model is similar to the aggregate
models in Table 8, the implied value of the partial elasticity of substitution between experience groups
is around 37 (which is somewhat smaller than the estimates in Card and Lemieux 2001b). This model
indicates that diﬀerences in own-group relative college supply go some distance towards explaining
variation across experience groups in the evolution of the college wage premium in recent decades.
The ﬁnal four columns of Table 9 present regression models of the college wage premium estimated
40separately by experience group. These estimates show that trend demand changes and relative skill
supplies play a large role in changes in educational diﬀerentials for younger and prime age workers. The
college wage premium for workers with under 20 years of experience is quite responsive to both own
group and aggregate relative skill supplies. However, aggregate supplies appear equally important
for workers with 20-plus years of experience, while own-group supplies are not found to exert an
independent eﬀect.
3.4 Overall inequality in the canonical model
Our brief overview of the salient empirical patterns in the previous section highlights that there have
been rich and complex changes in the overall earning distribution over the last four decades. While
changes in the college premium (or more generally in the returns to diﬀerent levels of schooling) have
contributed to these changes in the earnings distribution, there have also been signiﬁcant changes in
inequality among workers with the same education–i.e., within groups as well as between groups.
The canonical model introduced above can also provide a ﬁrst set of insights for thinking about
within-group inequality and thus provides a framework for interpreting changes in the overall wage
distribution. In particular, the model generates not only diﬀering wages for high and low skill workers,
but also wage variation among workers with a given level of observed skill. This follows from our
assumption that the eﬃciency units of labor supplies vary across workers of each skill group.
Nevertheless, this type of within group inequality (i.e., due to cross-worker, within skill group
heterogeneity in eﬃciency units) is invariant to skill prices and thus changes in overall inequality in
this model will closely mimic changes in the skill premium. In particular, recall that all workers in
the set L (respectively in the set H) always face the same skill price. Therefore changes in the skill
premium should have no direct eﬀect on within group inequality. Mathematically, in this model the









for , 0 ∈ L.
In this simple form, the canonical model can exhibit signiﬁcant within group wage inequality, but
inequality will be independent of the skill premium.59
Naturally, this feature can be changed by positing that there are increasing returns to eﬃciency
units of skill, so when the relative demand for high skill labor increases, this increases the demand for
“more skilled” college graduates by relatively more than for “less skilled” college graduates. One way
to incorporate this idea is to extend the canonical model by drawing a distinction between observable
groups (such as college vs. non-college) and skills. For example, we can remain fairly close to the
59This invariance property applies when considering wage ratios or, equivalently, the variance of log wages. The
variance of wage levels will positively covary with the skill premium in this model.
41spirit of the canonical model and continue to assume that there are only two skills, but now suppose
that these skills are only imperfectly approximated by education (or experience).
Speciﬁcally, we can assume that the two observable groups are college and non-college, and a
fraction  of college graduates are high skill, while a fraction    of non-college graduates are
high skill (the remaining fractions in both groups being low skill as usual). Let us again denote the
skill premium by  = . This is no longer the college premium, i.e., the ratio of average college
to non-college wages, however, since not all college workers have high skill and not all non-college
workers have low skill. Given our assumption, we can compute the college premium simply as the





 +( 1− )
 +( 1− )
=
 +( 1− )
 +( 1− )

It is straightforward to verify that, because   , this college premium is increasing in ,s ot h a t
when the true price of skill increases, the observed college premium will also rise. In addition, we can
deﬁne within group inequality in this context as the ratio of the earnings of high-wage college graduates
(or non-college graduates) to that of low-wage college graduates (or non-college graduates). Given our
assumptions, we also have  =  (since high-wage workers in both groups earn ,w h i l el o w -
wage workers earn ). As long as  and  remain constant,  and  will move together.
Therefore in this extended version of the canonical model, an increase in the returns to observed
skills–such as education–will also be associated with an increase in the returns to unobserved skills.
Moreover, we can also think of large changes in relative supplies being associated with compositional
changes, aﬀecting  and , so within group inequality can change diﬀerently than the skill premium,
and thus overall inequality can exhibit more complex changes as supplies and technology evolve.60
This model thus provides a useful starting point for thinking about changes in within group
inequality and the overall earnings distribution, and linking them both to the market price of skills.
In light of this model, the increase in the overall earnings inequality starting in the late 1970s or early
1980s is intimately linked to the increase in the demand for skills, also reﬂected in the increase in
60Lemieux (2006a) shows that the rising share of the U.S. labor force composed of prime age college graduates in
the 1990s and 2000s contributed to the increase in residual (and, implicitly, overall) dispersion of earnings during these
decades. Speciﬁcally, Lemieux observes that, education constant, earnings dispersion tends to be higher among more
experienced workers, and this is particularly true for experienced college-educated workers. As the highly-educated baby
boom cohorts began to reach their prime years in the 1990s, this force increased the dispersion of wages and wage
residuals. Lemieux concludes that a large share of the net rise in residual inequality between 1973 and 2006 can be
explained by this compositional eﬀect.
Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005 and 2008) suggest caution in interpreting this result because the composition-based
explanation for rising wage dispersion does not ﬁt the asymmetric expansion of the upper tail and compression of the
lower tail. The composition exercise implies that the rising share of prime age college employment during the 1990s
and 2000s should have increased dispersion in the lower tail of the earnings distribution (overall and residual), whereas
the opposite occurred (Figure 8). Conversely, these compositional shifts are not predicted to raise dispersion in the
upper-tail of the distribution, yet this is where the rise in dispersion was concentrated. This misalignment between facts
and predictions underscores the limitations of this approach.
42the college premium. While this parsimonious framework is valuable for analyzing the evolution of
distribution of earnings, it does not provide suﬃcient nuance for understanding why diﬀerent parts of
the earnings distribution move diﬀerently and, moreover, do so markedly during diﬀerent time periods.
3.5 Endogenous changes in technology
The canonical model is most powerful as an empirical framework when skill biased technical change
can be approximated by a steady process, such as the (log) linear trend posited in (9). However, the
discussion in Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) suggests that the pace of skill biased technical change
was likely more rapid between 1970 and 1990 than between the 1940 and 1970. The evidence dis-
cussed above, on the other hand, suggests that the pace of skill biased technical change slowed during
the 1990s, at least viewed through the lens of the canonical model. As also discussed in Acemoglu
(2002a), a relatively steady process of skill biased technical change is likely to be a particularly poor
approximation when we consider the last 200 years instead of just the postwar period. For example,
the available evidence suggests that the most important innovations of the nineteenth century may
have replaced–rather than complemented–skilled workers (in particular artisans). The artisanal
shop was replaced by the factory and later by interchangeable parts and the assembly line, and prod-
ucts previously manufactured by skilled artisans were subsequently produced in factories by workers
with relatively few skills (see, e.g., Mokyr, 1991, James and Skinner, 1985, Goldin and Katz, 1998,
Hounshell, 2000, Acemoglu, 2002a).
But once we recognize that skill biased technical change is not a steady process, it becomes more
important to understand when we should expect it to be more rapid (and when we should expect it
not to take place at all). The canonical model is silent on this question. Acemoglu (1998, 2002a)
suggests that modeling the endogenous response of the skill bias of technology might generate richer
insights. In particular, as we discuss further in subsection 4.8, under relatively general conditions,
models of endogenous (directed) technical change imply that technology should become more skill
biased following increases in the supply of high skill workers (and conversely, less skill biased following
increases in the supply of low skill workers). According to this perspective, steady skill biased technical
change might be partly a response to the steady increase in the supply of skills during the past century
(thus uniting the two parts of Tinbergen’s race); the skill replacing technologies of the nineteenth
century might be partly a response to the large increase in the supply of low skill workers in the cities;
the acceleration in skill bias in the 1980s might, in part, be a response to the more rapid increase in
the supply of college skills in the late 1960s and early 1970s noted in Section 2; and the deceleration
of demand shifts favoring skilled workers in the 1990s might in part be a response to the deceleration
in the supply of college skills during the 1980s (see again Section 2).
43As we discussed above, computer technology is particularly well suited for automating routine
tasks. This creates a natural tendency for the type of skill bias described by Autor, Levy, Murnane
(2003). It does not, however, imply that the path of technical change and its bias are entirely ex-
ogenous. Exactly how computer technology is developed and how it is applied in the production
process has much ﬂexibility, and it is plausible that this will respond to proﬁt opportunities created
by diﬀerent types of applications and uses.
3.6 Summary
To recap, the canonical model provides a parsimonious framework for thinking about the skill pre-
mium and the determinants of the earnings distribution. Its simplicity leads to several sharp results,
including:
1. Changes in the wage structure are linked to changes in factor-augmenting technologies and
relative supplies.
2. Overall inequality rises in tandem with the skill premium (as within group inequality is either
invariant when the skill premium changes or comoves with the skill premium).
3. The economy-wide average wage and the real wage of each skill group should increase over time
as a result of technological progress, particularly if the supply of high skill labor is increasing.61
4. The rate and direction of technological change do not respond to the relative abundance or
scarcity of skill groups.
Applied to the data, this simple supply-demand framework, emphasizing a secular increase in the
relative demand for college workers combined with ﬂuctuations in relative skill supplies, successfully
accounts for some of the key patterns in the recent evolution of between-group inequality, including
the contraction and expansion of the college-high school gap during the 1970s and 1980s and the
diﬀerential rise in the college/high-school gap by experience group in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the
admirable parsimony of the canonical model also renders it a less than wholly satisfactory framework
for interpreting several of the key trends we highlighted in the previous section.
1. It does not provide a natural reason for why certain groups of workers would experience real
earnings declines, yet this phenomenon has been quite pronounced among less-educated workers,
particularly less-educated males, during the last three decades.
61Wages for a skill group can of course fall if its supply becomes relatively more abundant. This is clearly not the
explanation for declining wages of non-college workers, however.
442. It does not provide a framework for the analysis of “polarization” in the earnings distribution,
which we documented earlier, and relatedly, it does not easily account for diﬀerential changes in
inequality in diﬀerent parts of the skill distribution during diﬀerent periods (decades).
3. Because the model does not distinguish between skills and tasks (or occupations), it does not
provide insights into the systematic changes observed in the composition of employment by occu-
pation in the United States and in other advanced economies–in particular, the disproportionate
growth of employment in both high-education, high-wage occupations and, simultaneously, low-
education, low-wage service occupations (i.e., employment polarization).
4. The model is also silent on the question of why the allocation of skill groups across occupations
has substantially shifted in the last two decades, with a rising share of middle-educated work-
ers employed in traditionally low-education services, or why the importance of occupations as
predictors of earnings may have increased over time.
5. Because it incorporates technical change in a factor-augmenting form, it does not provide a
natural framework for the study of how new technologies, including computers and robotics,
might substitute for or replace workers in certain occupations or tasks.
6. Because it treats technical change as exogenous, it is also silent on how technology might respond
to changes in labor market conditions and in particular to changes in supplies.
7. Finally, the canonical model does not provide a framework for an analysis of how recent trends
in oﬀshoring and outsourcing may inﬂuence the labor market and the structure of inequality
(beyond the standard results on the eﬀect of trade on inequality through its factor content).
Recognizing the virtues of the canonical model, we propose a richer conceptual framework that
nests the canonical model while allowing for a richer set of interactions among job tasks, technologies,
trading opportunities, and skill supplies in determining the structure of wages.
4 A Ricardian Model of the Labor Market
Many of the shortcomings of the canonical model can, we believe, be addressed by incorporating a
clear distinction between workers’ skills and job tasks and allowing the assignment of skills to tasks
to be determined in equilibrium by labor supplies, technologies, and task demands, as suggested by
Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003).62 In this terminology, a task is a unit of work activity that produces
62The precedent of this approach is the assignment model, introduced in Tinbergen (1974), and further developed
in Rosen (1974, 1981, 1982), Sattinger (1975, 1993), Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), Teulings (1995), Saint-Paul (2001)
45output. A skill is a worker’s endowment of capabilities for performing various tasks. This endowment
is a stock, which may be either exogenously given or acquired through schooling and other investments.
Workers apply their skill endowments to tasks in exchange for wages. Thus, the task-based approaches
emphasize that skills are applied to tasks to produce output–skills do not directly produce output.
Task models provide a natural framework for interpreting patterns related to occupations in the labor
market, as documented above, since we can think of occupations as bundles of tasks. In this light,
the canonical model may be seen as a special case of the general task-based model in which there is a
one-to-one mapping between skills and tasks.63
The distinction between skills and tasks becomes relevant, in fact central, when workers of a given
skill level can potentially perform a variety of tasks and, moreover, can change the set of tasks that
they perform in response to changes in supplies or technology. Although a growing literature adopts
the task-based approach to study technology and its role in the labor market, this literature has not yet
developed a ﬂexible and tractable task-based model for analyzing the interactions among skill supplies,
technologies, and trade in sharping the earnings distribution.64 The absence of such a framework has
also meant that the power of this approach for providing a uniﬁed explanation for recent trends has
not been fully exploited.
We believe that a useful task-based model should incorporate several features that are absent in
the canonical model, while at the same time explicitly subsuming the canonical model as a special
case. In particular,
1. Such a model should allow an explicit distinction between skills and tasks, and allow for general
technologies in which tasks can be performed by diﬀerent types of skills, by machines, or by
workers in other countries (‘oﬀshored’). This will enable the model to allow for certain tasks
to be become mechanized (as in Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003) or alternatively produced
internationally.
2. To understand how diﬀerent technologies may aﬀect skill demands, earnings, and the assignment
(or reassignment) of skills to tasks, it should allow for comparative advantage among workers in
performing diﬀerent tasks.
and Garicano (2000). The task-based approach has been used more recently in several papers studying the impact of
technology and international trade on the labor market, including Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(2001), Spitz-Oener (2006), Goos and Manning (2007), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), Autor and Dorn (2009,
2010), Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009), Acemoglu, Gancia and Zilibotti (2010), Rodriguez-Clare and Ramondo (2010),
and Costinot and Vogel (forthcoming).
63Alternatively, the canonical model can be interpret e da sa na p p r o x i m a t i o nw h e r e b yt h i sa s s i g n m e n ti sﬁxed during
the period of study.
64The assignment models mentioned in footnote 62 provide highly ﬂexible task-based models, but are generally not
tractable and do not oﬀer a simple framework in which the interaction between technology and the allocation of tasks
across diﬀerent skills can be readily analyzed.
463. To enable a study of polarization and changes in diﬀerent parts of the earnings distribution
during diﬀerent periods, it should incorporate at least three diﬀerent skill groups.
4. As with the canonical model, the task-based approach should give rise to a well-deﬁned set of skill
demands, with downward sloping relative demand curves for skills (for a given set of technologies)
and conventional substitutability and complementarity properties among skill groups.
The following sections present a succinct framework that enriches the canonical model in these
three dimensions without sacriﬁcing the underlying logic of the canonical model. This model is a
generalization of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and is also related to Costinot and Vogel (2010).65
The relationship between the framework here and these models will be discussed further below. Given
the central role that the comparative advantage diﬀerences across diﬀerent types of workers play in
our model and the relationship of the model to Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977), we refer to
it as a Ricardian model of the labor market.66
4.1 Environment
We consider a static environment with a unique ﬁnal good. For now, the economy is closed and there
is no trade in tasks (a possibility we allow for later). The unique ﬁnal good is produced by combining
a continuum of tasks represented by the unit interval, [01]. We simplify the analysis assuming a
Cobb-Douglas technology mapping the services of this range of tasks to the ﬁnal good. In particular,






or equivalently, ln =
R 1
0 ln(),w h e r e denotes the output of a unique ﬁnal good and we will
refer to () as the “service” or production level of task . We will also alternately refer to workers
65The assignment literature, and in particular the recent important paper by Costinot and Vogel (2010), considers a
similar model with a continuum of skills (as well as a continuum of tasks as in our framework). Under a comparative
advantage (log supermodularity) assumption, which generalizes our comparative advantage assumption below, Costinot
and Vogel (2010) characterize the equilibrium in terms of two ordinary diﬀerential equations, one determining the match
between skills and tasks and the other determining the wage as a function of assignment. They show that a variety of
changes in the patterns of comparative advantage will lead to unambiguous comparative static results. The framework
of Costinot and Vogel (2010) can thus also be used to study issues similar to those exposited below. As with other
assignment models, one would need to impose additional structure on the pattern of comparative advantage to obtain
sharp predictions.
Our framework is also related to growth models in which technical progress expands the range of tasks in which machines
can be used instead of labor. See, for example, Champernowne (1963), Zeira (1998, 2006), Hellwig and Irmen (2001) and
Acemoglu (2009). Finally, Saint-Paul (2008) provides a rich exposition of both conventional and unconventional models
of technological change and considers their nuanced implications for wage levels and wage inequality.
66In particular, our model is isomorphic to a Ricardian trade model à la Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977),
with each skill group representing a country (i.e., a single factor, three-country model with a continuum of goods). Wilson
(1980) provides a generalization of the Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson model to an arbitrary number of countries
and more general preferences. Wilson’s approach can be usd to extend some of the results here to more than three skill
groups and to more general preferences than those in equation (11).
47“performing” or producing a task. We assume that all markets are competitive. Throughout, we
choose the price of the ﬁnal good as the numeraire.
There are three factors of production, high, mediu ma n dl o ws k i l l e dw o r k e r s .I na d d i t i o n ,w ew i l l
introduce capital or technology (embedded in machines) below. We ﬁrst assume that there is a ﬁxed,
inelastic supply of the three types of workers, ,  and . We return to the supply response of
diﬀerent types of skills to changes in technology later in this section.
Each task has the following production function
()= ()()+ ()()+ ()()+ ()() (12)
where  terms represent factor-augmenting technology, and  (),  () and  () are the task
productivity schedules, designating the productiv i t yo fl o w ,m e d i u ma n dh i g hs k i l lw o r k e r si nd i ﬀerent
tasks. For example,  () is the productivity of low skill workers in task ,a n d() is the number
of low skill workers allocated to task . The remaining terms are deﬁned analogously. Given this
production function, we can think of  as (factor-augmenting) low skill biased technology, of  as
medium skill biased technology, and of  as high skill biased technology. It is critical to observe that
this production function for task services implies that each task can be performed by low, medium or
high skill workers, but the comparative advantage of skill groups diﬀer across tasks, as captured by
the  terms. These diﬀerences in comparative advantage will play a central role in our model.
We impose the following assumption on the structure of comparative advantage throughout:
Assumption 1  () () and  () () are continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly decreas-
ing.
This assumption speciﬁes the structure of comparative advantage in the model. It can be inter-
preted as stating that higher indices correspond to “more complex” tasks in which high skill workers
are better than medium skill workers and medium skill workers are better than low skill workers.
Though not very restrictive, this assumption ensures a particularly simple and tight characterization
of equilibrium in this economy.






() ≤  and
Z 1
0
() ≤  (13)
When we introduce capital, we will assume that it is available at some constant price .
4.2 Equilibrium without Machines
An equilibrium is deﬁned in the usual manner as an allocation in which (ﬁnal good) producers maximize
proﬁts and labor markets clear. For now there is no labor supply decision on the part of the workers.
48Let us ﬁrst ignore capital (equivalently,  (·) ≡ 0). This implies that initially there are no
machines that can substitute for labor in the production of speciﬁct a s k s .
Allocation of skills to tasks
We ﬁrst characterize the allocation of skills to tasks.
The characterization of equilibrium in this economy is simpliﬁed by the structure of comparative
advantage diﬀerences in Assumption 1. In particular, there will exist some  and  such that all
tasks   will be performed by low skill workers, and all tasks   will be performed by high
skill workers. Intermediate tasks will be performed by medium skilled workers. We can think of
these intermediate tasks as the routine tasks performed by workers in many production, clerical, and
administrative support occupations. More formally, we have:
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium there exist  and  such that 0      1 and for any  ,
()=()=0 , for any  ∈ ( ), ()=()=0 ,a n df o ra n y , ()=()=0 .
The proof of this lemma follows a similar argument to a lemma presented in Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(2001), extended to an environment in which there are three types of workers. Intuitively, if at given
prices of three types of labor, ,  and , the costs of producing a unit of services of task 
using either low skill or medium skill workers are the same, then in view of the fact that  () ()
is strictly decreasing (Assumption 1), it will cost strictly less to perform tasks   using low skill
rather than medium skill workers; and similarly, it will be strictly less costly to perform tasks  
using medium skill rather than low skill workers. The same argument applies to the comparison of
medium and high skill workers below or above the threshold . Note also that given Assumption 1,
we do not need to compare the cost of producing a given task using low and high skill workers, since
if the cost were the same with low and high skill workers, it would necessarily be strictly less with
medium skill workers. Furthermore, because there is a positive supply of all three types of labor, the
threshold tasks  and  must be both interior and diﬀerent (i.e., 0      1).
Lemma 1 shows that the set of tasks will be partitioned into three (convex) sets, one performed
by low skill workers, one performed by medium skill workers and one performed by high skill workers.
Crucially, the boundaries of these sets,  and , are endogenous and will respond to changes in skill
supplies and technology. This introduces the ﬁrst type of substitution that will play an important role
in our model: the substitution of skills across tasks. Given the types of skills supplied in the market,
ﬁrms (equivalently workers) will optimally choose which tasks will be performed by which skill groups.
49The law of one price for skills
Even though workers of the same skill level perform diﬀerent tasks, in equilibrium they will receive
the same wage–a simple “law of one price” that has to hold in any competitive equilibrium. We now
derive these prices.
Let () denotes the price of services of task .S i n c ew ec h o s et h eﬁnal good as numeraire (setting







In any equilibrium, all tasks employing low skill workers must pay them the same wage, ,s i n c e
otherwise, given the competitive market assumption, no worker would supply their labor to tasks
paying lower wages. Similarly, all tasks employing medium skill workers must pay a wage ,a n d
all tasks employing high skill workers must pay a wage . As a consequence, the value marginal
product of all workers in a skill group must be the same in all the tasks that they are performing. In
particular, in view of Lemma 1 and the production function (12), this implies:
 = () () for any  .
 = () () for any   .
 = () () for any  .
This observation has a convenient implication. We must have that the price diﬀerence between
any two tasks produced by the same type of worker must exactly oﬀset the productivity diﬀerence of





for any 0  ,w h e r et h el a s te q u a l i t yd e ﬁnes  as the price “index” of tasks performed by low skill
workers. Note, however, that this price is endogenous not only because of the usual supply-demand
reasons, but also because the set of tasks performed by low skill workers is endogenously determined.










The Cobb-Douglas technology (the unitary elasticity of substitution between tasks) in (11) implies
that “expenditure” across all tasks should be equalized, and given our choice of numeraire, this
50expenditure should be equal to the value of total output. More speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst-order conditions
for cost minimization in the production of the ﬁnal good imply that ()()=(0)(0) for any , 0.
Alternatively, using our choice of the ﬁnal good as the numeraire, we can write
()()= , for any  ∈ [01] (17)
(In particular, note that the ideal price index for the ﬁnal good, ,i sd e ﬁned such that () =
(), and our choice of numeraire implies that  =1 , which gives (17)).
Now consider two tasks 0   (performed by low skill workers), then using the deﬁnition of the





Therefore, for any 0  , we conclude that ()=(0), and using the market clearing condition




for any   (18)
This is a very convenient implication of the Cobb-Douglas production structure. With a similar








for any   (20)
The above expressions are derived by comparing expenditures on tasks performed by the same type
of worker. Now comparing two tasks performed by high and medium skill workers (    0),
































51No arbitrage across skills
The above derivations show that the key equilibrium objects of the model are the threshold tasks
 and . These will be determined by a type of “no arbitrage” condition equalizing the cost of
producing these threshold tasks using diﬀerent skills. We now derive these no arbitrage conditions
and determine the thresholds tasks.
Recall, in particular, that the threshold task  must be such that it can be proﬁtably produced
using either high skilled or medium skilled workers. This is equivalent to task  having the same
supply either when produced only with skilled or unskilled workers.67 That is, it implies our ﬁrst no















Equilibrium wages and inequality
Once the threshold tasks,  and , are determined, wage levels and earnings diﬀerences across skill
groups can be found in a straightforward manner. In particular, wages are obtained simply as the
values of the marginal products of diﬀerent types of skills. For example, for low skill workers, this is:
 =  (25)
Equally, or perhaps even more, important than the level of wages are their ratios, which inform us








A more convenient way of expressing these is to use (21) and write the relative wages simply in terms

























67Alternatively, the unit cost of producing task  should be the same with medium and high skill workers,
i.e.,  () =  (). We then obtain (23) using (26). Similarly, (24) can be obtained from
 () =  () using (27).
52These expressions highlight the central role that allocation of tasks to skills plays in the model. Relative
wages can be expressed simply as a function of relative supplies and equilibrium task assignments (in
particular, the threshold tasks,  and ).
These equations, together with the choice of the numeraire,
R 1
0 ln() =0 , fully characterize the
equilibrium. In particular, using (14)-(16), we can write the last equilibrium condition as:
Z 
0
(ln − ln ()) +
Z 

(ln − ln ()) +
Z 1

(ln − ln ()) =0  (28)
Equations (26) and (27) give the relative wages of high to medium and medium to low skill workers.
To obtain the wage level for any one of these three groups, we need to use the price normalization in
(28) together with (21) and (22) to solve out for one of the price indices, for example, , and then
(25) will give  and the levels of  and  can be readily obtained from (26) and (27).
Summary of equilibrium
The next proposition summarizes our equilibrium characterization and highlights several important
features of the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium summarized by
(       ) given by equations (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26), (27) and (28).
The only part of this proposition that requires proof is the claim that equilibrium is unique (the
rest of it follows from the explicit construction of the equilibrium preceding the proposition). This
can be seen by noting that in fact the equilibrium is considerably easier to characterize than it ﬁrst
appears because it has a block recursive structure. In particular, we can ﬁrst use (23) and (24) to
determine  and . Given these we can then compute relative wages from (26) and (27). Finally,
to compute wage and price levels, we can use (21), (22), (25) and (28).
Figure 22 shows a diagrammatic representation of the equilibrium, in which curves corresponding
to (23) and (24) determine  and . Both curves are upward sloping in the ( ) space, but
the ﬁrst one, (23), is steeper than the second one everywhere, (24)–see below for a proof. This
establishes the existence of a unique intersection between the two curves in Figure 22, and thus there
exists unique equilibrium values of  and . Given these values,      and  are
uniquely determined from (21), (22), (25), (26), (27) and (28).
While Figure 22 depicts the determination of the two thresholds,  and , it does not illustrate
the allocation of tasks to diﬀerent types of skills (workers). We do this in Figure 23, which can also
be interpreted as a diagram showing “relative eﬀective demand” and “relative eﬀective supply”. In









The right-hand side of this equation corresponds to the relative eﬀective supply of high to medium skills
(we use the term “eﬀective” since the supplies are multiplied by their respective factor-augmenting
technologies). The left-hand side, on the other hand, can be interpreted as the eﬀective demand for
high relative to medium skills. The left-hand side of (29) is shown as the outer curve (on the right) in
Figure 23. It is downward sloping as a function of  (for a given level of )s i n c e () ()








for given , and this expression has the same relative eﬀective demand and supply interpretation.
Since  () () is strictly decreasing again from Assumption 1, the left-hand side traces a
downward sloping curve as a function of  (for given ) and is shown as the inner (on the left)
curve in Figure 23. Where the outer curve equals , as shown on the vertical axis, gives
the threshold task , and where the second curve is equal to  gives . This picture
does not determine the two thresholds simultaneously as Figure 22 does, since the dependence of the
two curves on the other threshold is left implicit. Nevertheless, Figure 23 is helpful in visualizing the
equilibrium because it shows how equilibrium tasks are partitioned between the three types of skills.
We will return to this ﬁgure when conducting comparative static exercises.
4.3 Special Cases
We now study some special cases that help clarify the workings of the model. Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h e r e
are no medium skill workers. Assumption 1 in this case simply implies that  () () is strictly
decreasing in . Then we are back to a two-factor world as in the canonical model.
In addition, we could assume that instead of a continuum of tasks, there are only two tasks, one
in which high skill workers have a strong comparative advantage and the other one in which low
skill workers have a strong comparative advantage.68 This would be identical to the canonical model,
except with a Cobb-Douglas production function (elasticity of substitution between high and low skill
workers equal to one).
Another special case is found in the model studied by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), who also
assume that there are only two types of workers, high and low skill. In addition, Acemoglu and
68Or in fact, one could replicate a model with two tasks using a continuum of tasks, for example, assuming that
 ()=1if  ≤  and 0 otherwise, and  ()=0if  ≤  and 1 otherwise (or a smooth approximation to this that
would satisfy Assumption 1).
54Zilibotti impose the following functional form on the schedule of comparative advantage schedules:
 ()=1−  and  ()= (30)
Then an equivalent of (23) implies that all tasks below  will be performed by low skill workers and
those above  will be performed by high skill workers. Moreover, exactly the same reasoning that led
to the no arbitrage conditions, (23) and (24), now determines the single threshold task, ,s e p a r a t i n g
tasks performed by low and high skill workers. In particular, using (30), the equivalent of (23) and









In addition, the equivalent of (21) and (22) now gives the relative price of tasks performed by skilled





















Therefore, in this case the model is isomorphic to the canonical model with an elasticity of sub-
stitution equal to 2. This also shows that by choosing diﬀerent forms for the comparative advantage
schedules in the special case with only two types of skills, one could obtain any elasticity of substitu-
tion, or in fact any constant returns to scale production function (with an elasticity of substitution
greater than or equal to 1) as a special case of the model shown here. This is the sense in which the
canonical model, and thus all of economic forces emphasized by that model, are already embedded in
our more general task-based framework.
Finally, another special case is useful both to show how insights from the two-skill model continue
to hold in the three-skill model and also to illustrate how technical change in this task-based model can
reduce the wages of some groups. For this, let us return to our general three-skill model introduced
above, but suppose that
 ()=
½
˜  if  ≤ ˜ 
0 if ˜ 
(31)
where ˜  is large and ˜  is small. While this task productivity schedule for low skill workers is
neither continuous nor strictly decreasing (and thus does not satisfy Assumption 1), we can easily
take a strictly decreasing continuous approximation to (31), which will lead to identical results. The
implication of this task schedule is that the no arbitrage condition between low and medium skills,
(24), can only be satisﬁed at the threshold task  = ˜ .T h i sﬁxes one of the equilibrium thresholds,
55while the other one, , is still determined in the usual fashion from the other no arbitrage condition,
(23). Figure 24 adapts Figure 22 and shows how the determination of equilibrium task thresholds
looks in this case.
This case is of interest for two reasons. First, the model is now essentially identical to the two-
skill version we have just discussed, since the set of tasks performed by low skill workers is ﬁxed by
the task productivity schedule (31) (without reference to other parameters in the model). Thus the
mechanics of the equilibrium are simpler. Second, in the three-skill model, as we will see further in
the next subsection, a variety of changes that directly aﬀect  will have an indirect impact on 
and these tend to “soften the blow” of some of these changes on the medium skill workers. With 
ﬁxed at ˜ , this will not be the case and thus the wage eﬀects of certain types of technical change on
medium skilled workers will be exacerbated in this case. We return to this special case again in the
next subsection.
4.4 Comparative Statics
The usefulness of any framework is related to the insights that it generates, which are most clearly
illustrated by its comparative static results. We discuss these here.
To derive these comparative statics, we return to the general model, and take logs in equations
(23) and (24) to obtain slightly simpler expressions, given by the following two equations:
ln − ln +  ()+l n − ln − ln( − )+l n( 1− )=0  (32)
and
ln − ln +  ()+l n − ln +l n(  − ) − ln()=0  (33)
w h e r ew eh a v ed e ﬁned
 () ≡ ln () − ln () and  () ≡ ln () − ln ()
both of which are strictly decreasing in view of Assumption 1. It can be easily veriﬁed that both of
these curves are upward sloping in the ( ) space, but (32) is everywhere steeper than (33) as
claimed above, which also implies that there is indeed a unique intersection between the two curves
as shown in Figure 22.
Basic comparative statics
Basic comparative statics for the allocation of tasks across diﬀerent skill groups can be obtained from
this ﬁgure. For example, an increase in , corresponding to high skill biased technical change, shifts
( 3 2 )i n w a r d sa ss h o w ni nF i g u r e2 5s ob o t h and  decrease (the implications of an increase in 
56for task allocation, though not for wages, are identical). This is intuitive: if high skill workers become
uniformly more productive because of high skill biased technical change–generating an expansion of
the set of tasks in which they hold comparative advantage–then they should perform a larger range
of tasks. Thus the allocation of tasks endogenously shifts away from medium to high skill workers
( adjusts downward). If  remained constant following the downward movement of  this would
imply from (19) an “excess” supply of medium skill workers in the remaining tasks. Therefore, the
indirect eﬀect of the increase in  (or )i sa l s ot or e d u c e, thus shifting some of tasks previously
performed by low skill workers to medium skill workers.
Similarly, we can analyze the implications of skill biased technical change directed towards low
skill workers, i.e., an increase in , (or a change in the supply of low skill workers, ), which will
be to increase  and . This has exactly the same logic (there are either more low skill workers or
low skill workers are more productive, and thus they will perform more tasks, squeezing medium skill
workers, who now have to shift into some of the tasks previously performed by high skill workers). The
implications of medium skill biased technical change, increasing  (or of an increase in ) again
have a similar logic, and will reduce  and increase , thus expanding the set of tasks performed
by medium skill workers at the expense of both low and high skill workers. (Formally, in this case,
the curve corresponding to (32) shifts up, while that for (33) shifts down). Each of these comparative
statics illustrates the substitution of skills across tasks.
It is also useful to return to Figure 23 to visually represent changes in the task allocation resulting
from an increase in , and we do this in Figure 26. Such a change shifts the outer curve in Figure
23 downward as shown in Figure 26, reducing .T h i s ﬁrst shift holds  constant. However, the
inner curve in this ﬁgure also shifts, as noted above and as highlighted by Figures 22 and 24. The
decline in  also shifts this curve down, this time reducing . Then there is a second round of
adjustment as the decline in  shifts the outer curve further down. Ultimately, the economy reaches
a new equilibrium as shown in Figure 26.
It is a little more diﬃcult to visually represent the changes in the wage structure resulting from
changes in technology or supplies, because these depend on how  changes relative to . Neverthe-
less, obtaining these comparative static results is also straightforward. To do this, let us consider a
change in  and let us totally diﬀerentiate (32) and (33). We thus obtain:
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I tc a nb ee a s i l yv e r i ﬁed that all of the terms in the diagonals of the matrix on the left hand side are






















































Using these expressions, we can obtain comparative statics for how relative wages by skill group
change when there is high skill biased technical change. A similar exercise can be performed for low
and medium skill biased technical change. The next proposition summarizes the main results.
Proposition 2 The following comparative static results apply:
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Part 1 of this proposition follows by straightforward diﬀerentiation and manipulation of the ex-
pressions in (32) and (33) for  and . Parts 2 and 3 then follow readily from the expressions
58for relative wages in (26) and (27) using the behavior of these thresholds. Here we simply give the
intuition for the main results.
First, the behavior of  and  in Part 1 is intuitive as already discussed above. In particular,
an increase in  or  expands the set of tasks performed by high skill workers and contracts the
set of tasks performed by low and medium skill workers. This is equivalent to  decreasing and 
increasing. An increase in  or  similarly expands the set of tasks performed by medium skill
workers and contracts those allocated to low and high skill workers. Mathematically, this corresponds
to a decline in  a n da ni n c r e a s ei n. The implications of an increase in  or  are analogous,
and raise both  and , expanding the set of tasks performed by low skill workers.
Second, the fact that relative demand curves are downward sloping for all factors, as claimed in
Part 2, parallels the results in the canonical model (or in fact the more general results in Acemoglu,
2007, for any model with constant or diminishing returns at the aggregate level). The new result here
concerns the impact of an increase in  on . We have seen that such an increase raises 
and reduces , expanding the set of tasks performed by medium skill workers at the expense of both
low and high skill workers. This will put downward pressure on the wages of both low and high skill
workers, and the impact on the relative wage, , is ambiguous for reasons we will encounter
again below. In particular, it will depend on the form of the comparative advantage schedules in the
neighborhood of  and . When the absolute value of 0
 () is high (relative to 0
 ()), this
implies that low skill workers have a strong comparative advantage for tasks below . Consequently,
medium skill workers will not be displacing low skill workers much, instead having a relatively greater
impact on high skill workers, and in this case  will decline. Conversely, when the absolute value
of 0
 () is low relative to the absolute value of 0
 (), high skill workers have a strong comparative
advantage for tasks right above , and the medium skill tasks will expand at the expense of low skill
workers relatively more, thus increasing .
Third, the results summarized in Part 3 of the proposition, linking wages to technologies, are also
intuitive. For example, an increase in , corresponding to high skill biased technical change, increases
both  and  (i.e., high skill wages rise relative to both medium skill and low skill wages)
as we may have expected from the canonical model. Perhaps more interestingly, an increase in 
also unambiguously reduces  despite the fact that it reduces the set of tasks performed by
both medium and low skill workers. Intuitively, the ﬁrst order (direct) eﬀect of an increase in 
is to contract the set of tasks performed by medium skill workers. The impact on low skill workers
is indirect, resulting from the fact that medium skill workers become cheaper and this makes ﬁrms
expand the set of tasks that these workers perform. This indirect eﬀect never dominates the direct
eﬀect, and thus the wages of medium skill workers decrease relative to those of low skill workers when
59there is high skill biased technical change.
The implications of medium skill biased technical are distinct from the canonical case. Medium
skill biased technical changes has a direct eﬀect on both high skill and low skill workers. Consequently,
the behavior of  is ambiguous. Similarly to how an increase in  aﬀects , the impact
of a rise in  on  depends on the exact form of the comparative advantage schedules. When
0
 () is larger in absolute value than 0
 (),  is more likely to decline. Intuitively, this
corresponds to the case in which low skill workers have strong comparative advantage for tasks below
 relative to the comparative advantage of high skill workers for tasks above . In this case, medium
skill workers will expand by more into (previously high skill tasks than (previously) low skill tasks.
The levels of  and 1 −  also matter for this result; the higher is , the smaller is the eﬀect on
low skill wages of a given size reduction in the set of tasks performed by low skill workers (and vice
versa for 1 − ).
Finally, we can further parameterize the task productivity schedules,  (),  () and  (),
and perform comparative statics with respect to changes in these schedules. Naturally in this case
unambiguous comparative statics are not always obtainable–though, as discussed below, changes that
twist or shift these schedules in speciﬁc ways lead to intuitive results.
One attractive feature of the model, highlighted by the characterization results and the comparative
statics in Proposition 2, is that all equilibrium o b j e c t sd e p e n do nt h es e to ft a s k sp e r f o r m e db yt h e
three diﬀerent groups of workers. Depending on which set of tasks expands (contracts) more, wages
of the relevant group increase (decrease). This is useful for understanding the workings of the model
and also provides a potentially tractable connection between the model and the data.
Wage eﬀects
Given the comparative static results on the relative wages and the numeraire equation (28), we can
derive predictions on the eﬀects of technical change on wage levels. Although these are in general
more complicated than the eﬀects on relative wages, it should be intuitively clear that there is a
central contrast between our framework and the canonical model: any improvement in technology in
the canonical model raises the wages of all workers, whereas in our task-based framework an increase in
 (high skill biased technical change), for example, can reduce the wages of medium skilled workers
because it erodes their comparative advantage and displaces them from (some of) the tasks that they
were previously performing.69
To see how high skill biased technical change, i.e., an increase in , can reduce medium skill
69One could, however, draw a parallel between changes in (factor-augmenting) technology in this model and changes in
the distribution parameter, , in the canonical model (recall footnote 54). Unlike factor-augmenting technologies, shifts
in the distribution parameter can reduce the wages of the skill group whose corresponding multiplier is reduced.
60wages more explicitly, let us work through a simple example. Return to the special case discussed
above where the task productivity schedule for the low skill workers is given by (31), implying that
that  = ˜ . Suppose also that  () ≡ ln () − ln () is constant, so that the no arbitrage
condition between high and medium skills in Figure 25 (or Figure 22) is ﬂat. Now consider an increase
in . This will not change  (since  = ˜  in any equilibrium), but will have a large impact on 
(in view of the fact that the no arbitrage locus between high and medium skills is ﬂat). Let us next
turn to an investigation of the implications of this change in  on medium skill wages.
Recall from the same argument leading to (25) that
 = 
Since  is constant, the eﬀect on medium skill wages works entirely through the price index for
tasks performed by medium skill workers. To compute this price index, let us use (21) and (22) to


























































The ﬁrst term is positive and results from the indirect eﬀect of the increase in productivity of  workers
on the wages of medium skill workers operating through q-complementarity (i.e., an increase in pro-
ductivity increases the wages of all workers because it increases the demand for all types of labor).
We know from our comparative static analysis that ln is negative, and moreover given the
assumptions we have imposed here, this eﬀect is large (meaning that there will be a large expansion
of high skill workers into tasks previously performed by medium skill workers following an increase in
). Therefore, if  () ≥  (),  ≤ ,a n d1 −  ≤  − , the remaining terms
in this expression are all negative and can be arbitrarily large (and in fact, some of these inequalities
could be reversed and the overall expression could still be negative and arbitrarily large). This implies
that an increase in  can signiﬁcantly reduce  and thus .
This result illustrates that in our task-based framework, in which changes in technology aﬀect
the allocation of tasks across skills, a factor-augmenting increase in productivity for one group of
61workers can reduce the wages of another group by shrinking the set of tasks that they are performing.
This contrasts with the predictions of the canonical model and provides a useful starting point for
interpreting the co-occurrence of rising supplies of high skill labor, ongoing skill biased demand shifts
(stemming in part from technical change), and falling real earnings among less educated workers.
4.5 Task Replacing Technologies
A central virtue of our general task-based framework is that it can be used to investigate the impli-
cations of capital (embodied in machines) directly displacing workers from tasks that they previously
performed. In general, we expect that tasks performed by all three skill groups are subject to machine
displacement. Based on the patterns documented in the data above, as well as the general characteri-
zation of machine-task substitution oﬀered by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), we believe the set of
tasks most subject to machine displacement in the current era are those that are routine or codiﬁable.
Such tasks are primarily, though not exclusively, performed by medium skill (semi-skilled) workers.
For this reason, let us suppose that there now exists a range of tasks [000] ⊂ [ ] for which  ()
increases suﬃciently (with ﬁxed cost of capital ) so that are now more economically preformed by
machines than middle skill workers. For all the remaining tasks, i.e., for all  ∈ [000],w ec o n t i n u et o
assume that  ()=0 . What are the implications of this type of technical change for the supply of
diﬀerent types of tasks and for wages?
Our analysis directly applies to this case and implies that there will now be a new equilibrium
characterized by thresholds ˆ  and ˆ . Moreover, we have the following proposition generalizing
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 for this case:
Proposition 3 Suppose we start with an equilibrium characterized by thresholds [ ] and technical
change implies that the tasks in the range [000] ⊂ [ ] are now performed by machines. Then after
the introduction of machines, there exists new unique equilibrium characterized by new thresholds ˆ 
and ˆ  such that 0  ˆ   0  00  ˆ   1 and for any ˆ , ()=()=0and ()=ˆ ;f o r
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´
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1 − ˆ 
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.
This proposition immediately makes clear that, as a consequence of machines replacing tasks
previously performed by medium skill workers, there will be a reallocation of tasks in the economy.
In particular, medium skill workers will now start performing some of the tasks previously allocated
to low skill workers, thus increasing the supply of these tasks (the same will happen at the top with
an expansion of some of the high skill tasks). This proposition therefore gives us a way of thinking
about how new technologies replacing intermediate tasks (in practice, most closely corresponding to
62routine, semi-skilled occupations) will directly lead to the expansion of low skill tasks (corresponding
to service occupations).
We next investigate the wage inequality implications of the introduction of these new tasks. For
simplicity, we focus on the case where we start with [000]=∅, and then the set of tasks expands
to an interval of size 0,w h e r e0 is small. This mathematical approach is used only for expositional
simplicity because it enables us to apply diﬀerential calculus as above. None of the results depend on
the set of tasks performed by machines being small.
Under the assumptions outlined here, and using the results in Proposition 3, we can write the
equivalents of (32) and (33) as
ln − ln +  ()+l n − ln − ln( −  − )+l n( 1− )=0  (34)
and
ln − ln +  ()+l n − ln +l n(  −  − ) − ln()=0  (35)
When  =0 , these equations give the equilibrium before the introduction of machines replacing
medium skill tasks, and when  = 0  0, they describe the new equilibrium. Conveniently, we can
obtain the relevant comparative statics by using these two equations. In particular, the implications



























































where recall that ∆ is the determinant of the matrix on the left hand side. These results conﬁrm
the statements in Proposition 3 concerning the set of tasks performed by low and high skill workers
expanding.
Given these results on the allocation of tasks, we can also characterize the impact on relative
wages. These are stated in the next proposition. Here, we state them for the general case, rather
than the case in which the range of tasks performed by machines is inﬁnitesimal, since they can be
generalized to this case in a straightforward manner (proof omitted).
63Proposition 4 Suppose we start with an equilibrium characterized by thresholds [ ] and technical
change implies that the tasks in the range [000] ⊂ [ ] are now performed by machines. Then:
1.  increases;
2.  decreases;



















The ﬁrst two parts of the proposition are intuitive. Because new machines replace the tasks
previously performed by medium skill workers, their relative wages, both compared to high and low
skill workers, decline. In practice, this corresponds to the wages of workers in the middle of the
income distribution, previously performing relatively routine tasks, falling compared to those at the
top and the bottom of the wage distribution. Thus the introduction of new machines replacing middle
skilled tasks in this framework provides a possible formalization of the ‘routinization’ hypothesis and
a possible explanation for job and wage polarization discussed in Section 2.
Note that the impact of this type of technical change on the wage of high skill relative to low skill
workers is ambiguous; it depends on whether medium skill workers displaced by machines are better
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¯ ¯ implies that medium skill workers are closer substitutes for low than high skill workers in
the sense that, around , there is a stronger comparative advantage of high skill relative to medium
skill workers than there is comparative advantage of low relative to medium skill workers around 
The terms  and (1−) have a similar intuition. If the set of tasks performed by high skill workers
is larger than the set of tasks performed by low skill workers ((1 − )  ), the reallocation of a
small set of tasks from high to medium skill workers will have a smaller eﬀect on high skill wages than
will an equivalent reallocation of tasks from low to medium skill workers (in this case, for low skill
wages).
It appears plausible that in practice, medium skill workers previously performing routine tasks are
a closer substitute for low skill workers employed in manual and service occupations than they are
for high skill workers in professional, managerial and technical occupations.70 Indeed the substantial
movement of medium skill high school and some college workers out of clerical and production positions
and into service occupations after 1980 (Figure 14) may be read as prima facie evidence that the
comparative advantage of middle skill workers (particularly middle skill males) is relatively greater
70Juhn (1994) develops a model in which middle skill workers are closer substitutes for low than high skill workers. A
decline in demand for middle skill workers consequently places greater downward pressure on low than high skill wages.
64in low rather than high skill tasks. If so, Part 3 of this proposition implies that we should also see
an increase in . Alternatively, if suﬃciently many middle skill workers displaced by machines
move into high skill occupations,  may also increase. This latter case would correspond to one
in which, in relative terms, low skill workers are the main beneﬁciaries of the introduction of new
machines into the production process.
Let us ﬁnally return to the basic comparative statics and consider a change in the task productivity




˜ −˜  () if  ≤ ˜ 
˜  () if ˜ 
(36)
where ˜  () is a function that satisﬁes Assumption 1 and  ≥ 1, and suppose that ˜  is in the
neighborhood of the equilibrium threshold task for high skill workers, . The presence of the term

˜ − in (36) implies that an increase in  creates a rotation of the task productivity schedule for high
skill workers around ˜ .
Consider next the implications of an increase in . This will imply that high skill workers can now
successfully perform tasks previously performed by medium skill workers, and hence high skill workers
will replace them in tasks close to ˜  (or close to the equilibrium threshold ). Therefore, even
absent machine-substitution for medium skill tasks, the model can generate comparative static results
similar to those discussed above. This requires that the task productivity schedule for high skill (or
low skill) workers twists so as to give them comparative advantage in the tasks that were previously
performed by medium skill workers. The parallel roles that technology (embodied in machinery) and
task productivity schedules (represented by (·)) play in the model is also evident if we interpret
the task productivity schedule of high skill workers more broadly as including not only their direct
productivity when performing a task, but also their productivity when supervising (or operating)
machinery used in those tasks. Thus the framework oﬀers a parallel between the analytics of, on the
one hand, new machinery that replaces medium skill workers and, on the other hand, changes in the
task productivity schedule of high skill workers that enable them to replace medium skill workers in
a subset of tasks.
4.6 Endogenous choice of skill supply
We have so far focused on one type of substitution, which we referred to as substitution of skills
across tasks. A complementary force is substitution of workers across diﬀerent skills, meaning that
in response to changes in technology or factor supplies, workers may change the types of skills they
supply to the market. We now brieﬂy discuss this additional type of substitution.
65Environment
To allow for substitution workers across diﬀerent types of skills, we now assume that each worker  is
endowed with some amount of “low skill,” “medium skill,” and “high skill,” respectively ,  and














which captures the fact that the worker with skill vector
¡
  ¢
will have to allocate his time
between jobs requiring diﬀerent types of skills. Generally, we will see that each worker will prefer to
allocate his or her time entirely to one type of skill.
The production side of the economy is identical to the framework developed so far. Our analysis











where ,  and  are the sets of workers choosing to supply their low, medium and high skills
respectively.











There are similar inequalities determining when a worker will be in the sets  and . To keep the
model tractable, we now impose a type of single-crossing assumption in supplies. We order workers
over the interval (01) in such a way that lower indexed workers have a comparative advantage in
supplying high relative to medium skills and in medium relative to low skills. More speciﬁcally, we
impose:
Assumption 2  and  are both strictly decreasing in  and lim→0  = ∞ and
lim→1  =1 .
This assumption implies that lower index workers have a comparative advantage in high skill tasks
and higher index workers have a comparative advantage in low skill tasks. Moreover, at the extremes
these comparative advantages are strong enough that there will always be some workers choosing to
supply high and low skills. An immediate implication is the following lemma:
66Lemma 2 For any ratios of wages  and ,t h e r ee x i s t∗ () and ∗∗ ()
such that 

 =1for all  ∗ (), 

 =1for all  ∈ (∗ ()∗∗ ()) and


 =1for all  ∗∗ (). ∗ () and ∗∗ () are both strictly increasing in their
arguments.






















Note that given Assumption 2, ∗ () and ∗∗ () are both strictly increasing in their
arguments. This implies that all else equal, a higher wage premium for high relative to medium skills
encourages more workers to supply high rather than medium skills to the market. The same type
of comparative static applies when there is a higher premium for medium relative to low skills. In

















The ﬁrst expression, together with the fact that ∗ () is strictly increasing, implies that holding
 constant, an increase in  increases . Similarly, holding  constant, an
increase in  increases . Consequently, in addition to the comparative advantage of diﬀerent
t y p e so fs k i l l sa c r o s sd i ﬀerent tasks, we now have comparative advantage of workers in supplying
diﬀerent types of skills, which can be captured by two “upward sloping” relative supply curves.
The next proposition and the associated comparative static results exploit these insights.
Proposition 5 In the model with endogenous supplies, there exists a unique equilibrium summa-
rized by summarized by (       ∗ ()∗∗ ()) given
by equations (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26), (27), (28), (37) and (38).
To prove the uniqueness of equilibrium requires a little more work in this case, and the argument
is thus relegated to the Theoretical Appendix.
Comparative statics and interpretation
The major change to the analysis introduced by allowing for the endogenous supply of skills is that
when there is factor-augmenting technical change (or the introduction of capital that directly substitute
67for workers in various tasks), the induced changes in wages will also aﬀect supplies (even in the
short run). Accordingly, there will also be substitution of workers across diﬀerent types of skills.
When, for example, new machines replace medium skill workers in a set of tasks, this will induce
some of the workers that were previously supplying medium skills to now supply either low or high
skills. If the more elastic margin is the one between medium and low skills, we would expect a
signiﬁcant fraction of the workers previously supplying medium skills and working in intermediate
tasks to now supply low skills and perform relatively low-ranked tasks. This type of substitution
therefore complements the substitution of skills across tasks. Finally, assuming that eﬀective supplies
are distributed unequally across workers, this model also generates a richer distribution of earnings
inequality (and richer implications for overall inequality).
We can potentially interpret the changes in the U.S. wage and employment structures over the last
several decades through the lens of this framework. Let us take the comparative advantage schedules
as given, and consider what combinations of factor-augmenting technical changes, introduction of
new machines replacing tasks previously performed by diﬀerent types of workers, and supply changes
would be necessary to explain the patterns we observe. As we have seen, during the 1980s the U.S.
labor market experienced declining wages at the bottom of the distribution together with a relative
contraction in employment in low-wage occupations (though notably, a rise in employment in service
occupations as underscored by Autor and Dorn, 2010), and also rising wages and employment in high
skill occupations. In terms of our model, this would be a consequence of an increase in  and
, which is the analog of skill biased technical change in this three factor model. We see a
diﬀerent pattern commencing in the 1990s, however, where the behavior of both employment shares
and wage percentiles is U-shaped, as documented above. In terms of our model, this would result
from rising penetration of information technology that replaces middle skill tasks (i.e., those with a
substantial routine component). This will depress both the wages of medium skill workers and reduce
employment in tasks that were previously performed by these medium skill workers. In the most
recent decade (2000s), employment in low-wage service occupations has grown even more rapidly. In
terms of our model, this could be an implication of the displacement of medium skill workers under
the plausible assumption that the relative comparative advantage of middle skill workers is greater in
low than high skill tasks. This would therefore be an example of substitution of skills across tasks.
T h i sp r o c e s si sa m p l i ﬁed in our model if we also allow for substitution of workers across skills. In that
case, some of the workers previously supplying medium skills to routine tasks switch to supplying low
skills to manual and service tasks.
We stress that this interpretation of the gross patterns in the data is speculative and somewhat
coarse. Our objective here is not to provide a deﬁnitive explanation for the rich set of facts oﬀered
68by the data but rather to oﬀer a set of tools that may be applied towards a more reﬁned set of
explanations.71
4.7 Oﬀshoring
Alongside technological advances, a major change potentially aﬀecting the U.S. and other advanced
market economies over the past two decades has been the change in the structure of international trade,
whereby instead of simply trading ﬁnished goods and services, there has been a greater tendency to
engage in trade in tasks through “outsourcing” and “oﬀshoring” certain tasks to countries where they
can now be performed at lower cost. This process particularly applies to information-based tasks,
which in recent years have become nearly costless and instantaneous to transport. An advantage of
our task-based model is that it provides a uniﬁed framework for the analysis of this type of oﬀshoring
(or outsourcing) in a way that parallels the impact of machines replacing tasks previously performed
by certain types of workers.
To illustrate how oﬀshoring of tasks aﬀects the structure of wages, suppose that a set of tasks
[000] ⊂ [ ] can now be oﬀshored to a foreign country, where wages are suﬃciently low that such
oﬀshoring is cost minimizing for domestic ﬁnal good producers. This assumption, of course, parallels
our analysis of machines replacing tasks. In return, these ﬁrms can trade in the ﬁnal good to ensure
trade balance. In this case, it is straightforward to see that the equivalents of Propositions 3 and 4 will
hold. In particular, the next proposition contains the relevant results summarizing the implications
of oﬀshoring for the allocation of tasks across workers and for wage inequality.
Proposition 6 Suppose we start with an equilibrium characterized by thresholds [ ] and changes
in technology allow tasks in the range [000] ⊂ [ ] to be oﬀshored. Then after oﬀshoring, there
exists new unique equilibrium characterized by new thresholds ˆ    and ˆ    such that 0  ˆ  







ˆ  − 00 + 0 − ˆ 
´
; for any  ∈ (000), ()=()=()=0 ;
71Autor and Dorn (2010), for example, oﬀer a closely related but distinct interpretation of the same patterns. In their
model, advancing information technology displaces non-college workers performing routine tasks in production of goods,
leading these workers to supply manual labor to service tasks instead. This is equivalent to substitution of skills across
tasks in the current model. In Autor and Dorn (2010), this supply eﬀect initially depresses wages in low skill services.
But as the price of automating routine tasks becomes ever cheaper, the opportunity for further substitution of skills
across tasks is eventually exhausted when essentially all non-college workers have exited goods production. At this point,
the imperfect substitutability in consumption between goods and services outputs drives wage setting in services as in
Baumol (1967). If the substitution elasticity between goods and services is less than or equal to unity, wage inequality
between college workers (who supply abstract tasks to goods production) and non-college workers (who supply manual
tasks to service production) either asymptotes to a constant or reverses direction–leading to wage and employment
polarization. The Autor and Dorn (2010) hypothesis, as well as the framework developed here, can explain the rapid
growth in service occupation employment starting in the 1980s, a period when routine-intensive occupations were in
decline (see Figure 13).
69and for any ˆ , ()=()=0and ()=
³
1 − ˆ 
´
. The implications of oﬀshoring on the
structure of wages are as follows:
1.  increases;
2.  decreases;













While the extension of the model to oﬀshoring is immediate, the substantive point is deeper. The
task-based model oﬀers an attractive means, in our view, to place labor supply, technological change,
and trading opportunities on equal economic footing. In our model, each is viewed as oﬀering a
competing supply of tasks that, in equilibrium, are allocated to productive activities in accordance
with comparative advantage and cost minimization. This approach is both quite general and, we
believe, intuitively appealing.
4.8 Directed Technical Change
We have so far investigated the implications of extending and, in some senses rewriting, the canonical
model by allowing for the endogenous allocation of skill groups across tasks and workers across skill
groups, and considering how technology and oﬀshoring interact with this process. A ﬁnal, potentially
signiﬁcant aspect of the economic environment absent from the canonical model is the endogeneity
of technological progress to other changes in the labor market. We now discuss how this endogenous
technology aspect can be incorporated to enrich our understanding of the operation of the labor market
as well as the task-based model we have so far developed.
General discussion
Acemoglu (1998, 2002a) argues that both long run and medium run changes in U.S. labor markets
can be understood, at least partly, as resulting from endogenous changes in technology that responds
to changes in supplies. From this perspective, Tinbergen’s race between supplies and technology is
endogenously generated. Autonomous changes in skill supplies–resulting from demographic trends,
evolving preferences, and shifts in public and private education–induce endogenous changes in tech-
nology, which increase the demand for skills. These demand shifts in turn lead to endogenous increases
in skill supplies and, subsequently, further technological progress. While the impact of technological
change on the supply of skills (responding to the skill premium) is standard, the response of technology
to (relative) supplies is the more central and novel part of this explanation.
70Formally, papers by Acemoglu (1998, 2002b) generalize the canonical model with two types of skills
and two types of factor-augmenting technologies so as to endogenize the direction of technical change
(and thus the relative levels of the two technologies). This work shows that an increase in the relative
supply of skills will endogenously cause technology to become more skill biased. Moreover, this induced
skill bias could be strong enough that endogenous technology (or “long-run”) relative demand curves
can be upward sloping rather than downward sloping. This contrasts with the necessarily downward
sloping relative demand for skills in the canonical model and also in the Ricardian model studied
here (which, so far, holds technology constant). If the induced response of technology is suﬃciently
strong to make the endogenous relative demand curves upward sloping, then the increase in the skill
premium that the U.S. and many OECD labor markets experienced during the last three decades may
be, at least in part, a response to the large increase in the supply of skills that commenced in these
economies some decades earlier (around the 1960s).
Acemoglu (2002b) showed that for this strong form of endogenous skill bias (in the context of the
canonical model) an elasticity of substitution between high and low skill labor greater than a certain
threshold (which is somewhere between one and two) is suﬃcient. Thus for reasonable values of the
elasticity of substitution, the induced response of technology to supplies will be strong enough to make
the long-run price of skills increase in response to increases in the supply of skills–a stark contrast to
the neoclassical model with constant technology, which always predicts that demand curves for factors
are downward sloping.
A shift in focus from the canonical model to a task-based framework signiﬁcantly enriches the
mechanisms by which technology can respond endogenously to changes in (relative) supplies. In
particular, in the context of our Ricardian model, we can allow two types of endogenous responses of
technologies to changes in supplies. First, we can assume that factor-augmenting technologies respond
to skill supplies (namely the terms , ,a n d). This idea is analyzed by Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(2001) for the special case of our model discussed in subsection 4.3.72 Second, we can also allow for
the comparative advantage schedules (the (·)’s) to respond endogenously to skill supplies. This case
is both more novel and more relevant to our discussion of the importance of tasks to understanding
major labor market developments, and we pursue it here.
W h i l ew ew o u l dh a v et oi m p o s es p e c i ﬁc functional forms to derive exact results on how comparative
advantage schedules will endogenously respond to skill supplies, we can derive more abstract (though
72Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) showed that the response of factor-augmenting technology to supplies works exactly
in the same way in this task-based model as in the canonical model studied in Acemoglu (1998, 2002b). In particular,
because the special case studied in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) is equivalent to a version of the canonical model with
an elasticity of substitution equal to two, technology adjusts in the long run in that model to make the relative demand
for skills entirely ﬂat. It is straightforward to extend this result, again in the model with only high and low skill workers,
so that technology adjusts more or less than this amount. Hence, all of the results in Acemoglu (1998, 2002b) generalize
for factor-augmenting technical change in this task-based environment.
71nevertheless quite tight) predictions about the direction of change of technology by using the more
general framework introduced in Acemoglu (2007). To do this, let us suppose that technologies
are presented by a ﬁnite dimensional variable (vector)  ∈ Θ, and all three comparative advantage
schedules are functions of this vector of technology, i.e., we have  ( | ),  ( | ) and  ( | ).
Since any changes in the factor-augmenting terms, , ,a n d, can be incorporated into these
comparative advantage schedules, we hold the factor-augmenting terms constant.
We assume as in Acemoglu (2007) that a set of monopolistically competitive or oligopolistic ﬁrms
invest in technologies , produce intermediate goods (or machines) embedding this technology, and
sell them to ﬁnal good producers. We also assume that the cost of producing technology  is convex
in . An equilibrium is given by a set of allocations (prices, employment levels and technology levels)
such that taking technology levels as given, ﬁnal good producers maximize proﬁts, and simultane-
ously, taken the demands for technologies from the ﬁnal good sector as given, technology monopolists
(oligopolists) maximize proﬁts. Also, following Acemoglu (2007), we will say that a change in technol-
ogy is (absolutely) biased towards factor  (where  ∈ {}) if the change in technology increases
the price of that factor,  (where again  ∈ {}) at the prevailing factor proportions (i.e.,
when the supplies of the three factors are given by , ,a n d).73 Mathematically, a change in
technology is biased towards factor  if ( | ), written as a function of the supply levels of
the three factors, is nondecreasing in .I np a r t i c u l a r ,w h e n is a continuous one-dimensional variable




Moreover, we say that an increase in the supply of a factor induces technical change that is weakly
biased towards that factor (again focusing on the continuous one-dimensional variable representing
technology) if





where  is the supply level of factor  (for  ∈ {}), (−  | )=( | ),a n d
 is the induced change in technology resulting from a change in the supply of this factor. Using
the same notation, we also say that an increase in the supply of a factor induces technical change that
73The qualiﬁer “absolutely” is introduced, since in Acemoglu (1998, 2002b), bias refers to changes in technologies
aﬀecting relative prices, whereas in this more general framew o r k ,t h ef o c u si so nt h ep r i c el e v e lo faf a c t o r .T oo b t a i n
sharp results on relative price changes, one needs to restrict the focus to factor-augmenting changes (see Acemoglu,
2007). In what follows, all of the references to biased technical change refer to factor price levels, and thus one could
insert the qualiﬁer “absolute,” though we will not do so as to simplify terminology.
74When  is a continuous multidimensional variable (a vector), there is a straightforward generalization of this deﬁnition
(see Acemoglu, 2007). All of the results we discuss here are valid in this general case, but to simplify the exposition, we
will not introduce the necessary notation.
72is strongly biased towards that factor if
(−  | )

=
(−  | )

+





where the notation makes it clear that in contrast to the weak bias case, we are evaluating in this
case the change in the price as the supply also changes (and thus we have the ﬁrst term which is
the direct eﬀect of a change in supply for given technology). Put diﬀerently, we are now tracing an
“endogenous technology” demand curve. In the case of weak bias, however, factor supplies are held
constant (as emphasized by the use of the partial derivative), so weak bias requires only that the
technology-constant demand curve shifts in favor of the factor whose increased supply induced the
initial change in technology (represented by ).
Without specifying either the shape of the comparative advantage schedules or how speciﬁcally
they depend upon , the results in Acemoglu (2007) enable us to have the following two results.
Here we state the results without the full mathematical details. More rigorous statements of these
propositions follow the formulation in Acemoglu (2007), where proofs for these results can be found.
Proposition 7 Under regularity conditions (which ensure the existence of a locally isolated equilib-
rium), an increase in the supply of factor  (for  ∈ {}) will induce technical change weakly
biased towards that factor.
This proposition thus shows that even under the richer form of technical change considered in our
Riccardian model (in particular shifts in the comparative advantage schedules in response to changes
in supplies), the response of the economy to any increase in the supply of a factor will be to undergo
an endogenous change in technology that weakly increases demand for that factor. Therefore, even
in the context of the richer task-based approach developed here, this result implies that there are
strong theoretical reasons to expect the increase in the supply of high skill workers, which the U.S.
and OECD economies experienced over the past three decades, to have induced the development of
technologies favoring these high skill workers. This result does not, however, state that this induced
response will be strong enough to increase the price of the factor that it is becoming more abundant
(i.e., it does not state that long-run demand curves incorporating endogenous technological change
will be upward sloping). This question is investigated in the next proposition.
Proposition 8 Under regularity conditions (which ensure the existence of a locally isolated equilib-
rium), an increase in the supply of factor  (for  ∈ {}) will induce technical change strongly
biased towards that factor–thus increasing the wage of that factor–if and only if the aggregate pro-
duction possibilities set of the economy is locally nonconvex in factor  and technology .
73This local nonconvexity condition implies, loosely, that if we double both the supply of factor 
and the quality or quantity of technology , output will more than double. This form of nonconvexity
is quite common in models of endogenous technical change (e.g., Romer, 1990, and see Acemoglu,
2002b), and it is not a very demanding condition for one primary reason: the technology is not chosen
by the same set of ﬁrms that make the factor demand decisions; if it were, and if these ﬁrms were
competitive, then the equilibrium could not exhibit such local nonconvexity. In our setting (as in
Acemoglu, 2007), however, ﬁnal good producers make factor demands decisions taking technology
as given (while facing constant or diminishing returns), and technology monopolists or oligopolists
make technology decisions taking the factor demands of ﬁnal good producers as given (while again
f a c i n gc o n v e xd e c i s i o np r o b l e m s ) .I nt h i sf o r m u l a t i on, the aggregate production possibilities set of the
economy need not be locally convex (in each of the factors and the vector of technologies). For example,
the result on upward sloping relative demand curves with endogenous technologies in Acemoglu (1998,
2002b) mentioned above corresponds to this type of nonconvexity, and as explained above, only relies
on an elasticity of substitution greater than a certain threshold (between one and two). Therefore,
strong bias of technology does not require unduly strong conditions, though of course whether it
applies in practice is an empirical question on which there is limited evidence.
An example
We now provide a simple example illustrating how endogenous technology enriches the insights of our
task-based model here (and conversely, how the task-based approach enriches the implications of exist-
ing models of directed technical change). Let us return to the task productivity schedule for high skill
workers in (36) discussed in subsection 4.5. Suppose, as we did there, that the equilibrium threshold
task for high skill workers, ,i sc l o s et o˜ . Assume, however, that  is now an endogenous variable,
taking the value low or high  low. As in the general directed technical change framework described
so far in this section, we continue to assume that  is chosen by proﬁt maximizing technology ﬁrms,
which then sell machines (intermediate goods) embodying this technology to ﬁnal good producers.
When will technology ﬁrms choose high instead of low? Recall that, as a starting point, the
equilibrium threshold  is close to ˜ . This implies that high skill workers are not performing many
tasks below ˜  (or in fact, if   ˜ , they are not performing any tasks below ˜ ). As a result, the
return from increasing their productivity in tasks lower than ˜  would be limited. Therefore, we can
presume that to start with,  = low.
Now imagine that the supply of high skill workers,  increases. The general results we have
discussed so far imply that technology will adjust (if technology is indeed endogenous) in a way
that is biased towards high skill workers. However, these results are silent on what the impact of this
74induced change in technology will be on medium skill (or low skill workers). With the speciﬁc structure
outlined here, however, this endogenous technology response will create eﬀects that are predictable.
In particular, as  increases, the equilibrium threshold task for high skill workers, , will decline
given the existing technology (low). Suppose that after the change,  lies signiﬁcantly below ˜ .
This generates a potentially large economic return to increasing the productivity of high skill workers
in the tasks on the interval  to ˜ . This is accomplished by raising  from low to  high.F r o mo u r
discussion in subsection 4.5, however, we know that this corresponds to a change in technology that
will induce high skill workers to become more productive in tasks previously performed by medium
skill workers, which potentially further contracts the set of tasks performed by medium skill workers.
As per our interpretation in subsection 4.5, this process is analytically similar to the case in which
new machines replace medium skill workers in the tasks that they were previously performing.
Hence, the endogenous technology response to an expansion in the supply of high skill workers (in
this case from low to  high) may not only bias technology in their favor (i.e., raising their productivity),
but may also induce them to perform some of the tasks previously performed by medium skill workers
(either directly, or by supervising the operation of new machinery). With an analysis similar to that
in subsection 4.4, this process of endogenous technological change can lead to a decline in the wages
of medium skill workers.
Overall, this example illustrates how the endogenous response of technology to changes in relative
supplies–or, similarly, to changes in trade or oﬀshoring possibilities–may lead to a rich set of changes
in both task productivities and the allocation of skills to tasks. Whether this endogenous technology
response is in fact a central determinant of the changes in task allocations that have taken place over
the past 30 years is an area for further research.
5 Comparative Advantage and Wages: An Empirical Approach
We ﬁnally take a step back from the theoretical framework to consider how the broad implications
of the model might be brought to the data. A key implication of the theory is that holding the
schedule of comparative advantage (that is, the (·)
0 ) constant, changes in the market value of tasks
should aﬀect the evolution of wages by skill group. In particular, our model makes a relatively sharp
prediction: if the relative market price of the tasks in which a skill group holds comparative advantage
declines, the relative wage of that skill group should also decline–even if the group reallocates its
labor to a diﬀerent set of tasks (i.e., due to the change in its comparative advantage).
Critical to this prediction is the distinction made between the wages paid to a skill group and the
wages paid to a given task–a distinction that is meaningful because the assignment of skills to tasks
is endogenous. To see the implications of this distinction, consider a technological change that raises
75the productivity of high skill workers in all tasks (e.g., an increase in ). The model implies that
t h i sw o u l de x p a n dt h es e to ft a s k sp e r f o r m e db yh i g hs k i l lw o r k e r s( i . e . ,l o w e r), so that some tasks
formerly performed by medium skilled workers would now be performed by high skill workers instead.
Thus, relative wages paid to workers performing these (formerly) “middle skill” tasks would actually
increase (since they are now performed by the more productive high skill workers). But crucially,
our analysis also shows that the relative wage of medium skill workers, who were formerly performing
these tasks, would fall.75
This discussion underscores that because of the endogenous assignment of skills to tasks, it is
possible for the relative wage paid to a task to move in the opposite direction from the relative
wage paid to the skill group that initially performed the task.76 By contrast, the relative wage paid
to a given skill group always moves in the same direction as its comparative advantage–that is, a
technological change that increases the productivity of a skill group necessarily raises its relative wage.
Simultaneously, it alters the set of tasks to which that skill is applied.
As a stylized example of how this insight might be brought to the data, we study the evolution
of wages by skill groups, where skill groups are deﬁned according to their initial task specialization
across abstract-intensive, routine-intensive, and manual-intensive occupations. We take these patterns
of occupational specialization as a rough proxy for comparative advantage. Consider the full set of
demographic groups available in the data, indexed by gender, education, age, and region. At the start
of the sample in 1959, we assume that these groups have self-selected into task specialities according to
comparative advantage, taking as given overall skill supplies and task demands (reﬂecting also available
technologies and trade opportunities). Speciﬁcally, let 
, 
 and 
 be the employment shares
of a demographic group in abstract, routine and manual/service occupations in 1959, where  denotes
gender,  denotes education group,  denotes age group, and  denotes region of the country.77 By
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where and  are vectors of time, education, age and region dummies. The 
 and 
 coeﬃcients
75Recall in particular from Proposition 2 that ln  0 and ln()ln  0, and thus  will
fall.
76Nor is this notion far-fetched. Skill levels in production and clerical occupations, as measured by the college employ-
ment or wage-bill share, have risen as employment in these occupations has declined (Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998).
A plausible interpretation of this pattern is that educated workers have comparative advantage in the set of non-routine
tasks in these occupations that remain.
77Here, abstract occupations are professional, managerial and technical occupations; routine occupations are sales, cler-
ical, administrative support, production, and operative occupations; and service occupations include protective service,
food preparation, cleaning, buildings and grounds, and personal care and personal services.
76in this model estimate the decade speciﬁc slopes on the initial occupation shares in predicting wage
changes by demographic group. The routine task category (
) serves as the omitted reference
group. Thus we are conceiving of demographic groups as skill groups, and the  parameters as
reﬂecting their patterns of comparative advantage in 1959.
Our working hypothesis is that the labor market price of routine tasks has declined steeply over the
last three decades due to rising competition from information technology. Conversely, we conjecture
that the labor market prices of abstract and manual tasks will have increased since these tasks are
relatively complementary to the routine tasks (now produced at lower cost and in greater quantity
by capital). This hypothesis implies that we should expect the wages of workers with comparative
advantage in either abstract or manual/service tasks to rise over time while the opposite should occur
for skill groups with comparative advantage in routine tasks. Formally, we anticipate that 
 and

 will rise while the intercepts measuring the omitted routine task category () will decline. These
expected eﬀects reﬂect the rising earnings power of skill groups that hold comparative advantage in
abstract and manual/service tasks relative to skill groups that hold comparative advantage in routine
tasks.
Table 10 presents initial descriptive OLS regressions of equation (40) using Census wage and oc-
cupation data from years 1959 through 2008. Although this empirical exercise is highly preliminary–
indeed, it is intended as an example of an empirical approach rather than a test of the theory–the
pattern of results appears roughly consistent with expectations. Starting with the estimate for males
in column 1, we ﬁnd a rise in relative wages from the 1980s forward for male skill groups that were
initially specialized in abstract tasks. Similarly, starting in the 1980s, we see a substantial increase in
the relative wage of male demographic subgroups that had an initial specialization in manual/service
tasks. In fact, this task specialty moved from being a strongly negative predictor of wages in the 1960s
and 1970s, to a positive predictor from the 1980s forward.
Since the interactions between time dummies and each demographic group’s initial routine oc-
cupation share (
) serves as the omitted reference category in the regression model, these time
intercepts estimate wage trends for demographic groups that hold comparative advantage in routine
tasks. Consistent with a decline in the wages of workers with comparative advantage in routine tasks,
the routine occupation intercepts fall from strongly positive in the 1960s to weakly positive in the
1970s, and then become negative from the 1980s forward.
The second column repeats the initial estimate, now adding main eﬀects for education, age group,
and region. Here, the model is identiﬁed by diﬀerences in initial comparative advantage among workers
within education-age-region cells. The inclusion of these demographic group main eﬀe c t sd o e sn o t
appreciably alter the results.
77Columns 3 and 4 repeat these estimates for females. As with males, the estimates indicate rising
relative wages from 1980 forward for female demographic subgroups that were initially specialized
in abstract tasks. The pattern for the service tasks is less clear cut for females, however. Service
task specialization is surprisingly associated with strong wage gains during the 1960s and 1970s. This
association becomes negative in the 1980s, which is not consistent with the hypothesis above. It then
becomes positive (as predicted) in the ﬁnal two decades of the sample (column 4).
Finally, the routine task specialty intercepts for females go from weakly positive in the 1960s to
strongly negative in the 1970s forward. Thus, the decline in the routine task intercepts starts a decade
earlier for females than males. Inclusion of main eﬀects for education, age group and region generally
strengthens these results and brings them closer in line with our hypotheses.
We stress that this initial cut of the data is intended as an example of how linking the comparative
advantage of skill groups to changes over time in the demands for their task specialties could be used to
explore and interpret the evolution of wages by skill group. The evidence in Table 10 is therefore only
suggestive. But we believe the premise on which this exercise is based is a sound one and has the virtue
of exploring a theoretically-grounded set of empirical implications. This exercise and our discussion
at the beginning of this section, also emphasize that an alternative, and at ﬁrst appealing, approach
of regressing wages on measures of current tasks performed by workers could generate potentially
misleading results.78 In contrast, the approach here exploits the fact that task specialization in the
cross section is informative about the comparative advantage of various skill groups, and it marries
this source of information to a well-speciﬁed hypothesis about how the wages of skill groups that diﬀer
in their comparative advantage should respond to changes in technology, shifts in trade and oﬀshoring
opportunities, and ﬂuctuations in skill supplies.79
78As above, because the allocation of workers to tasks is endogenous, the wages paid to a set of workers previously
performing a given task can fall even as the wages paid to the workers now performing that task rise. Our framework
therefore suggests that a regression of wages on tasks currently performed, or their change over time, would be diﬃcult
to interpret.
79A recent working paper by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) also develops an innovative method for measuring the
impact of changing task prices on wage structure. Using a simple statistical model of occupational wage setting, they
predict that occupations that are specialized in tasks that have declining market value should see a reduction in both
mean occupational wages and the variance of occupational wages (and vice versa for tasks with rising prices). This
latter (variance) eﬀect stems from the interaction between a falling task price and a ﬁxed distribution of task eﬃciencies
within an occupation; as the market value of a given task falls, the variances of wages paid to workers with diﬀering
productivities in that task compresses along with it. An issue that needs further study in their approach is that changes in
task prices will presumably lead to changes in self-selection into occupations, as implied by our model (and more generally
by the assumption that worker are making maximizing choices). This should also aﬀect occupational wage means and
variances. Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux’s exploratory analysis ﬁn d sas i g n i ﬁcant role for both routine-task displacement
and, to a lesser extent, oﬀshoring in contributing to U.S. wage polarization between 1984 and 2001. In addition, their
analysis emphasizes the contribution of declining labor union penetration and shifts in demographic composition to wage
polarization.
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In this paper, we argue that to account for recent changes in the earnings and employment distribution
in the United States and other advanced economies, and also to develop a better understanding
of the impact of technology on labor market outcomes, it is necessary to substantially enrich the
canonical model. Speciﬁcally, we propose relaxing the assumptions implicit in this model that: (i)
the assignment of skills to tasks is ﬁxed (or, more precisely, that skills and tasks are equivalent); and
(ii) technical change takes a purely factor-augmenting form. These strictures, we believe, prevent
the model from shedding light on key phenomena presented by the data and documented above.
These include: (1) substantial declines in real wages of low skill workers over the last three decades;
(2) marked, non-monotone changes in earnings levels in diﬀerent parts of the earnings distribution
during diﬀerent decades; (3) the polarization in the earnings distribution, particularly associated
with a “convexiﬁcation” in the returns to schooling (and perhaps in the returns to other skills); (4)
systematic, non-monotone changes in the distribution of employment across occupations of various
skill levels; (5) the introduction of new technologies–as well as oﬀshoring possibilities in part enabled
by those technologies–that appear to directly substitute machines (capital) for a range of tasks
previously performed by (moderately-skilled) workers.
Having documented these patterns and highlighted why they are particularly challenging for the
canonical model, we argue that a task-based framework, in which tasks are the basic unit of produc-
tion and the allocation of skills to tasks is endogenously determined, provides a fruitful alternative
framework.
In the task-based framework proposed in this chapter, a unique ﬁnal good is produced combining
services of a continuum of tasks. Each worker has one of three types of skills, low, medium and high.
We assume a pattern of comparative advantage such that tasks are ranked in order of complexity,
and medium skill workers are more productive than low skill workers, and less productive than high
skill workers in more complex tasks. We show that the equilibrium allocation of skills to tasks is
determined by two thresholds,  and , such that all tasks below the lower threshold ()a r e
performed by low skill workers, all tasks above the higher threshold () are performed by high skill
workers, and all intermediate tasks are performed by medium skill workers. In terms of mapping this
allocation to reality, we think of the lowest range of tasks as corresponding to service occupations and
other manual occupations that require physical ﬂexibility and adaptability but little training. These
tasks are straightforward for the large majority of workers, but a degree of coordination, sightedness,
and physical ﬂexibility that are not yet easily automated. The intermediate range corresponds to
moderately skilled blue-collar production and white-collar administrative, clerical, accounting and
sales positions that require execution of well-deﬁned procedures (such as calculating or monitoring)
79that can increasingly be codiﬁed in software and performed by inexpensive machinery. Finally, the
highest range corresponds to the abstract reasoning, creative, and problem-solving tasks performed
by professionals, managers and some technical occupations. These tasks require a skill set that is
currently challenging to automate because the procedures used to perform these tasks are poorly
understood.
We show that despite the endogenous allocation of skills to tasks, the model is tractable, and
that relative wages among skill groups depend only on relative supplies and the equilibrium threshold
tasks. Comparative statics of relative wages then depend on how these thresholds change. For example,
whenever  increases (for ﬁxed supplies of low, medium and high skills in the market), there is a
larger range of tasks performed by low skill workers and their relative wages increase. Similarly,
when  decreases, the wages of high skill workers increase and when  −  increases, the relative
wages of medium skill workers increase. We also show that an increase in the supply of high skills, or
alternatively, technical change that makes high skill workers uniformly more productive, reduces 
(intuitively, because there is greater “eﬀective supply” of high skills). In addition to this direct eﬀect,
such a change also has an indirect eﬀect on , because the decrease in ,a tg i v e n, creates an
“excess supply” of medium skill workers in intermediate tasks and thus induces ﬁrms to substitute
these workers for tasks previously performed by low skill workers.
A noteworthy implication of this framework is that technical change favoring one type of worker can
reduce the real wages of another group. Therefore, the richer substitution possibilities between skill
groups aﬀorded by the endogenous allocation of skills to tasks highlights that, distinct from canonical
model, technical change need not raise the wages of all workers. As importantly, this framework enables
us to model the introduction of new technologies that directly substitute for tasks previously performed
by workers of various skill levels. In particular, we can readily model how new machinery (for example,
software that corrects spelling and identiﬁes grammatical errors) can directly substitute for job tasks
performed by various skill groups. This type of technical change provides a richer perspective for
interpreting the impact of new technologies on labor market outcomes. It also makes negative eﬀects
on the real wages of the group that is being directly replaced by the machinery more likely. These
same ideas can also be easily applied to the process of outsourcing and oﬀshoring. Since some tasks are
far more suitable to oﬀshoring than others (e.g., developing web sites versus cutting hair), it is natural
to model oﬀshoring as a technology (like computers) that potentially displaces domestic workers of
various skill levels performing certain tasks, thereby altering their wages by increasing their eﬀective
supply and causing a shift in the mapping between skills and tasks (represented by  and ).
We also show how the model can be extended to incorporate choices on the side of workers to
allocate their labor hours between diﬀerent types of activities and how technical change can be endog-
80enized in this framework. When the direction of technical change and the types of technologies being
adopted are endogenous, not only do we obtain the same types of insights that the existing literature
on directed technical change generates, but we can also see how the development and the adoption
of technologies substituting machines for tasks previously performed by (middle skill) workers can
emerge as a response to changes in relative supplies.
We view our task-based framework and the interpretation of the salient labor market facts through
the lenses of this framework as ﬁrst steps towards developing a richer and more nuanced approach
to the study of interactions between technology, tasks and skills in modern labor markets. Indeed,
it will be a successful ﬁrst step if this framework provides a foundation for researchers to generate
new theoretical ideas and test them empirically. In the spirit of a ﬁrst step, we suggest one means of
parsing changes in real wages over time by demographic groups that is motivated by this theoretical
model. Clearly, more needs to be done to derive tighter predictions from this framework and from
other complementary task-based approaches for the evolution of earnings and employment distribution
both in the United States and other countries. We view this as a promising area for future research.
We also believe that the study of a number of closely related topics in labor economics may be
enriched when viewed through this task perspective, though we must only mention them cursorily
here:
Organizational change: Acemoglu (1999), Bresnahan (1999), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt
(1999), Caroli and Van Reenan (1999), Kremer and Maskin (1999), Garicano (2000), Autor, Levy
and Murnane (2002), Dessain and Santos (2006), and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) among
others, have emphasized the importance of organizational changes as an autonomous factor shaping
the demand for skills or, alternatively, as a phenomenon accompanying other equilibrium changes
impacting earnings inequality. A task-based approach is implicit in several of these studies, and a
systematic framework, like the one proposed here, may enrich the study of the interactions between
organizational changes and the evolution of the distribution of earnings and employment. We also note
that substitution of machines for tasks previously p e r f o r m e db ys e m i - s k i l l e d workers, or outsourcing
and oﬀshoring of their tasks, may necessitate signiﬁcant organizational changes. One might reinterpret
the changes in equilibrium threshold tasks in our model as corresponding to a form of organizational
change. One might alternatively take the perspective that organizational change will take place in
a more discontinuous manner and will involve changes in several dimensions of the organization of
production (managerial and job practices, the allocation of authority within the organization, the
form of communication, and the nature of responsibility systems). In addition, organizational change
might also create tasks, demanding both low and high skill labor inputs, that were not previously
present, exerting another force towards polarization. These considerations suggest that the two-way
81interaction between these organizational changes and the allocation of tasks to diﬀerent skill groups
and technologies is an important area for theoretical and empirical study.
Labor market imperfections: The framework proposed here crucially depends on competitive
labor markets, where each worker is paid the value of his or her marginal product. In reality, many
frictions–some related to information and search and others resulting from collective bargaining,
social norms, ﬁring costs and minimum wage legislation–create a wedge between wages and marginal
products. The allocation of skills to tasks is more complex in the presence of such labor market
imperfections. Moreover, some of these imperfections might directly aﬀect the choice of thresholds
tasks. The implications of diﬀerent types of technical change are potentially quite diﬀerent in the
presence of labor market imperfections, and may in particular depend on the exact form of these
frictions. Further work tractably integrating various forms of labor market imperfections within a
framework that incorporates the endogenous allocation of skills to tasks appears to be another fruitful
area for research.
T h er o l eo fl a b o rm a r k e ti n s t i t u t i o n s :Closely related to labor market imperfections, a per-
spective that emphasizes the importance of tasks also calls for additional study of the role of labor
market institutions in the changes in employment and inequality in recent decades. Certain work
practices, such as collective bargaining and unionized workplace arrangements, might have greater
impact on the earnings distribution because of the way they impact the assignment of tasks to labor
or capital. These institutions may restrict the substitution of machines for certain tasks previously
performed by workers, particularly in the case of labor unions. Additionally, even if the substitution of
machines for labor is not fully impeded, it may occur more slowly than otherwise due to the inﬂuence
of these institutions. If this force raises the opportunity cost of union membership for some subset of
workers (for example, by depressing the return to skill), it may undermine union coalitions, leading to
an ampliﬁed impact on employment and wages (e.g., Acemoglu, Aghion and Violente, 2001). Richer
and empirically more important forms of two-way interactions between technology and unions and
other workplace arrangements are another fruitful area for future research.
Cross-country trends: We have shown that changes in the occupation of distribution are sur-
prisingly comparable across a sizable set of advanced economies. This fact not withstanding, changes
in the earnings distribution have been quite diﬀerent in diﬀerent countries (e.g., Davis, 1992; Blau
and Kahn, 1996; Card, Kramarz and Lemieux, 1996; Katz and Autor, 1999; Card and Lemieux,
2001; Atkinson, 2008; Dustmann, Ludsteck and Schönberg, 2009; Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2010;
Boudarbat, Lemieux and Riddell, 2010). One interpretation of these facts is that while many advanced
countries have experienced similar technological forces that have altered occupational structures, the
manner in which their labor markets (in particular their wage schedules) has responded to them have
82been far from identical. As of yet, there is no satisfactory understanding of the root causes of these
diﬀerences. One possibility is that the adoption of new technologies either replacing or complement-
ing workers in certain tasks requires up-front ﬁxed investments and the incentives for adopting these
technologies are not only aﬀected by labor supply and demand, but also by existing regulations. It
is then possible that ﬁrms select diﬀerent technologies in diﬀerent countries in accordance with these
constraints, and this may aﬀect the evolution of real wages for various skill groups. For example,
Acemoglu (2001) suggests a model in which institutionally-imposed wage compression encourages the
adoption of technologies that increase the productivity of low-skill workers and thus slows demand
shifts against these skill groups.
Changes in male-female and white-nonwhite wage diﬀerentials: Our empirical analysis
highlighted the substantial diﬀerences in the evolution of employment and earnings between men and
women. The framework and data both suggest that the comparatively poor labor market performance
of males may in part be due to the fact that men were more heavily represented in middle skill produc-
tion occupations that were undercut by automation and oﬀshoring.80 A similar contrast might exist
between white and nonwhite workers. Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991) provided an early attempt
to explain the diﬀerential evolution of earnings and employment by race and gender as a result of
skill biased demand shifts. A similar comprehensive exercise, with a richer conception of technology
potentially rooted in a task-based approach, is a logical next step to obtain a more complete under-
standing of the recent changes in the distribution of employment and earnings among minority and
non-minority groups.
The importance of service occupations: Our framework highlights why recent technical
change might have increased employment in service occupations. The idea here is related to Baumol’s
classic argument, where the demand for labor from sectors experiencing slower technical advances
might be greater if there is suﬃcient complementarity between the goods and services that they and
more rapidly growing sectors produce (Baumol, 1967; see also, Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2007, Pis-
sarides and Ngai, 2007, and Autor and Dorn, 2009, 2010). Our framework captures this phenomenon
to some degree, but because of the unit elasticity of substitution across all tasks, the extent of this
eﬀect is limited. A somewhat diﬀerent variant of our framework may be necessary to better capture
the evolution of the demand for services during the past several decades.
80We should caveat, however, that female workers have also been substantially displaced over the last two decades
from a diﬀerent set of middle skill tasks (in particular, administrative support and clerical jobs), without seemingly
experiencing the adverse wage and employment consequences observed among men.
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7D a t a A p p e n d i x
May/Outgoing Rotation Groups Current Population Survey
Wages are calculated using May/ORG CPS data for earnings years 1973—2009, for all workers ages
16-64, who are not in the military, institutionalized or self-employed. Wages are weighted by CPS
sample weights. Hourly wages are equal to the logarithm of reported hourly earnings for those paid by
the hour and the logarithm of usual weekly earnings divided by hours worked last week for non-hourly
workers. Top-coded earnings observations are multiplied by 1.5. Hourly earners of below $1.675/hour
in 1982 dollars ($3.41/hour in 2008 dollars) are dropped, as are hourly wages exceeding 1/35th the
top-coded value of weekly earnings. All earnings are deﬂated by the chain-weighted (implicit) price
deﬂator for personal consumption expenditures (PCE). Allocated earnings observations are excluded
in all years, except where allocation ﬂags are unavailable (January 1994 to August 1995).
March Current Population Survey
Wages are calculated using March CPS data for earnings years 1963—2008, for full-time, full-year
workers ages 16-64, excluding those who are in the military or self-employed. Full-time, full-year
workers are those who usually worked 35 or more hours per week and worked forty or more weeks
in the previous year. Weekly earnings are calculated as the logarithm of annual earnings divided by
weeks worked. Calculations are weighted by CPS sampling weights and are deﬂated using the personal
consumption expenditure (PCE) deﬂator. Earnings of below $67/week in 1982 dollars ($136/week in
2008 dollars) are dropped. Allocated earnings observations are excluded in earnings years 1967 forward
using either family earnings allocation ﬂags (1967—1974) or individual earnings allocation ﬂags (1975
earnings year forward).
Census/American Community Survey
Census Integrated Public Use Micro Samples for years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and
American Community Survey for 2008 are used in this paper. All Census samples are 5% of the
population, excluding 1970, which is 1% of the population. Wages are calculated for full-time, full-year
workers ages 16-64, excluding those who are in the military, institutionalized or self-employed. Weekly
earnings are calculated as the logarithm of annual earnings divided by weeks worked. Calculations are
92weighted by Census sampling weights and are deﬂated using the personal consumption expenditure
(PCE) deﬂator.
Education categories used for the May/ORG and March CPS ﬁles and Census/ACS ﬁles are
equivalent to those employed by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), based on the consistent classiﬁcation
system proposed by Jaeger (1997).
Dictionary of Occupational Titles
The U.S. Labor Department’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) task measures used in this
paper follow the construction of Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006), who collapse Autor, Levy and Mur-
nane’s (2003) original ﬁve task measures into three categories: routine, manual and abstract. Routine
corresponds to a simple average of two DOT measures: “set limits, tolerances and standards,” and
“ﬁnger dexterity.” Manual corresponds to the DOT measure “eye-hand-foot coordination”. Abstract
is the simple average of two DOT measures: “direction, control and planning” and “GED math.”
DOT task measures are converted from their original 14,000 detailed occupations to 326 consistent
occupations, which allow for merging with CPS and Census data ﬁles.
O*NET
O * N E Tt a s km e a s u r e su s e di nt h i sp a p e ra r ec o m posite measures of O*NET Work Activities and




4.A.4.a.1 Interpreting information for others
Non-routine cognitive: Interpersonal
4.A.4.a.4 Establishing and maintaining personal relationships
4.A.4.b.4 Guiding, directing and motivating subordinates
4.A.4.b.5 Coaching/developing others
Routine cognitive
4.C.3.b.7 Importance of repeating the same tasks
4.C.3.b.4 Importance of being exact or accurate
4.C.3.b.8 Structured v. Unstructured work (reverse)
Routine manual
4.C.3.d.3 Pace determined by speed of equipment
4.A.3.a.3 Controlling machines and processes
4.C.2.d.1.i Spend time making repetitive motions
93Non-routine manual physical
4.A.3.a.4 Operating vehicles, mechanized devices, or equipment




4.C.1.a.2.l Face to face discussions (reverse)
4.A.4.a.5 Assisting and Caring for Others (reverse)
4.A.4.a.8 Performing for or Working Directly with the Public (reverse)
4.A.1.b.2 Inspecting Equipment, Structures, or Material (reverse)
4.A.3.a.2 Handling and Moving Objects (reverse)
4.A.3.b.4 0.5*Repairing and Maintaining Mechanical Equipment (reverse)
4.A.3.b.5 0.5*Repairing and Maintaining Electronic Equipment (reverse)
O*NET scales are created using the O*NET-SOC occupational classiﬁcation scheme, which we
collapse into SOC occupations. Each scale is then standardized to have mean zero and standard devi-
ation one, using labor supply weights from the pooled 2005/6/7 Occupational Employment Statistics
(OES) Survey, one of the few large surveys that uses the SOC occupational classiﬁcation system. The
composite task measures listed above are equal to the summation of their respective constituent scales,
then standardized to mean zero and standard deviation one. In order to merge the composite task
measures with the Census data, the task measures are collapsed to the Census 2000 occupational code
level, using the OES Survey labor supply weights and then collapsed to the 326 consistent occupations
as detailed in Autor and Dorn (2010), using Census 2000 labor supply weights.
Theoretical Appendix: Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Proposition 5























−  () (42)
94where recall that  () ≡ ln () − ln () and  () ≡ ln () − ln () are both strictly






































 for the ﬁrst and second
derivatives of Γ. The arguments so far immediately imply that Γ0
  0, Γ0
  0 and Γ1
  0 and
Γ2
  0. Now rewriting (32) and (33) substituting for these, we again have a two-equation system in
 and  characterizing the equilibrium. It is given by
























− ln( − )+l n( 1− )=0 
and
























+l n(  − ) − ln()=0 
Let us evaluate the Jacobian of this system at an equilibrium. Following similar steps to those we













































  0, Γ0
  0, Γ1
  0 and Γ2
  0, the diagonal elements of this matrix are always negative.
In addition, we verify that the determinant of this matrix is also always positive. In particular,






































































































































































All four lines of the last expression are positive, and thus so is ∆. This implies that the Jacobian is
everywhere a P-matrix, and from Simsek, Ozdaglar and Acemoglu (2007), it follows that there exists
a unique equilibrium.
Moreover, given that the determinant is everywhere positive, comparative static results are similar
to those of the equilibrium with ﬁxed supplies. For example, an increase in  will reduce  and
increase  and  as before, but also it will increase . Similarly, if new machines
replace tasks previously performed by middle skills, this will increase  and reduce ,a s
workers previously performing middle skill tasks are reallocated to low and high skills. In addition,
there will now be a supply response, and workers previously supplying their middle skills will shift to
supplying either low or high skills. In particular, if the relevant margin of substitution in the supply
side is between middle and low, many of these workers will start supplying low skills to the market,
leading to an expansion of low skill tasks.
961963-  1972- 1979- 1989- 1999- 1963-
1972 1979 1989 1999 2008 2008
All 21.1 -1.7 -1.7 2.7 -0.3 20.1
Males 23.4 -2.8 -6.6 0.5 -1.2 13.3
Females 18.1 -0.2 4.9 5.8 1.0 29.6
Education (years)
0-11
Men  20.4 -1.5 -13.4 -7.4 -3.1 -5.1
Women 16.2 2.1 -2.7 0.2 -2.8 13.0
12
Men  22.2 -0.7 -10.3 -2.1 -2.9 6.2
Women 17.3 0.7 1.9 3.7 1.8 25.4
13-15
Men  20.9 -3.7 -5.8 2.8 -1.8 12.4
Women 18.7 1.0 5.8 6.4 1.0 33.0
16+
Men  30.6 -6.3 4.9 9.5 3.6 42.2
Women 20.1 -5.0 14.6 12.8 2.5 44.9
16-17  
Men  28.0 -7.4 3.3 7.4 2.2 33.4
Women 18.7 -5.7 15.6 10.7 2.1 41.4
18+
Men  36.0 -4.2 8.0 13.7 6.6 60.1
Women 23.7 -3.3 11.9 18.4 3.7 54.4
Source: March CPS data for earnings years 1963-2008. See note to Figure 1.
Table 1a. Changes in Real, Composition-Adjusted Log Weekly wages for Full-Time, Full-
Year Workers, 1963 - 2008: By Educational Category and Sex 
(100 x Change in Mean Log Real Weekly Wages)1963-  1972- 1979- 1989- 1999- 1963-
1972 1979 1989 1999 2008 2008
Experience 
5  years
Men 20.8 -5.1 -10.0 4.7 -2.6 7.8
Women 18.9 -2.3 -0.6 5.6 -0.9 20.6
25-35 years
Men 25.0 -0.9 -3.4 -2.1 -2.4 16.3
Women 17.2 2.1 8.5 5.4 1.7 34.8
Education and Experience 
Education 12
Experience 5
Men 23.2 -3.1 -19.1 2.2 -4.4 -1.1
Women 17.3 -1.8 -6.3 3.2 0.5 12.8
Experience 25 - 35
Men 20.5 1.6 -4.3 -4.2 -3.5 10.1
Women 16.9 2.7 6.4 5.2 1.8 33.0
Education 16+
Experience 5
Men 23.1 -11.6 8.6 10.4 0.6 31.2
Women 20.5 -5.6 14.7 9.3 -0.8 38.0
Experience 25 - 35
Men 35.5 -0.1 4.4 6.8 2.9 49.6
Women 18.6 -2.3 12.7 14.5 4.2 47.6
Source: March CPS data for earnings years 1963-2008. See note to Figure 1.
Table 1b. Changes in Real, Composition-Adjusted Log Weekly wages for Full-Time, Full-
Year Workers, 1963 - 2008: By Experience and Educational Category, by Sex 
(100 x Change in Mean Log Real Weekly Wages)1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 2007
Managers 8.9 8.5 9.8 11.8 14.1 14.4
Professionals 8.6 10.7 11.7 13.4 14.9 15.7
Technicians 2.2 2.6 3.1 3.6 3.6 3.5
Sales 8.3 8.3 10.0 11.9 11.3 11.4
Office and admin 15.1 18.1 17.3 16.6 15.3 14.0
Production, craft and repair 13.8 12.7 12.7 11.1 11.2 10.1
Operators, fabricators and laborers 24.7 22.6 19.2 15.6 13.0 11.9
Protective service 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.2
Food prep, buildings and grounds, cleaning 4.8 6.0 7.4 7.6 7.5 8.8
Personal care and personal services 6.7 6.6 5.0 4.9 5.9 6.8
Managers 47.9 67.3 60.9 67.5 80.8 88.5
Professionals 27.4 54.1 49.3 62.9 72.2 75.5
Technicians 16.5 33.5 34.3 45.6 64.3 68.5
Sales -6.2 10.5 9.8 20.5 28.3 27.9
Office and admin -6.5 7.6 7.1 13.8 19.3 17.5
Production, craft and repair 23.1 41.1 42.3 42.1 43.1 39.9
Operators, fabricators and laborers -4.7 11.1 15.7 15.1 22.5 17.3
Protective service 15.3 41.4 34.3 40.6 49.1 50.3
Food prep, buildings and grounds, cleaning -54.7 -31.5 -29.5 -23.1 -15.3 -22.0
Personal care and personal services -76.9 -46.7 -29.2 -18.8 -5.8 -10.4
1973 1979 1989 1999 2007 2009
Managers 36.8 33.7 39.4 49.9 58.7 60.7
Professionals 33.0 31.8 38.4 49.7 54.1 56.4
Technicians 15.3 13.7 23.9 27.7 53.6 52.5
Sales -18.9 -17.4 -18.5 -4.2 -0.3 -1.1
Office and admin -8.8 -9.8 -10.8 -5.8 -1.1 1.6
Production, craft and repair 21.9 21.3 14.7 19.0 18.3 21.6
Operators, fabricators and laborers -7.5 -5.7 -16.1 -11.7 -6.1 -2.0
Protective service 8.4 5.7 3.3 13.0 25.9 23.2
Food prep, buildings and grounds, cleaning -49.0 -49.2 -55.2 -44.8 -39.6 -38.3
Personal care and personal services -44.1 -39.3 -43.5 -31.4 -23.7 -22.7
Source: Census IPUMS 5 percent samples for years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and Census American 
Community Survey for 2008. May/ORG CPS data for earnings years 1973-2009. Labor supply is calculated using all 
persons ages 16-64 who reported having worked at least one week in the earnings years, excluding those in the 
military.Occupations are first converted from their respective scheme into 326 occupation groups consistent over the 
given time period. All non-military, non-agriculture occupations are assigned to one of ten broad occupations 
presented in the table. 
Table 2. Employment and Wages in Ten Broad Occupations, 1959-2007
A. Employment Shares
B. 100*Log Weekly Full-Time, Full-Year Wages 
Relative to the 1959 Mean
C. 100*Log Hourly Wages (May/ORG) 
Relative to the 1973 Mean 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 2007
All
Professional, Managerial, Technical 20.9 22.4 25.1 29.4 33.0 34.0
Clerical, Sales 24.9 27.2 27.9 29.0 26.9 25.7
Production, Operators 40.8 36.3 32.8 27.1 24.5 22.3
Service 13.4 14.0 14.2 14.5 15.6 18.0
Males
Professional, Managerial, Technical 22.9 25.2 26.2 28.4 31.3 31.5
Clerical, Sales 15.4 15.7 16.0 18.2 17.7 17.6
Production, Operators 54.0 49.7 47.3 41.4 38.3 36.1
Service 7.7 9.4 10.5 12.0 12.8 14.9
Females
Professional, Managerial, Technical 17.4 18.6 23.8 30.5 34.9 36.8
Clerical, Sales 41.0 43.3 42.6 41.0 37.1 34.6
Production, Operators 18.4 17.6 14.8 11.2 9.4 7.1
Service 23.2 20.5 18.8 17.2 18.6 21.4
Table 3a. Employment Shares in Four Broad Occupational Categories (%), 1959 - 2007
Source: Census IPUMS 5 percent samples for years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and Census 
American Community Survey for 2008. See note to Figure 15.Table 3b. Mean Log Full-Time, Full-Year Weekly and All Hourly Earnings in Four Broad 
Occupation Categories, 1959 - 2007 (Census) and 1973 - 2009 (May/ORG) Occupation Categories, 1959 - 2007 (Census) and 1973 - 2009 (May/ORG)
A. 100 x Log Weekly Full-Time, Full-Year Wages  A. 100 x Log Weekly Full-Time, Full-Year Wages 
Relative to 1959 Mean
1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 2007
Relative to 1959 Mean
1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 2007
All
Professional, Managerial, Technical 34.1 56.3 51.7 62.4 75.0 80.1 Professional, Managerial, Technical 34.1 56.3 51.7 62.4 75.0 80.1
Clerical, Sales -6.4 8.4 8.0 16.4 22.9 21.9 Clerical, Sales -6.4 8.4 8.0 16.4 22.9 21.9
Production, Operators 5.4 22.3 25.7 25.6 31.6 27.2
Service -58.7 -30.7 -22.2 -13.3 -3.0 -8.3 Service -58.7 -30.7 -22.2 -13.3 -3.0 -8.3
Males Males
Professional, Managerial, Technical 31.4 53.4 53.1 62.8 73.4 78.1
Clerical, Sales 1.1 23.3 22.7 25.0 24.9 21.2 Clerical, Sales 1.1 23.3 22.7 25.0 24.9 21.2
Production, Operators -7.0 12.3 16.9 14.7 19.2 13.3
Service -34.7 -13.7 -16.8 -15.0 -6.7 -13.6 Service -34.7 -13.7 -16.8 -15.0 -6.7 -13.6
Females Females
Professional, Managerial, Technical 34.5 61.7 63.2 80.6 95.7 102.1
Clerical, Sales 10.8 25.9 30.5 40.4 49.3 49.0
Professional, Managerial, Technical 34.5 61.7 63.2 80.6 95.7 102.1
Clerical, Sales 10.8 25.9 30.5 40.4 49.3 49.0
Production, Operators 2.7 17.3 24.1 30.7 40.9 37.3 Production, Operators 2.7 17.3 24.1 30.7 40.9 37.3
Service -50.6 -20.2 -2.2 9.3 21.5 17.3
B. 100*Log Hourly Wages Relative to 1973 Mean
1973 1979 1989 1999 2007 2009 1973 1979 1989 1999 2007 2009
All
Professional, Managerial, Technical 32.8 30.6 37.0 47.4 56.0 57.8 Professional, Managerial, Technical 32.8 30.6 37.0 47.4 56.0 57.8
Clerical, Sales -11.6 -11.9 -13.8 -5.1 -0.8 0.5
Production, Operators 3.0 4.4 -3.8 0.7 5.4 8.9 Production, Operators 3.0 4.4 -3.8 0.7 5.4 8.9
Service -40.5 -39.4 -43.7 -32.4 -24.9 -24.3 Service -40.5 -39.4 -43.7 -32.4 -24.9 -24.3
Males
Professional, Managerial, Technical 16.0 12.1 12.3 17.2 26.4 28.7 Professional, Managerial, Technical 16.0 12.1 12.3 17.2 26.4 28.7
Clerical, Sales -6.8 -6.9 -12.4 -11.0 -8.6 -9.6 Clerical, Sales -6.8 -6.9 -12.4 -11.0 -8.6 -9.6
Production, Operators -5.9 -0.8 -13.7 -7.9 -7.0 -8.8
Service -28.6 -31.8 -36.3 -32.3 -22.7 -23.9 Service -28.6 -31.8 -36.3 -32.3 -22.7 -23.9
Females Females
Professional, Managerial, Technical 30.2 28.4 32.7 41.4 50.9 51.5
Clerical, Sales -3.0 2.9 3.9 13.2 17.0 16.2 Clerical, Sales -3.0 2.9 3.9 13.2 17.0 16.2
Production, Operators -4.4 2.4 -1.4 9.5 12.9 20.7
Service -19.9 -11.4 -12.8 -6.0 7.9 6.4
Production, Operators -4.4 2.4 -1.4 9.5 12.9 20.7
Service -19.9 -11.4 -12.8 -6.0 7.9 6.4
Source: Census IPUMS 5 percent samples for years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and Census  Source: Census IPUMS 5 percent samples for years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and Census 
American Community Survey for 2008. May/ORG CPS data for earnings years 1973-2009. See note to 
Figure 15.  Figure 15. All
Managers 8.5 25.2 27.9 27.3 11.1
Professionals 3.1 8.5 20.7 36.6 31.1
Technicians 7.1 25.6 42.7 17.1 7.6
Sales 19.3 34.3 30.3 13.5 2.6
Office and admin 11.1 46.4 33.1 7.7 1.7
Production, craft and repair 31.2 43.5 20.1 4.2 1.0
Operators, fabricators and laborers 42.3 40.3 15.0 1.9 0.5
Protective service 17.6 34.0 37.0 9.1 2.3
Food prep, buildings and grounds, cleaning 45.0 30.5 21.2 2.5 0.7
Personal care and personal services 35.4 36.3 23.2 4.0 1.2
All
Professional, Managerial, Technical 5.8 17.3 26.3 30.5 20.2
Clerical, Sales 14.1 42.0 32.1 9.8 2.0
Production, Operators 37.9 41.5 17.1 2.8 0.7
Service 38.6 33.0 23.6 3.8 1.1
Males
Professional, Managerial, Technical 5.9 15.9 24.5 29.7 24.1
Clerical, Sales 14.9 30.6 33.2 17.2 4.1
Production, Operators 36.2 41.4 18.5 3.1 0.7
Service 37.8 28.2 27.3 5.0 1.7
Females
Professional, Managerial, Technical 5.7 19.2 28.7 31.4 14.9
Clerical, Sales 13.7 47.3 31.5 6.4 1.1
Production, Operators 44.3 42.1 11.4 1.8 0.4
Service 39.1 36.3 21.1 2.9 0.6
Source: Census IPUMS 5 percent samples for years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, and Census American 
Community Survey for 2008. See note to Table 3.
A. Ten Occupations
B. Four Occupations











1.22 -0.27 -0.49 -0.67
(0.35) (0.16) (0.18) (0.02)
1.21 -0.29 -0.36 -0.91
(0.02) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
1.05 -0.37 -0.36 -0.40
(0.13) (0.18) (0.11) (0.04)
Routine Cognitive and Manual
-0.44 0.31 0.35 -0.71
(0) (0.71) (0.07) (0.02)
-0.34 0.49 0.13 -0.61
(0.09) (0.48) (0.11) (0)
-0.88 -0.47 0.98 0.03
(0.05) (0.08) (0.16) (0.04)
Non-routine manual
-0.25 -0.77 0.60 0.46
(0.2) (0.07) (0.24) (0.31)
-0.81 -0.58 0.97 0.15
(0) (0.2) (0.29) (0.26)
Offshorability
0.23 0.64 -0.55 -0.34
(0.36) (0.12) (0.38) (0.22)
# of Detailed Occupations 106 51 127 34
Table 5a. Means and Standard Deviations of DOT and O*NET Task Measures for 
Four Broad Occupational Groups in 1979 Census















Source: O*Net and DOT. Task measures are constructed according to the procedure in the 











0.10 -0.43 -0.16 0.19 0.95 1.15 -0.14 -0.54 -0.27 -0.05 0.44 0.76
(0.91) (0.61) (0.76) (0.92) (0.89) (0.66) (0.74) (0.58) (0.69) (0.75) (0.71) (0.59)
0.09 -0.44 -0.14 0.17 0.81 1.20 -0.10 -0.70 -0.29 0.03 0.82 1.15
(0.82) (0.62) (0.67) (0.77) (0.69) (0.57) (0.83) (0.63) (0.62) (0.76) (0.78) (0.6)
0.04 -0.37 -0.15 0.11 0.64 0.92 -0.05 -0.43 -0.28 0.01 0.79 1.08
(0.77) (0.58) (0.68) (0.77) (0.72) (0.62) (0.79) (0.53) (0.62) (0.8) (0.88) (0.67)
Routine Cognitive and Manual
-0.08 0.05 0.07 -0.11 -0.39 -0.58 0.14 0.02 0.33 0.32 -0.35 -0.70
(0.66) (0.6) (0.69) (0.74) (0.55) (0.44) (0.75) (0.66) (0.73) (0.76) (0.72) (0.57)
-0.12 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.31 -0.63 0.21 0.05 0.40 0.38 -0.22 -0.64
(0.58) (0.59) (0.58) (0.6) (0.52) (0.43) (0.67) (0.64) (0.64) (0.6) (0.68) (0.51)
0.12 0.66 0.42 -0.04 -0.71 -0.95 -0.20 0.39 -0.12 -0.36 -0.80 -1.02
(0.89) (0.65) (0.8) (0.84) (0.65) (0.48) (0.73) (0.78) (0.7) (0.5) (0.49) (0.4)
Non-routine manual
0.18 0.52 0.33 0.06 -0.30 -0.33 -0.29 -0.03 -0.42 -0.39 -0.14 -0.13
(0.64) (0.51) (0.63) (0.69) (0.54) (0.35) (0.52) (0.5) (0.51) (0.56) (0.54) (0.36)
0.26 0.78 0.57 0.13 -0.61 -0.81 -0.42 -0.01 -0.38 -0.51 -0.84 -0.99
(0.87) (0.64) (0.76) (0.84) (0.63) (0.47) (0.54) (0.5) (0.55) (0.46) (0.37) (0.34)
Offshorability
-0.17 -0.40 -0.37 -0.12 0.39 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.37 0.19 0.10 0.07
(0.64) (0.44) (0.63) (0.74) (0.59) (0.35) (0.59) (0.4) (0.59) (0.8) (0.58) (0.32)
Source: O*Net and DOT. Task measures are constructed according to the procedure in the Data Appendix. Task measures means are 
calculated in 1979 for four broad occupation categories and by education group/gender.






































College All1959- 1969- 1979- 1989- 1999- 1959- 1979-
1969 1979 1989 1999 2007 1979 2007
Professional, Managerial, and Technical Occs (Non-Routine Cognitive)
Total ∆ 2.21 1.06 2.14 2.92 0.18 1.63 2.28
Industry ∆ 1.81 0.90 0.49 0.80 0.13 1.35 0.61
Occupation ∆ 0.40 0.16 1.65 2.12 0.05 0.28 1.68
Clerical, Administrative, and Sales Occs (Routine Cognitive)
Total ∆ 0.26 0.29 2.23 -0.56 -0.07 0.28 0.95
Industry ∆ 0.23 0.05 0.72 -0.16 -0.03 0.14 0.31
Occupation ∆ 0.03 0.25 1.51 -0.40 -0.05 0.14 0.63
Production, Craft, Repair and Operative Occs (Routine Manual)
Total ∆ -4.21 -2.41 -5.92 -3.10 -2.22 -3.31 -5.10
Industry ∆ -2.59 -1.28 -1.89 -0.70 -0.81 -1.94 -1.56
Occupation ∆ -1.62 -1.13 -4.03 -2.39 -1.41 -1.37 -3.54
Service Occupations (Non-Routine Manual)
Total ∆ 1.74 1.06 1.55 0.74 2.11 1.40 1.88
Industry ∆ 0.55 0.33 0.68 0.06 0.70 0.44 0.64
Occupation ∆ 1.19 0.72 0.87 0.68 1.41 0.96 1.24
Professional, Managerial, and Technical Occs (Non-Routine Cognitive)
Total ∆ 1.23 5.19 6.70 4.34 1.90 3.21 5.86
Industry ∆ 3.13 1.40 1.10 1.61 0.60 2.27 1.40
Occupation ∆ -1.91 3.79 5.60 2.73 1.30 0.94 4.46
Clerical, Administrative, and Sales Occs (Routine Cognitive)
Total ∆ 2.32 -0.73 -1.55 -3.95 -2.42 0.79 -3.18
Industry ∆ 0.85 2.07 0.63 -0.55 -0.30 1.46 0.02
Occupation ∆ 1.46 -2.80 -2.18 -3.40 -2.12 -0.67 -3.20
Production, Craft, Repair and Operative Occs (Routine Manual)
Total ∆ -0.75 -2.79 -3.57 -1.81 -2.29 -1.77 -3.40
Industry ∆ -2.11 -1.95 -2.27 -1.36 -1.48 -2.03 -2.25
Occupation ∆ 1.36 -0.83 -1.30 -0.44 -0.81 0.26 -1.15
Service Occupations (Non-Routine Manual)
Total ∆ -2.79 -1.68 -1.59 1.41 2.81 -2.23 0.72
Industry ∆ -1.88 -1.51 0.54 0.30 1.18 -1.70 0.83
Occupation ∆ -0.91 -0.16 -2.12 1.11 1.63 -0.54 -0.11
Source data Census IPUMS 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000, and American Community 
Survey 2008. Each set of three rows presents the change in the share of national 
employment (in percentage points) in the designated occupational category and time 
interval and decomposes this change into between and within-industry components. The 
decomposition uses 10 occupation and 11 industry groups that are harmonized for the full 
sample interval. See text for additional details.
Table 6. Decomposition of Changes in the Share of Employment in Four Occupational 
Categories by Decade (Percentage Points) due to Changes in Industry Shares and 
Changes in Occupational Shares within Industries, 1959 - 2007. 
A. Males
B. Females
Changes by Decade (Decadal Means)
Long Changes1959 0.027 0.126 0.128 0.118 0.119
1969 0.035 0.126 0.129 0.116 0.116
1979 0.026 0.093 0.095 0.082 0.083
1989 0.055 0.168 0.172 0.152 0.152
1999 0.066 0.190 0.193 0.171 0.171
2007 0.079 0.236 0.239 0.212 0.212
1959 0.025 0.224 0.225 0.194 0.198
1969 0.003 0.188 0.188 0.156 0.157
1979 0.000 0.142 0.142 0.115 0.115
1989 0.001 0.200 0.202 0.155 0.162
1999 0.001 0.216 0.217 0.173 0.180
2007 0.000 0.249 0.250 0.205 0.214
A. Males
B. Females
Table 7. Partial R-Squared Values of DOT and O*NET Task and Offshorability Measures,









DOT Tasks + 
Offshorability
Source: O*Net, DOT and Census IPUMS 5 percent samples for years 1980, 1990, and 
2000, and Census American Community Survey for 2008. See note to Figure 20.1963-1987
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.612 -0.339 -0.644 -0.562 -0.556
(0.128) (0.043) (0.066) (0.112) (0.094)
Time 0.027 0.016 0.028 0.029 0.020









Constant -0.217 0.059 -0.254 -0.189 -0.145
(0.134) (0.039) (0.066) (0.122) (0.103)
Observations 25 46 46 46 46
R-squared 0.558 0.935 0.961 0.941 0.960






Source: March CPS data for earnings years 1963-2008. See notes to Figures 2 and 
21. All 0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39
-0.272 -0.441 -0.349 0.109 -0.085
(0.025) (0.136) (0.095) (0.079) (0.099)
-0.553 -0.668 -0.428 -0.343 -0.407
(0.082) (0.209) (0.142) (0.138) (0.141)
Time 0.027 0.035 0.016 0.015 0.020
(0.004) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Time
2/100 -0.010 -0.023 0.007 0.001 -0.008
(0.004) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Constant -0.056 -0.118 0.120 0.138 0.018
(0.085) (0.212) (0.169) (0.145) (0.144)
Observations 184 46 46 46 46
R-squared 0.885 0.885 0.959 0.929 0.771
Potential Experience Groups (Years)
Own Minus 
Aggregate Supply
Table 9. Regression Models for the College/High-School Log Wage 
Gap by Potential Experience Group, 1963-2008
Aggregate Supply
Source: March CPS data for earnings years 1963-2008. See notes to Figures 2 
and 21. (1) (2) (1) (2)
Abstract Occupation Share
1959 share x 1959-1969 time dummy 0.021 0.033 0.146 0.159
(0.044) (0.104) (0.041) (0.081)
1959 share x 1969-1979 time dummy -0.129 -0.123 -0.054 -0.032
(0.044) (0.105) (0.036) (0.079)
1959 share x 1979-1989 time dummy 0.409 0.407 0.143 0.174
(0.046) (0.106) (0.033) (0.079)
1959 share x 1989-1999 time dummy 0.065 0.060 0.070 0.107
(0.049) (0.109) (0.033) (0.079)
1959 share x 1999-2007 time dummy 0.198 0.194 0.075 0.113
(0.051) (0.11) (0.033) (0.08)
Service Occupation Share
1959 share x 1959-1969 time dummy -0.836 -1.014 0.359 0.404
(0.278) (0.303) (0.064) (0.09)
1959 share x 1969-1979 time dummy -0.879 -0.991 0.304 0.363
(0.295) (0.316) (0.065) (0.091)
1959 share x 1979-1989 time dummy 1.007 0.917 -0.143 -0.060
(0.332) (0.349) (0.074) (0.096)
1959 share x 1989-1999 time dummy 0.202 0.143 0.117 0.221
(0.378) (0.39) (0.086) (0.104)
1959 share x 1999-2007 time dummy 0.229 0.212 -0.056 0.058
(0.398) (0.408) (0.094) (0.109)
Decade Dummies
1959-1969  0.274 0.274 0.120 0.046
(0.031) (0.037) (0.021) (0.032)
1969-1979  0.084 0.085 -0.083 -0.163
(0.033) (0.038) (0.02) (0.033)
1979-1989  -0.287 -0.283 -0.011 -0.099
(0.036) (0.041) (0.021) (0.034)
1989-1999  -0.002 0.002 0.061 -0.035
(0.039) (0.045) (0.022) (0.035)
1999-2007  -0.157 -0.157 -0.073 -0.171
(0.041) (0.046) (0.024) (0.036)
No Yes No   Yes
R-Squared 0.789 0.821 0.793 0.844
N 400 400 400 400
A. Males B. Females
Table 10. OLS Stacked First-Difference Estimates of the Relationship Between Demographic 
Group Occupational Distributions in 1959 and Subsequent Changes in Demographic Groups' 
Mean Log Wages by Decade, 1959 - 2007
Education, age group, and region main 
effects?
Source data Census IPUMS 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000, and American Community 
Survey 2008. Each column presents a separate OLS regression of stacked changes in mean 
log real hourly wages by demographic group and year, where demographic groups are 
defined by sex, education group (high school dropout, high school graduate, some college, 
college degree, post-college degree), age group (25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64), and region of 
residence (Northeast, South, Midwest, West). Models are weighted by the mean start and 
end-year share of employment of each demographic group for each decadal change. 
Occupation shares are calculated for each demographic in 1959 (using the 1960 Census) 
and interacted with decade dummies. Occupations are grouped into three exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive categories: 1) abstract - professional, managerial and technical 
occupations; 2) manual - protective service, food service and cleaning, and personal services 
occupations; 3) routine - clerical, sales, administrative support, production, operative and 
laborer occupations. The routine group is the omitted category in the regression models.Figure	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1963-ﾭ‐2008.	 ﾠLog	 ﾠweekly	 ﾠwages	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfull-ﾭ‐time,	 ﾠfull-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠare	 ﾠregressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠyear	 ﾠon	 ﾠfour	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠdummies	 ﾠ(high	 ﾠschool	 ﾠdropout,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcollege,	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠgraduate,	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠcollege),	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
quartic	 ﾠin	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠdummies	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠquartic,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠrace	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠ(black,	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐white	 ﾠother).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcomposition-ﾭ‐adjusted	 ﾠmean	 ﾠlog	 ﾠwage	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠlog	 ﾠwage	 ﾠevaluated	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhites	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠ experience	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ (5,	 ﾠ 15,	 ﾠ 25,	 ﾠ 35,	 ﾠ 45	 ﾠ years)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ education	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ (high	 ﾠ school	 ﾠ dropout,	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ school	 ﾠ
graduate,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcollege,	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠgraduate,	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠcollege).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmean	 ﾠlog	 ﾠwage	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠand	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠschool	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
weighted	 ﾠ average	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ composition	 ﾠ adjusted	 ﾠ cells	 ﾠ using	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ fixed	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ weights	 ﾠ equal	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ average	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠgroup.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠratio	 ﾠof	 ﾠmean	 ﾠlog	 ﾠwages	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠand	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠschool	 ﾠgraduates	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠyear	 ﾠis	 ﾠ




Source:	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1963-ﾭ‐2008.	 ﾠLabor	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠis	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠusing	 ﾠall	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠages	 ﾠ16-ﾭ‐64	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
reported	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠworked	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠweek	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠexcluding	 ﾠthose	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠare	 ﾠsorted	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
sex-ﾭ‐education-ﾭ‐experience	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsexes	 ﾠ(male/female),	 ﾠfive	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠ(high	 ﾠschool	 ﾠdropout,	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠschool	 ﾠ
graduate,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcollege,	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠgraduate,	 ﾠand	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠcollege)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ49	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠ(0-ﾭ‐48	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ
experience).	 ﾠNumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠby	 ﾠsubtracting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsix	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠage	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠone	 ﾠbegins	 ﾠ
school)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠschooling	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠis	 ﾠadjusted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠwork	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠage	 ﾠ16.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcalculation	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠzero,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠare	 ﾠset	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
equal	 ﾠzero.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcollege/high-ﾭ‐school	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠby	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠis	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠusing	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠunits.	 ﾠ
Efficiency	 ﾠunits	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmean	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠ(including	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠgraduates	 ﾠand	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠcollege)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
high-ﾭ‐school	 ﾠ(including	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠschool	 ﾠdropouts	 ﾠand	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠschool	 ﾠgraduate)	 ﾠcategories,	 ﾠweighted	 ﾠby	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠ
wage	 ﾠweights	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcell.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“some	 ﾠcollege”	 ﾠcategory	 ﾠis	 ﾠdivided	 ﾠequally	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐school	 ﾠcategories.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠweights	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ1963-ﾭ‐2008	 ﾠare	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠwage	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ490	 ﾠcells	 ﾠ(2	 ﾠsexes,	 ﾠ5	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠ49	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠgroups)	 ﾠover	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtime	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreference	 ﾠwage	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠmale	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠschool	 ﾠgraduate	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ10	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ3a	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1963-ﾭ‐2008.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠnote	 ﾠto	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠLog	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ0-ﾭ‐9	 ﾠand	 ﾠ20-ﾭ‐29	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠis	 ﾠplotted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmales	 ﾠand	 ﾠfemales.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ3b	 ﾠ
	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ4a	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1963-ﾭ‐2008.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠnote	 ﾠto	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreal	 ﾠlog	 ﾠweekly	 ﾠwage	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ
group	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠweighted	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠadjusted	 ﾠcells	 ﾠusing	 ﾠa	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠweights	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
average	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠgroup.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ4b	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ5a	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠMay/ORG	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1973-ﾭ‐2009.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠlog	 ﾠhourly	 ﾠwages	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠworkers,	 ﾠexcluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐employed	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary,	 ﾠare	 ﾠregressed	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠquadratic	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ(eight	 ﾠcategories),	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
quartic	 ﾠin	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfemale	 ﾠdummy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfemale	 ﾠdummy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquartic	 ﾠin	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠPredicted	 ﾠ
real	 ﾠlog	 ﾠhourly	 ﾠwages	 ﾠare	 ﾠcomputed	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1973,	 ﾠ1989	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠschooling	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfigure.	 ﾠ
See	 ﾠData	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠon	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠof	 ﾠMay/ORG	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ5b	 ﾠ
	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ6a	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠMay/ORG	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1973-ﾭ‐2009.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠlog	 ﾠhourly	 ﾠwages	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠworkers,	 ﾠexcluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐employed	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary,	 ﾠare	 ﾠregressed	 ﾠon	 ﾠeight	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠdummies,	 ﾠa	 ﾠquartic	 ﾠin	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
female	 ﾠdummy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfemale	 ﾠdummy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquartic	 ﾠin	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠPredicted	 ﾠreal	 ﾠlog	 ﾠhourly	 ﾠwages	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠcomputed	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1973,	 ﾠ1989	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠschooling	 ﾠpresented.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠData	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠof	 ﾠMay/ORG	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ6b	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ7a	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1963-ﾭ‐2008.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ10
th,	 ﾠmedian	 ﾠand	 ﾠ90
th	 ﾠpercentiles	 ﾠof	 ﾠlog	 ﾠweekly	 ﾠ
wages	 ﾠare	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfull-ﾭ‐time,	 ﾠfull-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠworkers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ7b	 ﾠ
	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ7c	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ8a	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠMay/ORG	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1973-ﾭ‐2009.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠare	 ﾠpooled	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthree-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠaverages	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
year	 ﾠ1974	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1973,	 ﾠ1974	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1975).	 ﾠFor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ10
th,	 ﾠmedian	 ﾠand	 ﾠ90
th	 ﾠpercentiles	 ﾠof	 ﾠlog	 ﾠ
weekly	 ﾠwages	 ﾠare	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠworkers,	 ﾠexcluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐employed	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠin	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠoccupations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ8b	 ﾠ
	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ8c	 ﾠ
	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ9a	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠMay/ORG	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1973-ﾭ‐2009.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠare	 ﾠpooled	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthree-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠaverages	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
year	 ﾠ1974	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1973,	 ﾠ1974	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1975).	 ﾠFor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠdenoted	 ﾠtime	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ5
th-ﾭ‐95
th	 ﾠ
percentile	 ﾠof	 ﾠlog	 ﾠweekly	 ﾠwages	 ﾠis	 ﾠcalculated.	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ9b	 ﾠ
	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ9c	 ﾠ
	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ10	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠCensus	 ﾠIPUMS	 ﾠ5	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠsamples	 ﾠfor	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1980,	 ﾠ1990,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠand	 ﾠCensus	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠSurvey	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
2008.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠand	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsamples	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠprior	 ﾠyear’s	 ﾠemployment.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠplots	 ﾠlog	 ﾠ
changes	 ﾠin	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠshares	 ﾠby	 ﾠ1980	 ﾠoccupational	 ﾠskill	 ﾠpercentile	 ﾠrank	 ﾠusing	 ﾠa	 ﾠlocally	 ﾠweighted	 ﾠsmoothing	 ﾠregression	 ﾠ
(bandwidth	 ﾠ0.8	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ100	 ﾠobservations),	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠskill	 ﾠpercentiles	 ﾠare	 ﾠmeasured	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemployment-ﾭ‐weighted	 ﾠpercentile	 ﾠ
rank	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠoccupation’s	 ﾠmean	 ﾠlog	 ﾠwage	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCensus	 ﾠIPUMS	 ﾠ1980	 ﾠ5	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠextract.	 ﾠMean	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠusing	 ﾠworkers’	 ﾠhours	 ﾠof	 ﾠannual	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCensus	 ﾠsampling	 ﾠweights.	 ﾠConsistent	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠ
codes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠCensus	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1980,	 ﾠ1990,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠare	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠAutor	 ﾠand	 ﾠDorn	 ﾠ(2009a).	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ11	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠData	 ﾠon	 ﾠEU	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠare	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠGoos,	 ﾠManning	 ﾠand	 ﾠSalomons,	 ﾠ2009a.	 ﾠUS	 ﾠdata	 ﾠare	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMay/ORG	 ﾠ
CPS	 ﾠfiles	 ﾠfor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1993-ﾭ‐2006.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠall	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠages	 ﾠ16-ﾭ‐64	 ﾠwho	 ﾠreported	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠworked	 ﾠlast	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠ
excluding	 ﾠthose	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠoccupations.	 ﾠOccupations	 ﾠare	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠconverted	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
respective	 ﾠ scheme	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ 326	 ﾠ occupation	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ consistent	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ period.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ occupations	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ then	 ﾠ
grouped	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthree	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠby	 ﾠwage	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ12	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠMay/ORG	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠfiles	 ﾠfor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1979-ﾭ‐2009.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠall	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠages	 ﾠ16-ﾭ‐64	 ﾠwho	 ﾠreported	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠ
worked	 ﾠ last	 ﾠ year,	 ﾠ excluding	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ employed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ military	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ agricultural	 ﾠ occupations.	 ﾠ Occupations	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ
converted	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ326	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠtime	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
military,	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐agriculture	 ﾠoccupations	 ﾠare	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠten	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠoccupations	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfigure.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ13a	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠCensus	 ﾠIPUMS	 ﾠ5	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠsamples	 ﾠfor	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1960,	 ﾠ1970,	 ﾠ1980,	 ﾠ1990,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠand	 ﾠCensus	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠ
Survey	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ 2008.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ persons	 ﾠ ages	 ﾠ 16-ﾭ‐64	 ﾠ who	 ﾠ reported	 ﾠ having	 ﾠ worked	 ﾠ last	 ﾠ year,	 ﾠ excluding	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ
employed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠoccupations.	 ﾠOccupations	 ﾠare	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠconverted	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠ326	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠtime	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐military,	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐agriculture	 ﾠoccupations	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
assigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠfour	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠoccupations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ13b	 ﾠ
	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ13c	 ﾠ
	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ14a	 ﾠ
	 ﾠSource:	 ﾠCensus	 ﾠIPUMS	 ﾠ5	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠsamples	 ﾠfor	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1960,	 ﾠ1970,	 ﾠ1980,	 ﾠ1990,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠand	 ﾠCensus	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠ
Survey	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠnote	 ﾠto	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ15.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠare	 ﾠdivided	 ﾠinto	 ﾠfour	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠcategories:	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠschool	 ﾠdropouts,	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
school	 ﾠgraduates,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠgraduates	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠemployment	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfour	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠ





	 ﾠSource:	 ﾠUS	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠMay/ORG	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1992-ﾭ‐2009.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠall	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠages	 ﾠ16-ﾭ‐64	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
reported	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠworked	 ﾠlast	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠexcluding	 ﾠthose	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠoccupations.	 ﾠOccupations	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠconverted	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ326	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠtime	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠoccupations	 ﾠare	 ﾠthen	 ﾠconsolidated	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeight	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfigure.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠ
share	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoccupation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠEurostat	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ1992-ﾭ‐2008.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠall	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠages	 ﾠ15-ﾭ‐59	 ﾠwho	 ﾠreported	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠworked	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlast	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠexcluding	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠworkers,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠoccupations.	 ﾠOccupations	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
grouped	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeight	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfigure.	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠshares	 ﾠare	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠusing	 ﾠunweighted	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ ten	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ countries:	 ﾠ Denmark,	 ﾠ France,	 ﾠ Germany,	 ﾠ Greece,	 ﾠ Ireland,	 ﾠ Italy,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Netherlands,	 ﾠ




Source:	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠEurostat	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ1992-ﾭ‐2008.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠnote	 ﾠto	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ15.	 ﾠEmployment	 ﾠshares	 ﾠare	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠten	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠindividually,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠunder	 ﾠ40	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠage.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ16b	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ17a	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠCensus	 ﾠIPUMS	 ﾠ5	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠsamples	 ﾠfor	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1960,	 ﾠ1970,	 ﾠ1980,	 ﾠ1990,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠand	 ﾠCensus	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠ
Survey	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠall	 ﾠfull-ﾭ‐time,	 ﾠfull-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠages	 ﾠ16-ﾭ‐64,	 ﾠexcluding	 ﾠthose	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠin	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠoccupations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Linear	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠof	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠattainment.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcompleted	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠgrade,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
years	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠare	 ﾠimputed	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠgender	 ﾠand	 ﾠethnicity.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcompleted	 ﾠan	 ﾠeighth	 ﾠyear	 ﾠof	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠmore,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠare	 ﾠimputed	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ20.5	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠEducation	 ﾠdummies	 ﾠconsist	 ﾠof	 ﾠfive	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠcategories:	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
school	 ﾠdropouts,	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠschool	 ﾠgraduates,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠgraduates,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐college	 ﾠdegree.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Occupations	 ﾠare	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠconverted	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ326	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
period.	 ﾠ From	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ groups,	 ﾠ occupations	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ then	 ﾠ consolidated	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ ten	 ﾠ broad	 ﾠ categories:	 ﾠ Managers;	 ﾠ Professionals;	 ﾠ
Technicians;	 ﾠ Sales;	 ﾠ Office	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ administrative;	 ﾠ Production,	 ﾠ craft	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ repair;	 ﾠ Operators,	 ﾠ fabricators	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ laborers;	 ﾠ
Protective	 ﾠservice;	 ﾠFood	 ﾠprep,	 ﾠbuildings	 ﾠand	 ﾠgrounds,	 ﾠcleaning;	 ﾠand	 ﾠPersonal	 ﾠcare	 ﾠand	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠservices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Industries	 ﾠare	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠconverted	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠ149	 ﾠindustries,	 ﾠas	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠAutor,	 ﾠ
Katz	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Krueger	 ﾠ (1998).	 ﾠ From	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ 149	 ﾠ industries,	 ﾠ ten	 ﾠ broad	 ﾠ industry	 ﾠ categories	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ constructed	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ include:	 ﾠ
Construction;	 ﾠManufacturing;	 ﾠTransport	 ﾠand	 ﾠutilities;	 ﾠWholesale	 ﾠtrade;	 ﾠRetail	 ﾠtrade;	 ﾠFinance,	 ﾠInsurance	 ﾠand	 ﾠReal	 ﾠEstate;	 ﾠ
Business	 ﾠservices;	 ﾠPersonal	 ﾠservices	 ﾠand	 ﾠentertainment;	 ﾠProfessional	 ﾠservices;	 ﾠand	 ﾠPublic	 ﾠadministration.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠpartial	 ﾠr-ﾭ‐squared	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠabove	 ﾠare	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrespective	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠlog	 ﾠweekly	 ﾠwage	 ﾠregressions.	 ﾠLog	 ﾠweekly	 ﾠwages	 ﾠand	 ﾠeach	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠabove	 ﾠare	 ﾠorthogonalized	 ﾠusing	 ﾠa	 ﾠquartic	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠand	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠethnicity	 ﾠdummies.	 ﾠUsing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresiduals	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠeach	 ﾠthese	 ﾠregressions,	 ﾠresidual	 ﾠlog	 ﾠweekly	 ﾠwages	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
regressed	 ﾠseparately	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresiduals	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠr-ﾭ‐squared	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠregression	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠplotted	 ﾠabove	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠregressions	 ﾠare	 ﾠweighted	 ﾠby	 ﾠCensus	 ﾠperson	 ﾠweights.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ17b	 ﾠ
	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ18a	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠCensus	 ﾠIPUMS	 ﾠ5	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠsamples	 ﾠfor	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1960,	 ﾠ1970,	 ﾠ1980,	 ﾠ1990,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠand	 ﾠCensus	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠ
Survey	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠnote	 ﾠto	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ19	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpartial	 ﾠr-ﾭ‐squared	 ﾠcalculation	 ﾠprocedure.	 ﾠFive	 ﾠO*Net	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠtask	 ﾠ
measures,	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠO*Net	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠscores,	 ﾠare	 ﾠutilized:	 ﾠroutine	 ﾠcognitive,	 ﾠroutine	 ﾠ
manual,	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐routine	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠanalytic,	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐routine	 ﾠmanual,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐routine	 ﾠinterpersonal.	 ﾠThree	 ﾠDOT	 ﾠtask	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠutilized,	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠAutor,	 ﾠLevy,	 ﾠMurnane	 ﾠ(2003):	 ﾠabstract,	 ﾠroutine,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmanual.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠData	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ






Source:	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1963-ﾭ‐2008.	 ﾠLog	 ﾠweekly	 ﾠwages	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfull-ﾭ‐time,	 ﾠfull-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠare	 ﾠregressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠyear	 ﾠon	 ﾠfour	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠdummies	 ﾠ(high	 ﾠschool	 ﾠdropout,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcollege,	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠgraduate,	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠcollege),	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
quartic	 ﾠin	 ﾠexperience,	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠdummies	 ﾠand	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠquartic,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠrace	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠ(black,	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐white	 ﾠother).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcomposition-ﾭ‐adjusted	 ﾠmean	 ﾠlog	 ﾠwage	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠlog	 ﾠwage	 ﾠevaluated	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhites	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠ experience	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ (5,	 ﾠ 15,	 ﾠ 25,	 ﾠ 35,	 ﾠ 45	 ﾠ years)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ education	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ (high	 ﾠ school	 ﾠ dropout,	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ school	 ﾠ
graduate,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcollege,	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠgraduate,	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠcollege).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmean	 ﾠlog	 ﾠwage	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠand	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠschool	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
weighted	 ﾠ average	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ composition	 ﾠ adjusted	 ﾠ cells	 ﾠ using	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ fixed	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ weights	 ﾠ equal	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ average	 ﾠ
employment	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠgroup.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠratio	 ﾠof	 ﾠmean	 ﾠlog	 ﾠwages	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠand	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠschool	 ﾠgraduates	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠyear	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
plotted.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠData	 ﾠAppendix	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠon	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠof	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠKatz-ﾭ‐Murphy	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠwage	 ﾠgap	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠregression	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollege/high-ﾭ‐school	 ﾠwage	 ﾠgap	 ﾠon	 ﾠtime	 ﾠtrend	 ﾠterm	 ﾠand	 ﾠlog	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠsupply,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
measured	 ﾠin	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠunits	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnote	 ﾠto	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1963-ﾭ‐1987.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ20	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1963-ﾭ‐2008.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠnote	 ﾠto	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ21.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdetrended	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠand	 ﾠwage	 ﾠseries	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠresiduals	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠOLS	 ﾠregressions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠwage	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠ
time	 ﾠtrend.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ21a	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠCPS	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1963-ﾭ‐2008.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠnote	 ﾠto	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ22.	 ﾠLog	 ﾠcollege/high-ﾭ‐school	 ﾠweekly	 ﾠwage	 ﾠratio	 ﾠ
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